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This work is an intellectual biography of the philosopher Thomas Franklin Green.  It 
follows his intellectual development beginning in his student years in higher education 
and concludes with an examination of his final published works.  The purpose is both to 
essay Green’s contribution to a particular period in education and to offer a careful 
analysis of the springs of his work in order to correct common misperceptions of Green 




This dissertation could have been subtitled “A Biography of a Pragmatist,” 
because a philosopher of education is a general class of scholars whose work may 
suggest praxis but need not be directly concerned with the relationship of theory to 
practice.  By contrast, a pragmatist is a practical empiricist; her criticism or evaluation 
or theory sets out from some particular problem found either among the objects of 
experience or within our social arrangements.  She understands that thought, if it is to 
be fruitful, must connect meaningfully to experience, that it cannot afford to regard the 
every day with contempt.  William James put it pointedly:  
The pragmatic method…is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its 
respective practical consequences.  What difference would it practically make to 
anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?  If no practical difference 
whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, 
and all dispute is idle.1   
 
Thomas Green might have written these words or something very much like them, but I 
have refrained from announcing him as a pragmatist on the title page for a couple of 
reasons. 
 First, Green wished to maintain distance from the ideological conflicts that had 
Balkanized the landscape of educational studies.  He referred to it mockingly as a game 
of king-on-the-mountain:  
One philosopher would set forth his views about the nature of a good education 
and what the schools should do, and then he would seek to gain disciples and 
begin his reign…Among the competing schools, there were realists, pragmatists, 
idealists…and existentialists.  The principals, it seemed to me, were engaged in 
a kind of ideological war, the aim of which was so ill-defined that it would be 
difficult to determine when the victory had been won…Being a peaceful man at 
heart, I was not at all attracted to the enterprise.2   
                                                
1 William James and Giles Gunn (Ed.), Pragmatism and Other Writings  (New York: Penguin Books, 
2000), 25. 
2 Thomas Green, Work, Leisure, and the American Schools  (New York: Random House, 1968), viii. 
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While Green wisely avoided getting shelled in an ideological battle, he could not so 
easily sidestep the fallout.  Some of his colleagues in the field, especially the Deweyans, 
interpreted his cautiousness as a veil concealing anti-progressive views.  It probably did 
little to allay suspicions that he wrote openly of his rootedness in the Reformed 
Christian tradition.  Writing much later, in his preface to Voices, Green attempted to 
restate his position with respect to ideological battle lines:  
[W]ithout exception, to proponents of the various ‘ists’, ‘ites’, and ‘isms’—
modernists, postmodernists, Deweyites, Marxists—I would apply a test of 
common sense and ask whether their doctrine aides in unwrapping the ordinary, 
whether it helps in grasping what I and others know to be true in ordinary 
experience.  Some may find here influences of pragmatism in one or another of 
its various forms.  If that is so, it would not surprise me.  The resemblance 
provides no evidence for the truth of what is argued here or elsewhere.3   
 
 The other reason I have refrained from touting Green as a pragmatist is because 
of the anachronism that such a claim would constitute.  Green came to study philosophy 
through his mentor, O.K. Bouwsma, who was a Kierkegaardian existentialist and 
disciple of Wittgenstein’s new philosophical method, and he credited another 
existentialist philosopher, Maxine Greene, as being first among his influences in the 
philosophical study of education.  His own abiding interest in the relationship between 
personal righteousness and social justice smacks of Kierkegaard.  But to call him an 
existentialist philosopher of education would likewise constitute misnaming; he was 
equally, profoundly influenced by his reading of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, 
Hume, and Mill, among others.  He was not averse to discovering helpful ideas from 
any quarter.  His reading of philosophy was constructive.  So, to the matter of Green’s 
affiliation, one might say, “Don’t call him a pragmatist, but he’s a pragmatist.  Don’t 
                                                
3 Thomas Green, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience  (Notre Dame: The University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1999), x-xi. 
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call him a Wittgensteinian, but he’s a Wittgensteinian.  Don’t call him a Reformed 
Christian existentialist, but you get the point.” 
 In the pages that follow, I have narrated Green’s career from his undergraduate 
years to the final, unfinished articulation of his presiding project—a philosophically 
rigorous understanding of moral education in a pluralistic, democratic society.  This is 
the pragmatic problem that absorbed most of his attention from first to last.  If the 
narrative can be said to pursue a theme, it is how Green single-mindedly and across 
decades worked toward a unique articulation of moral education as a domain of inquiry 
distinct from moral philosophy.  This separation of moral education from moral 
philosophy is adumbrated in his earliest published work and given increasingly fuller 
expression in the 1980s, culminating in the publication of Voices in 1999 and in the 
writing of the unfinished follow-up Walls.   
 In detecting a single project behind the various books and articles written by 
Green, I am departing from the assessment of his longtime friend and colleague, Dr. 
Emily Robertson.  I am also aware of the tremendous burden that such a departure lays 
on my narrative.  I hope I shall have shown sufficient evidence that Green did indeed 
have an early and abiding interest in the project, that it motivated much if not most of 
what he wrote and published.  That, in a very real sense, it was always his endgame, 
however many decades in the making.  To take a brief example, in his first book, Work, 
Leisure, and the American Schools, Green defines “human capacities” as “the exercise 
of judgment, a sense of style, and the practice of a sense of craft.”4  This is strikingly 
similar to his understanding of self-governance in the much later work Voices, and as 
                                                
4 Green, Work, 37. 
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readers of that book will know it is the central concept in Green’s philosophy of moral 
education.   
 The opening chapter will be devoted to Green’s undergraduate experience of life 
at a wartime and postwar university and how the cultural environment of a forward-
looking country and an article by O.K. Bouwsma acted as the dual springs of his 
interest in the philosophical study of education.  Particular attention is given to 
Bouwsma’s article, “Jack and Jill on a Log,” which I suggest is preliminary to Green’s 
project and remained central to his understanding of what it means to do philosophy of 
education.  Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the development of Green’s understanding of the 
relationship of moral education to public institutions.  This is also a time (the middle to 
late 1960s) of considerable professional success following years of—as Green put it—
floundering.  Here, he explicitly connects the problems of moral education to the 
specifically American democratic commitment to social and cultural pluralism.  This is 
an angle on the problem he would pick up forty years later in his unpublished 
manuscript Walls.  Again, we have the opportunity to witness Green at work on a single 
project—a particular aspect of it, anyway—stretched out across decades.   In Chapter 3, 
I also examine the development of “the System,” as Green called it, the rational 
structure within which moral education takes place.  This work resulted in what some 
consider his magnum opus and lasting contribution to Educational Studies, Predicting 
the Behavior of the Educational System.  It is the first of a conceptual trilogy, continued 
in Voices and partially concluded in the unfinished Walls, in which Green intended to 
publish his decades of research in the philosophy of moral education.  More pointedly, 
the trilogy succeeds in defining the philosophy of moral education as a domain of 
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inquiry distinct from moral philosophy.  Green’s project represented something 
genuinely new on the intellectual landscape.  Chapter 4 unpacks the uniqueness of the 
project in relation to other works of and projects in moral education. 
 My aim throughout has been to spark an interest in a philosopher whose work is 
novel, important, and largely forgotten.  If I am also able to convince my readers that 
pragmatism is a broad enough umbrella to cover even an elder of the Presbyterian 
Church, then I will regard that as a happy, if concomitant, effect.  What gets admitted to 
pragmatism if Green is admitted will be a broader understanding of democratic 
pluralism that neither rules out supernatural worldviews—as did John Dewey—nor 
promotes them—as William James did; will draw freely and creatively from the whole 
tradition of Western philosophy from the Ancient Greeks to the postmodernists in 
search of what works for Americans in the here and now; and will be a bit wiser, if 
warier, of the deliverances of reason.  If I am right, then what I have written may be 
considered an examination of a threefold legacy—of a pragmatist philosopher of 
education, of a talented Wittgensteinian, and of a Reformed Christian philosopher of the 
skill and accomplishment, however unacknowledged, of an Alvin Plantinga or a 
Nicholas Wolterstorff.  This is not to say that Green professed any continuity between 
his work and these three philosophical traditions.  He was loath to ally himself in any 
ideological spats, and this meant concealing or leaving unspoken in his published work 
any connection to his influences.  Nevertheless, there are traces and even explicit 
statements of influences in his letters and in prefatory material to some of his books.  I 
have attempted to make these connections obvious.  If there is anything amiss in my 
discussion of Green’s philosophical legacy, then the mistake is my own.  This semi-
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conjectural aspect of the work that follows has been a biographical necessity; because I 
do not believe that a mind in conversation with itself is very interesting I have chosen to 
compare Green’s writings with his most likely influences and philosophical kin. 
 The description “philosopher of education” is shot through with vagary.  For 
example, it must comprehend Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey, and R.S. Peters, 
writers as different in their methods, interests, and understanding of education as a guru, 
a systems analyst, and an epistemologist.  Just as we would not feel we had made much 
headway by describing the latter three as “thinkers,” we should perhaps feel more 
suspicious than we normally do in calling the former three “philosophers of education.”  
Such is the crudeness of our thinking about education.  There are two routes to address 
this problem.  We can engage, as many scholars have, in a metadiscourse about the 
proper scope of the philosophy of education as a field of scholarship, through which we 
attempt to gain universal or broad assent to some particular definition of education and 
agreement on methodologies.  Evidence of the last century leads one to feel dubious 
that any such agreement is forthcoming.  Another route is to accept someone’s claim to 
being a philosopher of education and to explore what that meant to the individual.  This 
has the advantage of being less tiresome than spinning about in the whirlpool of 
metadiscourses, and I would like to suggest that large portions of this work should be 
read as an experiment in “doing” philosophy of education through the writing of 
biography.  In this sense, it is a work that straddles two fields.  I do not think a scholarly 
biography of a philosopher need become less a work of philosophy for its narrative 
ambitions. 
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 Years in the company of Thomas Green can lead to fruitful discombobulation, 
and as a result I have experienced an unexpected reversal of what I thought most 
profound and least interesting in his work.  Thus I feel that work and leisure are not 
only crucial concepts in education but may in fact be its twin stars, and Green’s analysis 
of these concepts represents one of the most unique and creative contributions both to 
philosophy and to education.  Work, Leisure, and the American Schools is a book 
Wittgenstein or Bouwsma might have written, had they possessed Green’s wit and his 
incomparable ability to bring the insights of several fields to bear on a problem.  It was 
his finest work.  The long-term project, getting clear about moral education as its own 
domain of inquiry, had its original expression in that work.  Second to his analysis of 
work and leisure is a chapter from his book The Activities of Teaching titled, “Wonder 
and the Roots of Motivation.”  Like the former work, it is a creative departure from the 
traveled roads of philosophy.  It is an exploratory analysis of the use of the word 
wonder that makes clear not only its proper use in education but also its improper 
neglect.  Here, we see the method developed by Wittgenstein and picked up by 
Bouwsma deployed to its best effect, not merely staking out the boundaries of an idea 
but pointing to areas of expansion.  It is constructive philosophy pointing the way to 
pragmatic results.   
 On the other hand, the conceptual trilogy on moral education that some consider 
his magnum opus suffers from lack of completion.  Predicting and Voices show Green 
at the height of his powers—they are creative, original, and show an uncanny sense of 
what is and is not important.  Along with his other books, they constitute a master class 
for anyone interested in applying the tools of philosophical inquiry to the problems of 
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education in a pluralistic democracy.  Tragically, the unfinished manuscript Walls was 
to be a sort of hermeneutic key, connecting the insights of the previous two books to 
actual students entering the commons from their respective identity groups.  Without it, 
the vision is incomplete.  As it stands, Predicting and Voices can be read fruitfully by 
students interested in learning how to do philosophy of education or by policymakers 
who are unconcerned by the problems presented by the competing claims of various 
normative groups on the identities of American students. 
 Green disliked late twentieth century literature for its lack of moral seriousness.  
I share his sentiment and have attempted in the pages that follow to write a narrative 
that takes seriously the idea that my readers can learn something about themselves by 
learning about Thomas Green. 
 Professor Green was born on February 8, 1927 in Lincoln, Nebraska to an 
educated, Presbyterian family.  His father was a civil engineer and his mother a writer 
who turned her hand to educational biography later in life.  His home was visited by 
some of the leading intellectuals and writers of the Midwest, including Willa Cather and 
Roscoe Pound.  From early on, it seems, his life was pointed in the direction of 
creativity and the written word, but it was his encounter with one of America’s great 
philosophers, O.K. Bouwsma, at the University of Nebraska that set him on the path to 
philosophical inquiry.
 1 
Chapter 1: Work and Leisure 
In the summer of 1964, Thomas Franklin Green arrived in Syracuse, New York, 
at the end of a twelve-year period of intellectual frustration and academic exile.1  He 
brought with him the nearly completed manuscript of what was to become his first large 
work of philosophy, as yet untitled—an analysis of the concepts of work and leisure.2  It 
may have lacked the popular appeal of more exciting philosophical topics published 
throughout the 1960s, like the existence of God and other minds and the debates over 
free will and true belief, but what his topic lacked in flash he made up for in creativity 
of approach.  In fact, Green exhibited a talent for deploying metaphors and constructing 
insightful thought experiments to rival the very best disciples of Ludwig Wittgenstein, a 
talent that sometimes drew the ire of his less perspicacious readers.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the manuscript on work and leisure initiated one of the most original 
contributions by an American to the philosophical problems attending education in a 
pluralistic society. 
It is a seldom-acknowledged fact that very few can, with sufficient time and 
effort, produce useful ideas about education in a pluralistic society.  Typically, the 
person with ambition to solve such problems cannot pull free of perspective—the 
problems grow upon approach—and what one thought a molehill turns out to be Mount 
Everest.  The task of sorting through the problems of education in the 1960s was, by 
                                                
1 The characterization is Green’s own, conveyed in a letter to Gerald Grant dated March 1st, 1976. 
2 He had Chapters II-V in a “primitive and early form” as early as 1965, when they constituted his Robert 
Jones Lectures in Education (see “Preface” to Thomas F. Green, Work, Leisure, and the American 
Schools. New York: Random House, 1968.).  Although the manuscript is older, as we know from Green’s 
own remarks that he discussed the work with David Riesman at a 1964 meeting of the National Council 
of Churches at Eastern Baptist College, and he talked about it as if it had been a project long in the 
making with little encouragement from his colleagues at Michigan State.  If this is the case, then the 
manuscript in early forms is perhaps as old as 1959, when Green moved to the Education Faculty at 
Michigan State.  He credited the encounter with Riesman as his primary encouragement for completing 
the manuscript (in the letter of March first mentioned previously).  
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mountain standards, gargantuan, but Green possessed the odd combination of ambition 
and patience that enabled him to scale some important peaks.  This is all the more 
impressive because Green was new to the game and made his entrance during one of the 
most mercurial periods for public education, before public policy confined itself to the 
merry-go-round of testing regimes, to more or less standard core subjects, and to 
compulsory attendance through ten or twelve grades.  The question of what it meant to 
be educated, perennially unsettled, was all the more lively during that period of high-
spirited, if inconstant, debate about the purposes of education on a national scale.  To 
this quicksilver controversy, Green would bring a rare talent for cool analysis and a 
distinctly Presbyterian commitment to democratic pluralism.  It would be his singular 
contribution and his life’s work.   
But how did a young man from an educated white-collar home, a young man 
who had studied under the top analytical philosophers in the country and an Ivy League 
graduate to boot, decide to turn his attention to the philosophical problems of manual 
labor?  An answer to this question begins at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln then 
winds through years of early disappointment in Rapid City and East Lansing before 
taking a positive turn in a fateful meeting in Philadelphia. 
 
The University of Nebraska at Lincoln, 1944-49 
For twenty years, from the closing act of World War II to Thomas Green’s 
arrival in Syracuse, the United States busied itself with the economic and military 
aspirations of a growing empire, and at the center of empire stood the public school 
system.  Green was himself a product of this period in higher education, having entered 
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the University of Nebraska at Lincoln in 1944, when campus life carried on under the 
shadow of the war, a shadow that had loomed over Green’s youth.  In many ways, the 
situation at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln during Green’s five years there 
(1944-1949) was typical of the wave of changes effecting universities around the 
country.  In fact, the environment of the campus and the country’s larger social 
transition from a wartime mood to optimism and prosperity helps illuminate Green’s 
early interest in futurism, an interest which contributed motivation to the writing of his 
manuscript on work and leisure, and so it will pay dividends to briefly reconstruct the 
social and cultural environment of the time before moving on.3 
In the four years preceding his registration at The University of Nebraska, both 
the university and the country had experienced the highs and lows of the Cornhuskers 
competition at the 1940 Rose Bowl, the reelection of Franklin Roosevelt—an unpopular 
president in Nebraska—to his third term and later, in 1944, to his fourth, the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor, the Declaration of War, the official presence of the army at the university, 
and the departure of the R.O.T.C. for the warfront.  A native of Lincoln, Green’s mood 
was affected by the uncertainties and insecurities, the local victories and national 
tragedies, which made headlines at the university and around town.   
The University of Nebraska yearbook for 1943-44, the year before Green 
enrolled, is full of patriotic military imagery.  On the bottom right hand corner of the 
introductory page is a stencil of a woman in plainclothes smiling at a man in uniform, 
and on the next page is the strong profile of a determined, helmeted soldier.  Most 
sobering is a black and white photo on the editor’s page of two female students smiling 
                                                
3 The description of the campus setting that follows is largely a reconstruction of information taken from 
the University of Nebraska Yearbooks for 1944-49. 
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up at a male student in uniform with his luggage beside him and the caption, “Fall 
would see the coeds returning, but great and grave adventure lay before the soldier.”  
For all of the bold imagery and captioning, the yearbook was full of repetition of words 
like uncertainty, tumult, and parting.  This was a year of escalating anxieties and doubly 
so for a young man stepping out into the world of college. 
 When Green arrived on campus in the fall of 1944, the mood of the place had 
grown grim.  The war effort was in full swing.  Many of the female students folded 
bandages on the weekends, while many of the male students, including Green, joined 
military fraternities and began their preparation for combat.  The trials of enrollment at 
the University of Nebraska were a perspicacious symbol for the experience of young 
Americans that year.  Freshmen wound their way through a disorienting maze of desks, 
chalkboards, and folding wooden lawn chairs in the basketball gymnasium.  Lincoln 
natives, like Green, would have been looking around the ordered mess for familiar 
faces, stopping to speak with a high school friend before heading to yet another table for 
a second or third round of signing forms.   
It was a hot, noisy, and time-consuming affair but one undertaken, in 1944, in a 
dutiful spirit.  In the previous academic year, many of the young men on campus had 
gone off to the front lines, and their example haunted those just entering the university.  
It was a year when to be a young man meant to fight the axis powers on the frontlines.  
Billboards, posters, and news stories presented one narrative for American manhood, 
and it had little to do with cozying up to campus life and the pleasant company of coeds.  
And yet, this was just the situation in which Green found himself, with an older brother 
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fighting and dying at the Battle of the Bulge and himself on the lovely campus of the 
University of Nebraska. 
His concession to the spirit of duty and wartime seriousness was expressed in 
his pledging to the army fraternity, the Nebraska Alpha chapter of Phi Kappa Psi, but 
Green was by disposition a cheerful young man who delighted in campus social life.  
Fortunately for him, despite the tensions and the austerities of wartime, college life still 
presented a variety of pleasures to appeal to Green’s interests, particularly in music and 
performance.  The campus hosted accomplished musicians and singers such as the 
violinist Erica Morini, Lawrence Tibbit, the lead baritone for the Metropolitan Opera, 
and pianist and popular humorist Alec Templeton.  Green joined the University Singers 
who performed Handel’s “Messiah” to considerable praise and a couple of weeks later 
gave a Christmas Carol service.  A more lasting musical interest for Green was the 
clarinet, for which he joined the University Orchestra.  He devoted his Tuesday nights 
throughout freshman year to practicing Beethoven, Bach, and Brahms, and when fall 
rolled around the orchestra gave a public performance as the highlight of the musical 
season. 
The bustle and seriousness of 1944 was followed by a memorial year both on 
campus and in the Green family, but by 1946 the cultural environment of the country 
and the university was saturated with talk of the future.  With the influx of G.I. Bill 
students, the university began an ambitious building project that resulted in a new 
library hall, agronomy building, women’s physical education building, fine arts 
building, student health and pharmacy building, engineering building, auditorium, and 
classroom building.  Like the school, Green himself went through a period of 
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exploration and rebuilding.  He followed up on a burgeoning interest in journalism by 
working for the school paper, The Cornhusker, the local paper, The Nebraskan, and the 
Presbyterian House newsletter, The Presby Post.  He left the orchestra for the varsity 
band, playing at all of the football games, and his fraternity, Phi Kappa Psi, won best 
arrangement in the victory parade following the defeat of arch-rivals Kansas.  Green 
was an officer in his fraternity in 1946, and with the rest of his brothers would sit on the 
porch each day at lunch and watch passersby.  It is tempting to think that here we find 
the beginnings of his interest in leisure, whiling away the time in the lazy peacefulness 
of campus life.   
Green met two people who would influence his development as a philosopher 
and scholar during this time at the university.  Rosemary would do so through 
unflinching support, first as his girlfriend and later as his wife, while Oets Kolk (O.K.) 
Bouwsma introduced him to common language conceptual analysis, a nascent area of 
philosophical study that he was developing in response to G.E. Moore’s analysis of 
sense-data and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s unique work in Cambridge. 
Bouwsma was a Reformed Christian philosopher, trained at Calvin College, who 
like many Reformed Christians in the mid-century discovered a ready alliance between 
Calvinist theology and analytic philosophy.4  This alliance had something to do, one 
would suspect, with the anti-foundationalist tendencies of Calvinism and the modest 
epistemological ambitions of analytic philosophy.  Alvin Plantinga famously drew this 
parallel in his monumental trilogy on Warrant in epistemology, ultimately arguing that 
Calvinism’s sensus divinitas provided warrant for true beliefs.  That such a connection 
                                                
4 Many notable Reformed Christian philosophers trained in this period come to mind: Alvin Plantinga, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, Norman Malcolm, and Thomas Green, among others. 
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between philosophy and theology mattered to Bouwsma, as well, is attested to by his 
many former students.  One such student, Ronald Hustwit, who organized and 
published portions of Bouwsma’s notebooks, wrote that “Christianity oriented 
Bouwsma’s intellectual journey at every point and with respect to the direction of every 
idea.”5  He taught at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln from 1928 to 1966 and then 
worked at the University of Texas at Austin until his death on March 1, 1978.   
Bouwsma’s method will sound familiar to anyone who has read Green’s work.  
It was strikingly simple but could yield surprisingly complicated insights.  Rather than 
define a problem from some well-worn philosophical position, e.g. Thomism or 
Pragmatism, he would ask after the uses of words and then play with them, typically by 
comparison to the ways the words are used outside of philosophical discussion, until he 
had arrived at some new statement about or new insight into a problem.  For example, 
he discovers a telling distinction in ethics between broadly ethical language and more 
narrowly moral language (a distinction which Green makes great use of later): 
Today in ethics I came upon this distinction.  When it comes to injunctions like: 
Be smart; Be honest; it will sometimes make sense to ask why?  And the answer 
may be something like: You’ll get on in the world.  These may be called 
counsels of prudence.  [These keep the world from breaking you down.]…But 
there are other commands: “Be merciful,” “Be kind,” “Be compassionate,” “Be 
charitable.”  Here to ask: Why? makes no sense at all.6 
 
Bouwsma borrowed from Wittgenstein, who he knew personally, the notion of 
language-games, “reminding himself of how the words of the philosopher work and do 
not work in those games.”7  This method was meant to bring philosophy down to the 
earth—to concern philosophers with the mundane world, so to speak—but the method 
                                                
5 Hustwit, Ronald E. and J.L. Craft (eds.) O.K. Bouwsma’s Commonplace Book: Remarks on Philosophy 
and Education.  Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 13. 
6 Hustwit and Craft, O.K. Bouwsma, 65. 
7 Hustwit and Craft, O.K. Bouwsma, xix. 
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itself involved a tremendous amount of play, especially play with words.  In fact, 
Bouwsma’s archived writings at the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas 
are recorded on upwards of 480 legal pads and five reels of microfilm.8 
Bouwsma’s way of doing philosophy required a tremendous amount of patience, 
including an especially high tolerance for only modest advances on problems.  One 
popular anecdote from his time at the University of Texas in Austin has it that a more 
classically trained philosophy student, overcome with frustration at a protracted and 
laborious discussion of the many uses of the word “think,” angrily interrupted the class 
to insist on knowing merely what were the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
thinking.  Bouwsma, with characteristic good grace, gently told the student, “For me, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of thinking are a pencil, a tablet and a 
lapboard.”9  This sort of response to Bouwsma was not unusual.  His manner in the 
classroom has been captured best by Hustwit and Craft: 
His seminars began with time for the student to express what had been 
troublesome during the week.  “What shall we talk about today?”  If no one 
began immediately, Bouwsma waited with patience.  There was never a hurry.  
Students, by contrast, were impatient.  “Why does he not lecture?  Why does he 
allow people to go on like that?  Why does he not tell us something?”  But 
Bouwsma would not “tell” anyone anything.  If he saw that a student wanted 
information, he would not give in.  He waited.  If he saw that a student was 
interested in something, he allowed him to go to wherever that thought led.  He 
waited.  If he tried to get there too quickly, he slowed him down.  He said in his 
manner of questioning and the tone he set in discussion: “We have all day.  
There is no hurry.  Learn from what we are failing to accomplish.”  Patience.10 
                                                
8 Hustwit and Craft, O.K. Bouwsma, ix. 
9 Pincoffs, Edmund L. (chairman), Edwin B. Allaire and Aloysius Martinich. “In Memoriam: O.K. 
Bouwsma,” retrieved 1/10/2015 from The University of Texas website: 
http://www.utexas.edu/faculty/council/2000-2001/memorials/SCANNED/bouwsma.pdf 
10 Hustwit and Craft, O.K. Bouwsma, 15. 
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For Bouwsma, philosophy was “an activity, not a body of doctrine.”11  It was a 
matter of untangling the language with which philosophers articulate problems, of 
making the familiar strange, and of seeing a problem in a new and more constructive 
way.  However, philosophy was not something that produced new knowledge, per se.  It 
could produce insight into what is already known or, in its popular critical form, it could 
expose ignorance masquerading as knowledge.  But it was not the sort of discipline that 
should aspire to accomplish more than “dabbling”—inspired dabbling, perhaps, but still 
only dabbling.  Making this very point, Bouwsma once compared doing philosophy to 
rearranging the books in a library.12  To view the task this way requires that the 
philosopher adopt a humble outlook regarding her own work.  That sounds well and 
good, but the question arises as to how a philosopher can practice epistemic humility 
when confronted with a pressing practical concern, such as those one finds in education.  
Fortunately, Bouwsma was working on educational problems the very year Thomas 
Green began his undergraduate studies at the university, and so we can see to some 
degree his answer to that question—an answer in which we glimpse the springs of 
Green’s own future scholarly project. 
Bouwsma’s most explicit statement of his educational philosophy is found in an 
article published in 1944 for Prairie Schooner titled, “Jack and Jill on a Log.”13  It 
marks his first published foray into practical philosophy, having published previously 
almost solely on the metaphysical problem of universals.  Universals are properties that 
individuals “have” in common.  The question philosophers have been asking and 
answering in various ways is how properties are “had.”  So, for example, one might 
                                                
11 Pincoffs, et al., “In Memoriam.”   
12 Hustwit and Craft, O.K. Bouwsma’s, 121. 
13 O.K. Bouwsma, “Jack and Jill on a Log.”  Prairie Schooner, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 1944), pp. 112-12 
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notice that the red property of an apple is precisely the same red found in a paint can.  A 
realist says that the two instances of red are really one thing, the property “redness,” 
shared between two individuals (the apple and the paint).  A nominalist, on the other 
hand, would give some version of the answer that “redness” exists only in our minds.  
That it is not a property of individual objects but rather of ideas we have about the 
objects of our perception.  The difference between the realists and nominalists has 
enormous implications for how we think about the universe.  If the realists are correct 
that there are mind-independent properties, like redness (the property of all particular 
reds), chairness (the property of all particular chairs), or doghood (the property of all 
particular dogs), then the fundamental nature of the universe cannot be reducible to 
matter and energy.  There must be some realm, like a spiritual realm or a Platonic realm 
of forms, where properties can be said to exist.  This is an attractive possibility for 
philosophers who are not atheists, as it provides a positive argument against atheistic 
materialism.  However, if the nominalists are correct, a materialist universe does not 
follow necessarily but an argument against it is taken away.  This is why so many 
theistic philosophers have devoted a considerable amount of energy to defending some 
form of realism with respect to universals.  The problem is one of the oldest in 
philosophy and one that Bouwsma applies in an interesting way to his thinking about 
education.   
He does not drop his interest in metaphysics; rather, he brings metaphysical 
considerations into contact with the practical problem of what to do about educating 
children.  It is against this backdrop of his work in metaphysics that Bouwsma hits upon 
the notion that any philosophical inquiry into education must spring from one of many 
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possible anthropological assumptions.  That is, behind all philosophical speculation 
about what to teach children stands some more or less specific idea, some first principle, 
about what kind of thing a human being is.  From this it may be inferred that the 
philosophy of education is the critical examination of the ideologies at back of 
educational theories, curricula, and practices.  This same idea is echoed in the opening 
pages of Green’s book, Work, Leisure, and the American Schools: “Each such model of 
humanity, fully explicated, would yield its corresponding style of education.  Education 
would then become more vocational, more professional, more classical, more religious, 
more practical, or whatever—depending on the particular blend of excellence implicit in 
one’s ideology of man.”14   
Bouwsma published his article during Green’s freshman year at the University 
of Nebraska, and it is tempting to imagine the young Thomas hunkered over a copy in 
the popular student commons reading intently as his friends talked about the war effort 
and the coeds.  Whatever the case, it is clear that in one way or another he benefited 
from his professor’s insights about education.  Bouwsma treated his classes as a 
philosopher’s workshop, and saw teaching as something with which both the student 
and the professor should be engaged.  He once wrote of himself,  
If I am a fairly good teacher, this is not at all because I am sharp, clear headed, 
well informed, and so on.  I have had students who are ever so much more 
intelligent than I.  I think it is because I am and continue to be in step with the 
students I teach, not a step behind and perhaps only a step ahead.  Under these 
conditions, these students and I can understand one another.  We can 
discuss…[w]e are to share our confusions so that we should work together to 
share a state of clarity.15   
 
                                                
14 Green, Work, Leisure, 5. 
15 Hustwit and Craft, O.K. Bouwsma, 177. 
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There can be little doubt that his ideas about education, still fresh on his mind, were 
common points of discussion in Green’s first year or two of coursework. 
So what did Bouwsma say exactly in his famous article?  First, he begins by 
stating what he takes to be the least controversial claim about education—that it must 
have something to do with knowledge.  He then quickly moves on to deconstructing the 
commonly held idea that education is principally a matter of acquiring culturally 
valuable or interesting information.  Rather, he argues that “[b]y knowledge we come to 
enjoy the design, the sweeping plans, upon the outlines of which the world is made.”16  
Most interestingly, Bouwsma says something that Green picks up on and writes quite 
elegantly about twenty-five years later: “Knowledge is born in wonder, and may end in 
reverence.”17  These are not the sentiments of a particular religious dogma, per se, but 
they are premised upon some faith in the meaningfulness of the order found in the 
universe.  This is significant for a couple of reasons.  Bouwsma’s understanding of 
knowledge anticipates later philosophies of situatedness, such as Alastair MacIntyre’s 
rival versions of moral inquiry,18 Charles Taylor’s hermeneutic of the unarticulated 
background,19 and various postmodern narrativity theories.20  This separated Bouwsma, 
and I would argue Green, from the strongly Kantian analytic philosophers of the early 
to middle twentieth century.  The elder philosopher seemed to be fully cognizant of the 
                                                
16 Bouwsma, “Jack and Jill,” 114. 
17 Bouwsma, “Jack and Jill,” 114.  This is the idea at the heart of one of Green’s best works, his chapter 
titled, “Wonder and the Roots of Motivation.” 
18 Alastair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry  (Notre Dame: The University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1991). 
19 Taylor articulates this theory across a number of well-known works, the most important of which are, 
in my opinion: Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity  (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992); and Charles Taylor, A Secular Age  (Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard 
University Press, 2006). 
20 I will just mention the popular poststructuralist thinkers whose work serves as the pillars of narrativity 
theories: Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, and Immanuel Levinas. 
 13 
division of worldviews even in philosophy.  Rebuffing Turgenev’s arch-cynic, Bazarov, 
who called nature a workshop, “not a temple,” Bouwsma protests:  
nature, if not a temple, is at least not nothing but a workshop.  Nor is it simply a 
great stone upon which men are to grind their minds.  Nature is dumb, but we 
may know enough to see that if it could speak, it would not speak of ready cash 
or of love on the sly.  It might echo the words of the psalmist: I too am ‘fearfully 
and wonderfully made.’21   
 
While for Bouwsma this is the third and most important form of knowledge, he 
also sketched out two other uses of the word having to do with sharpening the wits and 
solving problems.  He clearly felt that this was the central issue for philosophers of 
education—if we did not distinguish between these uses of the word knowledge then we 
were unlikely to know what to do for Jack and Jill.  This understanding of the divide 
between worldviews and the implicit rejection of a universal rationality to which all 
reasonable people might assent, was a unique insight into the springs of conflict in 
various educational theories.  Furthermore, Bouwsma’s situated understanding of 
knowledge is important also because it gave Green a model for thinking philosophically 
from a theistic perspective—a point of view that characterized his work throughout his 
career.   
 Late into the writing of his manuscript on work and leisure, Green would come 
back to Bouwsma’s understanding of the philosophy of education as the critical 
examination of ideologies but with a change in focus.  Instead of latching onto the idea 
that it was a philosopher’s job to get straight his or her own conception of knowledge 
before proceeding, Green thought that one’s view of knowledge was one piece of an 
ideology that should be sifted for what did and did not work.  So, whereas Bouwsma 
considered getting hold of the proper understanding of knowledge to be the key move in 
                                                
21 Bouwsma, “Jack and Jill,” 115. 
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a constructing a helpful theory of education, Green thought it more important to show 
which beliefs about knowledge (whether true or false) were more useful—which had 
greater pedagogical value or were more adequate given some social need.  This is Green 
the pragmatist, asking “what precisely are the constituents of our beliefs, as well as 
whether and in what respects they are either functional or dysfunctional in relation to 
our world and therefore in relation to the process of growing up into our world.”22  On 
this point, and on many others, he took a pragmatic turn that distinguished his own 
approach to philosophy from that of his mentor. 
 Nevertheless, Bouwsma’s influence is felt in the technique employed by Green, 
as well as in his understanding of what it means to do philosophy.  Like his mentor, 
Green saw the philosopher’s work as “[t]he art of reminding, exposing and curing” 
requiring “a detailed examination of numerous uses of ordinary words in ordinary 
contexts,” in order to draw “the limits of the uses and...showing that and how traditional 
philosophers unwittingly exceed the limits.”23  This is the lesson he learned fully over 
his five years spent in the small, stuffy but lively classrooms of the University of 
Nebraska.   
 A question lingers over this period of Green’s education.  What made this new 
way of conceiving the philosophical enterprise so attractive to Bouwsma and his 
students?  In asking the question this way, I mean to gesture in the direction of a social 
and cultural structure in which anyone living in the university system of the time would 
find him- or herself situated.  The picture of postwar America is a familiar one.  On the 
one hand, it was a time of celebration for the millions of American servicemen who 
                                                
22 Green, Work, Leisure, 7. 
23 Pincoffs et al., “In Memoriam.” 
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were reunited with their loved ones.  There were the well-known street parades, the 
baby boom, the economic emergence from the dustbowl—especially relevant to a place 
like Nebraska—which made the G.I. Bill and record enrollments possible.  While 
flushing toilets, central heating, and electricity were not yet ubiquitous experiences for 
Americans, by 1945 the country was unequivocally a global economic superpower and 
well on its way to ultramodernity.  Spirits were undeniably high. 
 Unfortunately, the light mood did not last long.  At home, postwar inflation led 
to massive waves of workers’ strikes for higher wages, there was a housing shortage 
due to the baby boom, and Soviet antagonism created fresh anxieties about the security 
of the future.  These anxieties were exacerbated by Stalin’s “iron curtain,” which fueled 
the development of what would later be called the military-industrial complex in the 
United States.  Over the next few years, the tensions that rode beneath the surface of 
American optimism were justified in changes overseas—changes for the worse, in the 
eyes of many Americans.  By 1949, Mao Zedong won control of China for the 
Communist Party following a violent civil war, the developed and developing world 
split between NATO and Warsaw Pact factions, and relations with soviet countries 
steadily worsened due to spying. 
 In 1948, the year before the creation of NATO, American Elizabeth Bentley’s 
testimony to extensive spying on behalf of the Soviet Union was made public, 
implicating upwards of 140 American government employees as spies.  Bentley, 
formerly of Ithaca where Green would make his home for a few years, was in many 
ways a model American woman.  She had done her undergraduate work at Vassar, been 
a graduate student at Columbia, and received a fellowship to study abroad in Italy 
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during the fascist uprising.  Her family was respectable, her image clean.  So it came as 
a shock to the country to learn that someone like her was capable of spying for the arch-
nemesis of the United States.  The fear generated by the revelation of her spying led a 
couple of years later to Senator McCarthy’s Red Scare. 
 The decade stretching from the middle 1940s to the middle 1950s was perhaps 
the most uncertain time since the years immediately leading up to the Civil War.  
Although there was no public debate about what it meant to be an American, there was 
plenty of fear that one might not be able to trust the American next door, and this 
problem was compounded by the firm belief that there was one way only to live a fully 
human life—by buying into the American dream.  What to do with the parts of the 
world, and the people at home, who seemed to hold such disparate views on what it 
meant to be human, to be fulfilled?   
 Bouwsma, who had a strong grasp on this period of uncertainty, led his students 
back to the most fundamental question driving any educational enterprise: what kind of 
thing is Jack or Jill?  Of course, he had an answer in mind.  His method was Socratic 
elenchus, meant to guide them to a particular understanding—that the best way to 
conceive of Jack and Jill was as Judeo-Christian creatures, made in the image of God to 
steward his creation.   There were some advantages to setting out from such a starting 
point.  Most importantly for a philosopher, it provided the educational theorist with a 
firm metaphysical basis for those humane values that had driven the public school 
movement.  If Jack and Jill were made in the image of God, then their value was 
unimpeachable (or inalienable, in the words of Thomas Jefferson).  The educational 
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theorist need look no further for a reason to allocate massive amounts of money, 
resources, and time on their intellectual and moral development.  They were worth it.   
 This belief in the innate value of children was quickly being put on the 
backburner as the fears that drove the military-industrial complex led education 
policymakers to adopt a factory model of education that, in effect, devalued the young. 
As a result, the spirit of humane values that motivated the public school movement was 
quickly, if silently, replaced by the belief that children should be useful if they are to be 
valuable.  This was the decade that initiated the notion that children and youth were, in 
a frightening bit of newspeak, our nation’s “most precious natural resource.”24   
 Green allied himself with Bouwsma’s Judeo-Christian vision of human worth, 
which by the 1960s had not kept pace with new philosophical vocabularies, themselves 
largely a product of a military-industrial grammar.  It is perhaps why he was often seen 
as someone living out of touch with new ideas (who reads Aquinas in a college of 
education?).  Nevertheless, as his narrative develops, it would be useful to think of him 
as someone who sought relentlessly to bring this older—and what he thought perfectly 
valid—way of thinking of human beings to bear on the problems of education in a 
world that had moved on from the vision of Christian humanism that had given birth to 
public education. 
 
The Move to Cornell, 1949-1952 
 By 1949, Green had shown enough promise in philosophy to merit Bouwsma 
shepherding him to Cornell to study under his former student, the Wittgenstein scholar 
                                                
24 Thomas Green, “Response to the Presidential Address.”  Education Theory, Vol. 17 (1967), 289-294. 
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Norman Malcolm.25  Malcolm had been hired in 1947 by the Cornell philosophy 
department and was able, through intense persistence and some good luck, to convince 
Wittgenstein to make a secret trip to Cornell.26  He told no one, per Wittgenstein’s 
request.  The meeting would have a profound and lasting effect on Green. 
 Ithaca was then and is today a relatively small town nestled in a picturesque part 
of central western New York, situated in a lush green valley at the south end of Lake 
Cayuga.  Like Lincoln, Ithaca sported a good deal of nineteenth century architecture, 
but unlike the flat Midwestern town, it was surrounded by rolling hills.  The 1,166 mile 
drive from Lincoln to Ithaca would take Green and his young wife Rosemary through 
Chicago and Cleveland, on into the green country of Amish Pennsylvania and finally 
into the hot green Finger Lakes region of New York.  It was an exciting drive and an 
exciting time to be on the road.  After all, this was one of the listless, postwar years 
memorialized by Jack Kerouac in his novel On the Road.  It was a time to see and be 
seen on the great highways of America and to lose yourself in the uncertainty of the 
present.  Green was as susceptible as the rest of his generation to the excitement and 
formlessness of the future, but he was not yet lost, not quite a member of the beat 
generation.  A bright future lay ahead of him at Cornell.  A degree from an Ivy League 
institution meant a secure future; it meant a professorship or entry into a prestigious law 
school.  It afforded him a measure of certainty not granted to all twenty-somethings in 
the late 1940s. Of course, he had no way of knowing that one of the greatest 
                                                
25 Bouwsma and Green went to Cornell, in fact, during the same summer; Bouwsma to meet Wittgenstein 
and Green to begin his doctoral work. 
26 Malcolm was persistent possibly to the point of annoyance, but Wittgenstein’s sister, who was living on 
the east coast, ultimately sealed the trip to America. 
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philosophers of the time would be meeting him in Ithaca, or that his experience of the 
next three years would seriously confound his sense of security. 
The summer of 1949 was unusually hot in New York.  Despite this, 
Wittgenstein was unusually active, taking long walks either by himself or with Malcolm 
and his graduate students and engaging in his characteristically intense philosophical 
discussions.27  In this way, at least, Wittgenstein fit in well with the Cornell philosophy 
department, where the teaching had a reputation for being “intimidating and the 
atmosphere authoritarian.”28  It was also the top philosophy department in the country 
for analytic philosophy, particularly in the study of Wittgenstein’s method.  There, 
Green studied not just under Norman Malcolm and Max Black but also Gregory 
Vlastos, who revolutionized the study of classical Greek philosophy by applying 
Wittgensteinian rigor to his analyses of Plato’s dialogues.  His classmates included the 
celebrated novelist and philosopher, William H. Gass, John O. Nelson, and William 
Kennick, who went on to become a widely respected Amherst professor.  It was a 
talented circle of philosophers and students for the inexperienced Midwesterner, and a 
wild induction into the world of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
If Green had learned, under the auspices of Bouwsma, to look at philosophy as a 
way of unveiling meaning through wordplay, then he learned from Wittgenstein how to 
ground a philosophical investigation in plain observations.  William Kennick provides 
an illustration from what must have been one of Green’s first evenings with the 
philosophy department.  Gregory Vlastos had presented a paper in defense of Kant’s 
                                                
27 Trevor Pinch and Richard Swedberg, “Wittgenstein’s Trip to Ithaca in 1949: on the importance of 
details,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory (2012), 4. 
28 Pinch and Swedberg, “Wittgenstein,” 6. 
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notion that ought implies can.  When Vlastos finished with an impressive performance, 
Black asked Wittgenstein if he would care to address the argument: 
Wittgenstein put his head down on the table and stayed in that position for what 
seemed to be a week.  He then raised his head and said (in almost these very 
words: I took notes): ‘A nurse says to me, “swallow this tube, please” [rumor 
had it that Wittgenstein was having some tests run to see whether he had 
stomach cancer.]  “I can’t”.  “But you have to do it; otherwise they can’t run the 
tests”.  “I can’t”.  “But you really ought to, you know”.  “Yes, but I can’t”.  That 
was it.  Does ‘ought’ imply ‘can’?  Is ‘I ought to but I can’t’ contradictory?  
No.29 
 
The simplicity of his rejoinder was disarming for a room of philosophers and 
philosophy graduate students trained in the never-ending wordplay of traditional 
analytic philosophy.  This is illustrative of an elegant touch to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical investigations that Bouwsma never quite matched, though he came close 
from time to time.  It is the same elegance found in the best moments of Green’s 
work.30 
During Green’s three years at Cornell, Malcolm worked on a paper developed 
from his talks with Wittgenstein titled, “Knowledge and Belief,” published in 1952.31  
This was part and parcel of the epistemological turn in midcentury philosophy, but it 
was also a sort of muddled attempt at applying Wittgenstein’s insight that the 
distinctions found within ordinary language were where the real philosophical battles 
should take place.  In reality, Malcolm’s work looks quite a lot like the “model 
language” project of the positivists, which Wittgenstein so adamantly rejected.  Green 
                                                
29 Pinch and Swedberg, “Witgenstein,” 11. 
30 Some examples: the thought experiment with which he begins Work, Leisure, and the American 
Schools; his idea that governance (as self-reflexive judgment on matters of importance) is the central 
concern of moral education; and the metaphor of walls and commons in his examination of moral 
pluralism. 
31 Pinch and Swedberg, “Wittgenstein,” 8. 
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appears to have understood the shortcomings of Malcolm’s project.  By all indications, 
he was bored by it.   
Green had learned from Bouwsma the situatedness of philosophical inquiry and 
had therefore learned to see philosophy as the rational criticism of ideology—of one’s 
own and others’ ideological commitments.32  Malcolm was moving the game to a new 
playing field, treating the situatedness of philosophy as a matter foremost of language 
games, per Wittgenstein.  Green’s and Malcolm’s understandings of philosophy 
diverged.  To acknowledge the importance of language games is wise, but to limit the 
scope of inquiry to language was to miss the point, namely that language existed in 
service to some particular ideological program.  Something like this formulation of the 
difference between them must have been bothering Green during his years with 
Malcolm, because nothing he wrote after his time at Cornell reflected even the slightest 
interest in Malcolm’s philosophical concerns.   
Perhaps it was symptomatic of a deeper disaffection from the Wittgenstein 
crowd that Green was unmoved by endless debates over common-sense and ordinary 
language.  In the best times it is often difficult to feel the importance of in-house 
philosophical debates, but in 1950 war broke out with North Korea over the ever 
present, if long-distant, threat of the expansion of communism.  Green, in the middle of 
his doctoral work, would sit out another war.  It is easy to imagine that all parties in the 
Green family would be pleased, having lost one son in Europe, but someone as sensitive 
to existential questions as Green could not help but be affected by a nagging sense that 
what he was about in the classrooms of Cornell did not really matter.  Perhaps this is 
                                                
32 See, or example, Green, Work, Leisure, 6. 
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why he was already plotting his exit from the professional practice of philosophy 
through entry into law school. 
To make matters worse, for his dissertation Malcolm had Green pick at a 
supposed false move in Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy—a research project 
he hoped would help his own critique of G.E. Moore.  Titled, Thomas Reid’s Theory of 
Sensation and Perception, the dissertation is a joyless read, flat in tone, and without the 
slightest sense of the author’s interest in his subject.  It is also unlike anything else 
published by Green, whose philosophical work is notable for its warmth, deep interest, 
and amusement.  But it would sound a false note to leave the impression that Green and 
Malcolm were at odds with each other.  Green saw the importance of philosophy 
differently; or rather he thought the important problems lay elsewhere than in the 
minutia of longstanding scholarly arguments.  Several former students recall that Green 
would speak warmly of going through Wittgenstein’s Blue and Brown books with his 
mentor, and it is significant that his philosophical differences with Malcolm, however 
broad, went largely unexpressed.  He played the dutiful student, and that is what we 
have left from this period in his life: a dutiful, if dull, dissertation. 
 
First Jobs and Early Disappointment, 1952-1964 
 In 1952, following graduation Green and Rosemary relocated with some 
reluctance to Rapid City, South Dakota, for a position as an English and Humanities 
instructor at the newly endowed South Dakota School of Mines and Technology.  If 
Green were going to law school, then he would need to work and save for a few years, 
and while the school did not pay well enough for him to support his family, it was the 
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only job on offer.  It had been rechristened in the last decade from the shorter name, 
South Dakota School of Mines, in acknowledgment of the expansion of the school into 
“new areas of science and technology.”33  In any case, it was not the sort of place where 
one would expect to find a philosopher. 
 Rapid City was no metropolitan area, though it was the second largest city in 
South Dakota, situated at the west end of the state not far from the notorious saloon 
town of Deadwood.  In 1952, travellers might stop in at Rapid City on their way to 
nearby Mount Rushmore, but if they planned their vacation trip to coincide with May 
twenty-third of that year then they were in for a nasty surprise.  Rapid City flooded, and 
not for the first or last time.34  While the flood damage would have dried up by the time 
the Greens arrived in the last leg of summer, it could not have been heartening to know 
that their future home was a subject of disaster relief for the federal government.35  
Pictures taken immediately after the flood show a barren landscape dotted by a few 
trees with houses and buildings immersed in a great puddle of mud.36 
 Green could not be said to have settled into his work as an English instructor.  
The position fell far short of the expectations of a Cornell philosophy graduate, and the 
poor pay weighed on him.  He had to take up other part-time jobs—one in a reptile zoo 
and another as a door-to-door salesman of baby chairs—as well as a considerable 
amount of debt, to make ends meet.  His troubles were far from unique for new scholars 
                                                
33 “University History” from the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology website: 
http://www.sdsmt.edu/About/University-History/  Last retrieved on 1/27/2015. 
34 Neil Ericksen, “A Tale of Two Cities: Flood History and the Prophetic Past of Rapid City, South 
Dakota.”  Economic Geography, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct, 1975), 307. 
35 Ericksen, “A Tale,” 307. 
36 There are four such pictures archived at the U.S. Geological Survey website: 
http://sd.water.usgs.gov/projects/FloodHistory/1951-1960/photos.html.  Last retrieved 1/28/2015. 
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in the early 1950’s.  Green wrote of the experience to his friend and fellow philosopher 
Maxine Greene in a letter dated July 8, 1977: 
I think I know something of the anger and frustration that you sense.  Perhaps 
you will remember that I had quite the same experience myself some years ago.  
I was unemployed as an educator—at least in anything that resembled what I 
had expected and worked for years to achieve.  And so, for some five years—
and with a family—I was unable to find any kind of position that was even a 
decent approximation of what I had prepared to do.  The impact of that 
experience—which equally bore upon the lives of many of my fellow students—
was devastating.  For me it led to hospitalization, a rather thorough collapse, and 
partial, but temporary paralysis.  For others that I knew, it led to other forms of 
psychic ruin—two suicides, one murder, and three cases of total personal ruin.  I 
have never yet had a position for which I was “properly trained”.  And it took 
nearly fifteen years, after I finally did locate a post, before we were able to get 
anywhere near out of debt. 
 
He toyed with the thought of entering the ministry for the Presbyterian Church, 
but “recoiled from ecclesiastical duties, and was repelled by what, at the time, seemed 
to [him] the terrible timidity of the Church.”37  Was this cryptic remark a reference to 
the Church’s slowness at coming round to the civil rights movement?  It is hard to say.  
He did, however, begin to think seriously of taking on the responsibilities of an elder—a 
lay position of some seriousness within the Presbyterian polity.  The First Presbyterian 
Church on Kansas Street had just completed its new building months before the Greens 
arrived in Rapid City, and it drew professors and instructors from the colleges.  But this 
was not the typically progressive Presbyterian Church that Green, who had only lived in 
major university towns, felt at home in.  Rapid City was then a deeply conservative 
place, and Green was by comparison a fancy Ivy League outsider with liberal views. 
Without social, professional, and to a surprising degree physical comfort, Green 
found himself overworked and stressed to the point of serious illness.  After his 
hospitalization, he and Rosemary began taking vacations to his parents’ cabin in 
                                                
37 From a letter written to “Gerry” (Gerald Grant) dated March 1st, 1976. 
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Minnesota as a way to escape the drudgery and debt into which they had fallen, but this 
did little to ameliorate their situation while they remained in Rapid City.  They were 
renters who subsidized their income with credit while raising a young family.  
During his many trips to Minnesota to convalesce, Green had slowly begun to 
articulate his thoughts about the “leisure society” and on educational concepts like 
teaching, acting, and behaving at the kitchen table of his parents’ cabin.  From these 
early swipes at what would become the manuscript on work and leisure, he finally 
pieced together the humble beginnings of a research program.  There is no way to know 
what his research looked like at this point.  Whatever he was up to, he had clearly been 
reading the futurists with a critical eye and had been able to convince the recruiting 
committee at Michigan State that he possessed some potential.  When the offer came, in 
the late spring of 1955, he and Rosemary packed up their few belongings as quickly as 
they could and left the muddy landscape of Rapid City behind them forever.   
The move to East Lansing was welcome, despite whatever reservations Green 
had about continuing to teach outside of a philosophy department.  For starters, East 
Lansing was an established Midwestern college town, much like his hometown of 
Lincoln, and it was considerably closer to his parents’ cabin, which had become a 
refuge and spiritual retreat for him.  And while Michigan State brought him on as a 
Humanities professor, the truth was that Green still had not figured out for himself what 
it meant to do philosophy.  A few more years in the wilderness—this time a 
considerably greener wilderness—might not be so bad. 
He set to the task of proving himself capable of holding a paying professorship, 
but publishing proved to be an uphill battle for him.  His research program had not yet 
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crystallized, and he was not the sort of person who could churn out articles on subjects 
he cared little about.  After a three year long dry spell, and under pressure to publish 
something, he hastily scribbled an article with the uninspired title, “A Humanities 
Teacher Looks at Engineering Education” for the Journal of Engineering Education.  
Green thought it so forgettable that, in a CV composed several years later, he had not 
bothered to remember the volume or number of the issue in which it had been 
published.  It would be another five years before he published anything else, and it is 
tempting to see this gap as indicative of Green’s own moral seriousness with regard to 
his work.   
In 1955, Michigan State had officially become a university, changing its name in 
July of that year to Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science.38  It 
was the original land grant college in the United Stated and had been able to draw some 
considerable talent to its faculty.  Among his colleagues was the famed existential 
psychologist, Erich Fromm, who was at Michigan State for part of two years that Green 
was there.  In a letter to Gerald Grant dated March 1, 1976, Green recalls:  
I sat on the fringes of many discussions with him, and listened with a certain 
ambivalence and even fear, but also fascination.  I don’t suppose that I 
exchanged more than five words with him, but I listened to him for hours on 
end.  I think that my timidity was partly an expression of my own rather dismal 
sense of personal failure. 
 
Green’s tenure at Michigan State overlapped with Fromm’s from 1957 to 1961.  
He was either mistaken in his remembrance of the years they shared or Fromm enjoyed 
a couple of sabbatical leaves during his time at Michigan State.  In any event, Green 
was a humanities professor for two of those years, but in 1959 he took a position with 
                                                
38 “University History” from “MSU Facts” on the Michigan State University website: 
https://www.msu.edu/about/thisismsu/facts.html.  Last retrieved on 1/28/2015. 
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the university as an assistant professor of education.  It is clear from these and other 
remarks about his time at Michigan State that the move to education was not the cure 
for what ailed him:   
Up to that time, I too, was convinced that I was a failure, unable to support my 
family, unable to get a job “in philosophy”—whatever that means—unable to 
find a way to law school, unable to master the “methods of research”—whatever 
that means—unable to convince anyone of importance at Michigan State that I 
might be able to do something worthwhile (there were exceptions), and, in 
general, I felt terribly “boxed in”, totally inadequate, and a rather complete 
failure.39 
   
It must be noted that he speaks here of a sense of complete failure, but these years 
cannot have been a complete wash.  After all, his scratchings on work and leisure, so far 
written as a kind of response to Sebastian De Grazia’s classical, conservative book, Of 
Time, Work, and Leisure, had begun to look something like a manuscript, enough so 
that he could submit his work for a Senior Research Fellowship at Princeton 
Theological Seminary—a fellowship which he received and for which he took a much 
needed sabbatical leave during the 1962-63 school year to work on his manuscript.  And 
it should not be overlooked that, alongside his complaints about this period in his life, 
he alludes to a time, to a turning point in his sense of self.  This was his meeting with 
acclaimed sociologist David Riesman. 
 Green had been looking outside of his profession for a sense of purpose, for his 
life’s work, and he found it in religious life.  Living in a long-established college town, 
he was able to settle somewhat more comfortably into his local church community, 
Eastminster Presbyterian—a stylish church designed in the Michigan Modern style by 
famed architect Alan Dow.  This is where he moved into a leadership role in his 
religious community as an elder but more importantly as a synodal representative to the 
                                                
39 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976. 
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National Council of Churches (NCC), an organization embroiled in the civil rights 
movement.  During his sabbatical year in 1963, Green attended a fateful meeting of the 
NCC at Eastern Baptist College in Philadelphia.  David Riesman, who had risen to fame 
with the publication of his landmark work in sociology, The Lonely Crowd, was there as 
a Jewish participant.   
 Green and Riesman hit it off.  Though he did not know it at the time, Riesman 
had been a close acquaintance of his Michigan State colleague, Erich Fromm, and was 
perhaps drawn to Green because of the association.40  Whatever the case, the meeting 
was nothing short of life changing for Green: 
You are aware, of course, how much [Riesman] has influenced my own life.  He 
was the first person, of any prominence, who took pains to listen to what I 
thought, first at a small meeting assembled by the National Council of Churches 
at a small college outside Philadelphia…but then he encouraged me to send him 
the early manuscript of the book on work.  I sent it to him fearfully, and his 
response—a letter of some eight pages—was, and remains, the most perceptive, 
helpful and supportive response that I have ever received…That letter did more 
than anything up till then to lift me from periodic despair for myself into a fresh 
resolve to persevere and a new kind of understanding for others.41 
 
The letter is unfortunately lost to time, and all that remains of it are a few remarks in a 
single correspondence.  What is known is that Riesman put Green in touch with other 
people, scholars who could help fill in the gaps in his project (for example, noted 
anthropologist Dorothy Lee) and set Green in a direction that clarified his argument’s 
mainline by distinguishing between self-disclosure and self-discovery, telling Green 
they run on separate tracks.  “I remember sitting on a bench in the kitchen of my 
parents’ cabin in Minnesota all one afternoon writing five pages until I thought I had 
                                                
40 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976.  I’m engaging in a bit of speculation on this point, but not wildly.  
Riesman sought out Fromm to learn more about psychoanalysis, and it is fair to assume his natural 
motives for befriending the young Green were mixed with professional interest. 
41 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976. 
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that thought in hand.”42  He also suggested to Green the key to his whole project—
getting at a distinction between work and labor.  Riesman told him that “[m]ost of us 
are not heroic enough to be always at our work…It is our work that redeems our jobs, 
but our jobs that give needed structure to our lives and sustain us in our work.”43  
 In Riesman, Green had found the intellectual camaraderie and the mentoring that 
had been missing from his early career.  In an eight page letter, now lost, Riesman 
inspired in Green a vision for his future as a scholar.  Writing to Gerald Grant about the 
letter, Green says, “I cannot tell you with what elation I received that letter, what a burst 
of energy it unleashed, and, oddly enough, how it added to the calm patience needed to 
finish the thing started.  I felt so much less a failure!!!”44  He was most drawn to 
Riesman’s epistemic humility:  
He said to me when I last saw him in Cambridge that he was “tone deaf” to 
philosophy.  I have thought about that a lot, and in so far as I understand what he 
means, I think I share that attitude, that reluctance, to some extent.  I think it is a 
reluctance, in the face of so many complexities, to offer pretense to a kind of 
omniscience.  In religious terms, it is a turning away from idolatry in favor of a 
serious attention to the different forms of flesh and blood, a favoring of 
biography over the study of social history in the grand sense – or perhaps, better 
said, a blending of those two.45 
 
Green described him as a first-rate scholar who did not bring a theory that explained 
everything to each case, but rather allowed the theory to grow out of the observance and 
interpretation of facts.  His attention to the nuances of context was, to Green’s mind, 
quite impressive and relatively rare for a sociologist of his time: 
“Philosophy often seems to deal with the general and the abstract as though it 
would never condescend to the mundane details of life.  Yet, on the other hand, 
it can get nowhere unless it rests upon the particular.  The philosophic task is to 
                                                
42 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976. 
43 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976. 
44 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976. 
45 Letter to Gerry dated March1, 1976. 
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find the general in the particular and pronounce it in ways that illumine, ways 
that make it recognizable to others, and that is what Riesman has always been 
good at. 
 
“I know that the texts of philosophy – it is, unlike sociology, a textual discipline 
–seem often to traverse only the airey [sic] heights of pure rationality.  It is as 
though they never descend to the world we all live in – even philosophers, if 
they would only admit it…Yet, anyone who has ever tried to teach the meaning 
of those texts – instead of trying merely to make point by point a demonstration 
of his own brilliance – will discover that the only way to do it is to show how the 
texts illuminate the particular experiences of human beings. 
 
“That is why I often think of Riesman as I think of Wittgenstein.  He, you know, 
insisted always on examples – and context.  The point, it seems to me, is often 
lost on modern “pyrotechnicians”, like [J.L.] Austin, who seem to think that 
nothing more is needed than examples.  Wittgenstein, in considering the nature 
of language, once observed, “Dogs never tell lies,” and then he adds, “And it is 
not because they are so honest.”46    
 
Through the letter from Riesman and in subsequent interactions, Green came to 
clarify his own position on the “disciplines.”  That is, the mastery of a discipline meant 
to Green that one learns to use the disciplines in service to thought, rather than seeing 
the disciplines as intellectual ends toward which thought is mastered. 
The academic disciplines are important not because we are to “advance the 
discipline” but because the disciplines are helpful in promoting what is good in 
human life.  Each one is incomplete and in itself, therefore, of no importance 
whatever, but if one masters one, then another, and lives within a third, their 
joint effect is more likely to be of human worth.47 
 
The consequence of such a shift in thinking brought Green to the periphery of a 
kind of pragmatism.  One does not study philosophy in order to become a philosopher, 
to see the world in terms of a philosophical system; rather, one studies philosophy to 
have the tools of philosophical inquiry at one’s disposal when confronted with a 
problem or intellectual difficulty.  In Kantian language, the disciplines are not the ends 
of education but the means to an end, namely problem solving.  To become a 
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philosopher would be, on this view, far too limiting with respect to the problems of 
education, which are not reducible to one or another philosophical category (e.g. 
epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, et al.).  In fact, when Green announces in the 
opening chapter of WLAS that the philosophy of education must be the philosophical 
study of ideology, he is declaring the limits of philosophical inquiry into education by 
subtly invoking the need to bring other disciplines to bear on the matter, such as 
sociology, history, and anthropology.  A “philosopher” of education cannot work in as 
constrained a way as academic philosophers; he or she must be a master of many 
disciplines and slave to none. 
The extent to which this realization amounts to a paradigm shift for Green is a 
matter of some ambiguity.  On the one hand, his entire philosophical education had 
been conducted under the auspices of some of the most noteworthy analytic and post-
analytic philosophers of the twentieth century; men who conceived the philosophical 
enterprise as rightfully absorbed with the abstract problems of epistemology and 
ontology.  To these, a philosopher must concern himself with the objects of thought, not 
with the messy mundane problems that arise when one begins to consider how various 
thoughts play out on a cluttered field of practice.  They ask brazenly, if only implicitly, 
What has Athens to do with Horace Mann?  On the other hand, Green’s concern for 
practical problems and lack of passion for abstract arguments was longstanding.  His 
Master’s work at the University of Nebraska had been in political philosophy, and his 
most abstract analytical work, his dissertation, had clearly been written in a tone of 
indifference toward its subject matter. 
 32 
What does philosophical method mean for philosopher who does not believe in 
the construction of philosophical systems?  Most importantly, for Green, it means that 
philosophy is nothing other than the activity of rational criticism, and in the special case 
of education, it means the rational criticism of the ideologies that underwrite every 
vision of education (cf. WLAS 6).  There’s a note of irony here for anyone familiar with 
Green’s (undeserved) reputation as a crypto-conservative.   
It is hard to know whether Green encountered Durkheim’s thought before or 
after Riesman, whether he had come across the father of sociology previously and been 
encouraged by Riesman to return to him with renewed interest, or whether he had 
already developed a strong interest in Durkheim’s functionalism by the time he met 
Riesman.  Whatever the case, Green was by the mid-1960s convinced of the real value 
of the functionalist perspective for understanding institutional and social change.  He 
said of Riesman’s functionalism, that his “sense of the tenuous condition of society and 
the long time and tortuous path that change and civilization take have always been to 
me features of his thought that are worth dwelling on again and again.”48 
Green credited this functionalist perspective of Riesman’s for his own 
“rebellious attitude” towards revisionist historians and critical theorists in education.  It 
was not, to Green’s mind, a matter of choosing one prescription for change over 
another, but rather rejecting a prescription for how to change institutions (critical 
theory) because it did not realistically deal with how institutional life actually unfolds 
(functionalism).  It is this perspective that riled many of his colleagues in Educational 
Studies and set him up for accusations that he was prescribing outdated institutional 
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values in the face of a great deal of suffering by minorities and women.  This is the 
main criticism that would haunt his next major work on “the system.”   
It is difficult, without the original letter, to say more about why the meeting with 
Riesman had the impact it did on Green.  Perhaps he was simply starved for validation 
by an established scholar and Riesman came along at just the right moment with the 
kindness and attentiveness the younger scholar craved.  Riesman certainly fit the 
pattern—fit the type—of scholar Green was drawn to; like Bouwsma and Malcolm, he 
displayed, In Green’s words, “an impeccable attention to fact (accompanied by a 
remarkable capacity to see it), a reluctant issuance in generalization, and a downright 
avoidance of anything resembling doctrine—except in methodology.”49  He might have 
been describing his previous two mentors.  Interestingly, he might also have been 
describing his future self from the perspective of his students.   
 In the following two years, Green experienced a new level of productivity.  
Thanks to a much needed sabbatical year and to the impetus he had received from 
Riesman, the manuscript was taking a definite shape; it was far enough along that Green 
was able to present all but the first and last chapter of the completed version for the 
Robert Jones Lecture in Education at the Austin Theological Seminary in January of 
1965.  This is getting ahead of the narrative.  First, there is the offer to come aboard at 
Syracuse in a tenure-track position.  It is the offer he had been waiting for a decade to 
receive. 
 
                                                
49 Letter to Gerry dated March 1, 1976. 
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Chapter 2: Syracuse and Success 
In 1964, Syracuse University hired Green to create an Educational Studies 
program that would draw together various departments.  He may have had little by way 
of publications to show for his time at Michigan State, but he had added four important 
experiences to his resume that likely appealed to the search committee.  One was the 
research fellowship at Princeton Theological Seminary, and another was a stint, in 
1960, as the United States delegate to the World Conference on Teaching and Theology 
at the University of Strasbourg.  Although Syracuse was not officially a Methodist 
university, it had a strong Protestant identity, and the search committee would likely see 
that a scholar such as Green—one concerned with the relationship between his own 
Protestantism and public education—would fit well with the culture of the school.  
During the spring of 1964, Green would also have been able to tell the search 
committee that he was engaged in two lectureships: one, as the current Provost Lecturer 
at Michigan State, lecturing on the topic, “Teaching, A Model of the Political Process”; 
and the other, as guest lecturer to the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S.A., where his talk was titled, “The Americanization of Conflict: 
Some Cultural Assumptions.”     
So, in the summer of 1964, the Greens moved again, although this time the 
move was a happy one.  They knew the area well, having lived just an hour south of 
Syracuse for several years, and both were pleased to be out of the miserable situation at 
Michigan State.  In addition to the serenity of the green hills of Syracuse, they 
discovered a fair bit of excitement.  On August fifth, shortly after they arrived in town, 
President Lyndon Johnson made his famous speech, “Remarks on the Communist 
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Problem in Southeast Asia,” at Syracuse University.  It has been called the speech that 
launched the Vietnam War.1  Aside from the flurry of activity surrounding Johnson’s 
visit, Syracuse was a quiet community that summer—a natural, peaceful small 
university community of the sort that largely vanished in the following decades of 
economic expansion.   
The manuscript on work and leisure was nearing completion.  Green had 
developed key analyses of work, job, and calling, and was developing an argument 
about vocation that would put him at odds with his own Calvinist tradition.  Dorothy 
Lee had supplied Green with “key comments” on diurnal time, a centrally important 
piece in his analysis of work and leisure.2  And through his work with the National 
Council of Churches he was made known to the selection committee for the prestigious 
Robert F. Jones Lecture in Christian Education at the Austin Presbyterian Theological 
Seminary in Austin, Texas.  He received his invitation to deliver the lecture during this 
first year at Syracuse.  It was a tremendous way to cap off his first year of academic 
success. 
 The Robert F. Jones Lecture was created in honor of Robert Franklin Jones, a 
Presbyterian minister active in education in Texas, who was also a participant in the 
National Council of Churches at the same time as Green.  It had become a widely 
regarded forum for theologians, philosophers, and educated Christian clergymen to try 
out ideas for reforming Christian religious education.  The lecture topics cast a fairly 
                                                
1 From “The American Presidency Project” website: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26419. 
Last retrieved on 2/01/2015. 
2 Green quotes from a letter from Dorothy Lee on page 50 of Work, Leisure: “Greeks ‘pass’ the time; they 
do not save or accumulate or use it…It is distasteful to Greeks to organize their activities according to 
external limits; they are therefore either early or late, if a time is set at all…To arrive to dinner on time is 
an insult, as if you came just for the food…Visitors, asking how far it is to the next village, find that ‘five 
minutes’ may mean half an hour or two hours, but they find that the answer ‘a cigarette away’ does 
provide reasonably accurate measure.” 
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wide net.  In 1953, Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary had hosted James Smart, 
whose lecture was published as The Teaching Ministry of the Church: An Examination 
of the Basic Principals of Christian Education; and several years after Green, in 1978, 
Carl Ellis Nelson published his lecture under the title, Don’t Let Your Conscience be 
Your Guide.  Of all the lectures, wide in scope though they were, none could match 
Green’s for near irrelevance to the immediate practical concerns of religious education.  
His is by far the most philosophical, the most general in potential application, of the 
lectures.  Most importantly, it allowed Green to try his manuscript with a large audience 
consisting of few if any philosophers, a crucial test for Green’s pragmatic interest in 
speaking to practitioners as well as specialists.   
 It is clear from correspondences about this time that the manuscript now 
consisted of all but the first and last chapter of Work, Leisure, and the American 
Schools.  This means that the manuscript read out at the lecture included the chapters on 
work and labor, time and leisure, work and job, and work and the quest for potency.  
Interestingly, the manuscript would have been without the final chapter, which dealt 
most directly with the impact of his investigation on public education.  It would also 
have been without his opening chapter, which supplied his definition of the philosophy 
of education.  So, what went with him to Austin was a fascinating conceptual analysis 
of work and leisure as it applied to the Protestant Christian debate about the relationship 
between jobs and callings.   
Given his recent work with the PCUSA General Convention and the World 
Conference on Teaching and Theology, it may be reasonable to conclude that Green’s 
primary interest at this point was not public education—that he tacked on the opening 
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and closing chapters concerning public education as an afterthought.  There may be 
something to this.  After all, in 1964 churches and synagogues were still the privileged 
sites for explicit moral instruction, and Green was clearly interested in moral education; 
but a second lecture, delivered the following year, shows Green already deep into an 
investigation of moral education in a pluralistic, democratic polity. 
  
The J. Richard Street Lecture, 1966 
 In the summer session of 1966, Green was tapped to deliver the J. Richard Street 
Lecture in Education.  The lectureship was established in honor of the founder of the 
teacher’s college at Syracuse University, and its purpose was to create a forum for 
students, professors, and the public that would explore cutting edge ideas in education. 
 Green’s lecture, titled, “Education and Pluralism: Ideal and Reality,” is 
interesting because it is an early sketch of the argument he was developing in his final, 
unpublished work Walls some thirty years later, in the late 1990s.  It is also of interest 
in that it shows Green at work on moral education from quite a different angle than we 
find in Work, Leisure, and the American Schools.  Both the J. Richard Street lecture and 
the manuscript on work and leisure are concerned with the cultural environment in 
which moral education unfolds—the former with the way a value, such as pluralism, is 
embedded in social structures and the latter with the way ideologies of work are 
embedded in social structures.  This would remain Green’s modus operandi for the 
remainder of his career, seeking to understand a problem from more than one angle.   
 The lecture is equal parts conceptual analysis—of pluralism as it applies to 
education—and historical analysis of American democratic pluralism as a political 
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philosophy.  He sets out to draw attention to the important fact that, in a social world, 
pluralism may be an ideal or a reality, a constellation of values or a social structure.  As 
a value, pluralism is more at home in Anglo-American democracy than in the French-
Continental tradition—an important point of contrast for Green’s investigation.  The 
French style of democracy is characterized as prizing equality over liberty, unity over 
difference, whereas the Anglo-American style prizes liberty above all, and therefore 
difference over unity, freedom over equality.  This is why, in France, it is common to 
find legislation which, to Americans, would seem anti-Democratic but in actuality 
supports a form of democracy oriented toward a unified, and egalitarian, culture.3   
 According to Green, what we find in the United States is a more pluralistic 
polity, one that supports the freedom of local and private associations, even privileging 
them over egalitarian concerns.  Consequently, to prevail politically in the United States 
it is not necessary to prevail ideologically, as would be the case in a more egalitarian 
democratic polity.  Americans secure freedoms through politics, Europeans secure 
assent; and so politics in America does not become ideological in the profound sense in 
which it does in continental Europe.  This, anyway, is the picture Green paints of 
pluralism as a democratic value in his lecture.   
 In America, this means that pluralism as a value is about freedom of association, 
and this includes an implicit assumption—distinctly American—that local and private 
associations do not threaten the unity of the polis.  This assumption entails several 
important beliefs about association.  First, that freedom of association must extend both 
to groups and to individuals; individuals must be allowed to choose their associations 
freely and to dissociate just as freely.  Second, it entails that diversity is good.  After all, 
                                                
3 A recent example would be the banning of headscarves in French state schools. 
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this is what is meant by the claim that the polis is not threatened by a proliferation of 
private associations; yet, this cannot be all that is meant.  If diversity is good (and not 
merely tolerable), then contact between groups is both good and necessary.  Third, and 
finally, the idea that diversity is good assumes that diversity must be maintained 
throughout contact between associations, that contact should not be a process of 
“saming” the other.  It is good to have different ways of life in contact and competition 
with one another. 
 That is to speak only of pluralism as an American democratic value, which 
leaves the greater part of his lecture to examine what it means to call pluralism a social 
reality.  This is the most important part of his task, for if the ideal of pluralism is to be 
realized in education—and it is his argument that it should be—then it is necessary to 
understand how pluralism as a value is embedded in social structures.  What follows is 
Green’s characteristically astute interdisciplinarity, bringing the insights of sociology to 
bear upon a philosophical investigation: 
Now one of the fundamental ways of viewing education, perhaps the most 
fundamental way, is to see it not simply as formal schooling but as a process by 
which (1) one generation seeks to transmit its culture to the next, (2) induct the 
young into adult social roles, and (3) help them to develop their own self-
identity through membership in some historical group and through 
participational roles in some contemporary association.  In other words, 
education is primarily the process of cultural transmission, socialization, and 
developing participational and historical identity.  Education does not require 
formal schooling.  It is, if anything, education in highly specialized societies 
which requires it.  I wish then to examine pluralism in relation to these 
fundamental social functions of education.4 
 
 His argument turns upon two sets of sociological distinctions.  The first is the 
distinction between primary and secondary associations, the former being “intimate, 
                                                
4 Thomas Green, Education and Pluralism: Ideal and Reality.  Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press 
(1966), 12. 
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face-to-face, personal, and informal relations with others” that “engage the whole 
personality,” the latter being “casual, frequently functional, and usually not face-to-
face,” that do not engage the “whole personality.”5  The second set of distinctions 
involves types of pluralistic social structures that Green breaks up into insular 
pluralism, halfway pluralism, and structural assimilation.  The argument that follows is, 
in a nutshell, that regardless of the particular social structure in play, the educational 
problems remain the same: cultural transmission, socialization, and the development of 
an historic identity.  It is this third part, the development of historic identity, that grew 
complicated as our society moved from insular pluralism to structural assimilation. 
 Green’s J. Richard Street lecture deserves close biographical attention for a 
couple of reasons.  It contains his first published formulation of the process of 
education—an understanding of what education is about that Green sticks to, word for 
word, for the remainder of his career; and it is also the first published work in which 
Green presents the primary predicament of moral education—the difficulty, in an 
assimilation society, of forming an identity rooted in a particular historical group—as 
the central problem of contemporary American education.  The “solution” to the 
problem has its practical expression in what Green dubs the principle of concern and the 
principle of indifference.  The principle of concern states that “nothing that people care 
very strongly about can be introduced into the public schools as a topic of study unless 
the strongly held opinions concerning it approach unanimity.”6  The principle of 
indifference is its corollary.  Namely, “anything can be introduced as a topic of study in 
the public schools provided it is a matter about which nobody cares a great deal or is 
                                                
5 Green, Education and Pluralism, 12. 
6 Green, Education and Pluralism, 31. 
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widely believed to have no practical consequences.”7  Taken together, this formulation 
of the problem of education in a pluralistic society constitutes a genuinely new insight 
that Green had been straining towards for years, and it is his first unique contribution to 
pragmatic thought about the problems of public education. 
 The connection between the two completed manuscripts—Work, Lesiure, and 
the American Schools and Educational Pluralism: Ideal and Reality—can be located in 
Green’s early concerns about moral formation in a pluralistic and technocratic society.  
It is tempting to hazard a second connection, one without direct documentary testimony 
but possessing, nevertheless, reasonably compelling circumstantial evidence, between 
Green’s work and the contemporaneously composed essays of Harvey Cox that were 
published in 1965 as The Secular City.8  Cox had been at work on The Secular City at 
Andover Newton Theological School during the 1963-64 school year, and he had been 
running in the same large circles as Green.9  They had both been reading Riesman, had 
both met him—Cox eventually became a sort of colleague through Harvard Divinity 
School in 1965, and both, in their respective chapters on work and job had drawn 
heavily on Alan Richardson’s book, The Biblical Doctrine of Work.  Compare, for 
example, this quote from Richardson as found in Cox’s book with the following 
statement by Green in Work, Leisure: 
The Bible knows no instance of man’s being called to an earthly profession or 
trade by God.  St. Paul, for example, is called to be an apostle; he is not called to 
be a tentmaker…We cannot with propriety speak of God’s calling a man to be 
an engineer or a doctor or a schoolmaster.10 
                                                
7 Green, Education and Pluralism, 31. 
8 Harvey Cox, The Secular City: New Revised Edition.  New York: The Macmillan Company (1965). 
9 From a biographical page on Pennsylvania authors at the Pennsylvania State University website: 
http://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/palitmap/bios/Cox__Harvey.html.  Last retrieved 2/5/2015.  The “large 
circles” to which I refer are the National Council of Churches and the Ivy League Seminary scene, where 
unpublished manuscripts often circulate freely among faculty. 
10 Cox, Secular City, 164. 
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And in Green: 
 
Nowhere [in the New Testament] is there the idea of a man being “called” to be 
a teacher, an engineer, a physician, or a fisherman or to fill any other occupation 
in the secular order of things.  Paul was not called to be a tentmaker; that was 
simply his job, his method of making a living.11 
 
This may well have amounted to an incidental connection between scholars working on 
similar tracks with similar reading material at hand.  That is likely all this amounts to, 
but it is nonetheless valuable to see Green at this point in his career articulating a 
problem that others in the Protestant tradition are likewise attempting to address, but 
without an eye to public education.  Green’s genius was to see how a dilemma in 
religious education—the secularization of work—pertained to a more comprehensive, 
important change in the mission of the public schools.  If, as Green and Cox argued, 
work and job were understood as distinct enterprises—in contradiction to the 
“Protestant Ethic” that viewed them as one and the same—then educators and schools 
should take a double approach to their students.  On the one hand, they would need to 
prepare them for a specific job, as schools do now; but on the other hand, they would 
encourage their students to think separately about what their life’s work might be.  This 
latter sense of work lines up with the old notion of a “calling.” 
 At this point, the final pieces of Green’s presiding project were falling into 
place, and he had a sense, finally, of the range of problems that would hold his attention 




                                                
11 Green, Work, Leisure, 93. 
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Educational Policy Research Center, 1967-69 
 Green had hit the ground running at Syracuse.  In his first two years, between 
1965 and 1967, he had managed to complete his manuscript on work and leisure during 
a talk at the New School for Social Research,12 had been a guest lecturer at the Up-State 
Medical Center and at the Danforth Annual National Workshop on Liberal Education, 
had delivered the J. Richard Street lecture, had developed new courses for the nascent 
Educational Studies department, and had marshaled several of his colleagues from 
colleges across the university to create an interdisciplinary think-tank, the Educational 
Policy Research Center.   
 The EPRC was Green’s brainchild, having grown out of his engagement with 
the futurists for his manuscript on work and leisure.  In the 1967-68 school year, the 
center was little more than an organized forum for select members of the faculty, a sort 
of coordinated series of brainstorming sessions intended to feel out who could 
contribute what and how.  By the following year, 1968-69, the members of the EPRC 
were able to compose a detailed 203-page report about their work, prepared under 
contract with the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.13 
 The report has Green’s fingerprints all over it.  There are the three major areas 
of concern—staffing, defining a specific research program, and development of 
methods for futures studies in educational policy, but it is the last one that smacks most 
of Green’s continuing interests in the heuristic value of futures studies.  It was his idea 
to bring in Robert J. Wolfson to work with the Institute for the Future, with whom the 
                                                
12 Green, Work, Leisure, ix. 
13 Thomas F. Green, “Report of Activities and Accomplishments: March 1, 1968 to February 28, 1969.  
Final Report.”  Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Research Corp. (28 February 1969). ERIC 
ED050433. 
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EPRC subcontracted.14  Perhaps most importantly, it shows Green himself at work on 
the next phase of his project to define the enterprise of moral education in the public 
schools, that having to deal with the rational structure of the educational system.   
 In 1967, The U.S. Office of Education had tasked the EPRC with focusing on 
several questions, the most important for Green being the question of “alternative sets 
of social and organizational arrangements that might characterize the schools of the 
future and the issues attendant upon changes in those arrangements.”15  The second 
most important question, given Green’s research interests “asked for an analysis of the 
possible effects of new instructional systems upon the social design of schools, the 
patterns of social life surrounding the schools, and other impacts on society that will 
require policy consideration in the future.”16  The questions were far too unwieldy for 
research purposes, but by 1968, Green, along with the Research Panel of the EPRC, had 
developed a methodology for addressing them. 
 As a matter of perspicuous timing, systems analysis had produced two new 
methods that had not yet been tried on matters of educational policy.  One was the 
Delphi method and the other a cross-impact matrix for identifying the determining 
forces of a work environment.  Both were nascent tools in futures studies, and Green 
was aware of being on the vanguard of something important for the future of 
educational policy research: 
In the first place, Delphi has been used in the past primarily with respect to 
technological forecasting. It has not been extensively used with respect to so-
called "soft" areas of social phenomena. It seems clear to us, however, that the 
                                                
14 Green, “Report of Activities,” 2. 
15 Green, “Report of Activities,” 2. 
16 Green, “Report of Activities,” 2. 
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difficulties must be directly confronted if the device is to be used extensively in 
areas of concern to the Educational Policy Research Center.17  
 
One of the prime difficulties in the use of the Delphi methods for educational policy 
forecasting that he mentions is how to formulate judgments concerning events in the 
hurly-burly of social change.  Technological forecasting, for which the Delphi method 
was invented, was relatively simple by comparison; it involved making predictions 
about the invention and development of technologies, not about their implementation in 
and repercussions for society.  The crucial difference is one of specificity.  An invention 
of some piece of technology occurs at a specific moment in time; it can be formulated 
as an event.  In order to deal with social processes using the Delphi method, it would 
therefore be necessary to formulate them as events.   
[T]hough a process may extend over a very large span of time and therefore 
cannot be said to occur at any particular point, nonetheless it may reach a certain 
size or a particular configuration at a specific point in time. Various Delphi 
studies can be constructed dealing with broad social processes or social trends 
provided we attach to them appropriate social indicators or indices which are 
signs or evidences of stages that can occur at a specific point in time. This 
technique is currently being adopted by the Center in a social Delphi developed 
in conjunction with the Institute for the Future. This Delphi study deals with 
social changes in twelve major sectors of concern to the Center, and to each 
sector of change there are attached certain interesting indicators or descriptors of 
a specific state of affairs.18 
 
 This adaptation of the Delphi method to educational research is a brilliant but 
little known episode from Green’s career.  Previous uses of the Delphi method were 
able to render expert opinions about goal- and mission-drift in colleges of education, but 
before Green the method had little or no predictive value.19   
                                                
17 Green, “Report of Activities,” 42. 
18 Green, “Report of Activities,” 43. 
19 Frederick R. Cyphert and Walter L. Gant, “The Delphi Technique: A Tool for Collecting Opinions in 
Teacher Education.”  U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1969) ERIC ED042691 
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Two important chapters grew out of his use of the Delphi method at the EPRC, 
“The Shifting Context of Educational Planning” and “The Dismal Future of Equal 
Educational Opportunity,” both written between 1968 and 1969 and published in his 
1971 monograph titled Educational Planning in Perspective.  In the former, Green 
argues that the basic assumptions driving educational policy had changed; due to new 
research in the social sciences, it was no longer possible to take for granted the idea that 
economic growth was “a necessary condition for the advancement of human welfare,” 
and because the public investment in the schools had expected a return in economic 
growth, the very enterprise of formal, government sponsored schooling had been called 
into question.20  To make matters more complicated for educational planning, not only 
economic growth but also the democratization of education had been called into 
question because of “increased inequities in the distribution of occupational opportunity 
and income.”21  The problem with such criticisms is that they cut away at the pillars of 
public education: economic growth and democratization.  It was therefore incumbent 
upon educational planners and policymakers to develop a new sensitivity of attention to 
the social meaning of demographic changes, to shifts in culture; her craft must become 
“more akin to pedagogy and less related to research,” in the sense that she will need to 
“learn from the public and instruct the politician.”22 
 In the latter chapter, the target of Green’s analysis is the goal of equal 
educational opportunity, which he describes as politically inevitable but without a 
                                                
20 Thomas Green, Educational Planning in Perspective: Forecasting and Policymaking.  Surrey, 
England: IPC Business Press Limited (1971), 6. 
21 Green, Educational Planning, 7. 
22 Green, Educational Planning, 8. 
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plausible political solution.23  The chapter is as challenging to read today as it would 
have been in 1968 when he first composed it, primarily because of the cost-benefit 
analysis he applies to an issue freighted with moral significance.  It is the sort of move 
that made Green look like the archconservative he most assuredly was not.  Ironically, 
this is Green at his most pragmatic, acknowledging the importance of a problem while 
asking after the practicality of proposed solutions to it.  The main difficulty for policy 
formation is that the equal distribution of educational benefits, which Green terms the 
benefits view, requires a school system that is “immensely powerful relative to those 
other institutions, such as the family, that constitute the environment for learning in the 
early years.”24  He found this to be a doubtful prospect.  If there were to be a pedagogy 
developed and resources marshaled for increased educational benefits, then Green 
believed that the advantaged class—more skillful in the assembling of resources—
would be the one to claim those benefits, though they were intended for the 
disadvantaged: “It would not be surprising, for example, to discover that the mere 
promulgation and dissemination of the idea of giving children a ‘head-start’ was 
accompanied by a rapid increase in early-childhood education among the advantaged 
groups of American society.”25  To control the pattern of change so that the 
disadvantaged benefited from such a policy, it would be necessary to institute political 
measures that would bar the middle and upper classes from taking advantage of those 
benefits.  Likewise, in order to secure benefits for the disadvantaged the schools would 
have to become total institutions, a dubious prospect for American culture.26  His 
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25 Green, Educational Planning, 34. 
26 Green, Educational Planning, 34. 
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conclusion was in the title of the chapter, that the future of equal educational 
opportunity looked bleak. 
 It is easy for someone in the twenty-first century to find Green’s conclusion 
quaint and rather obvious, but the situation in the middle to late 1960s was very 
different.  He stood at the beginning of the era of national educational policymaking, 
when outcomes were uncertain and hopes were high.  Few people were as astute as 
Green about the direction the schools had begun to take in the middle of the decade.  It 
was the Johnson Administration that, in the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, made the federalization of education significantly more than a relationship of 
financial suasion between the federal government and state schools.  It treated the 
schools as unnecessary middle men, cutting them out of primary considerations for 
funding, and instead granted schools categorical aid based on those students who were 
living in poverty.  More than any federal legislation that came before, the ESEA was a 
“hearts and minds” law aimed at improving the lot of disenfranchised, poor students.  It 
also opened the door to future federal interventions in all aspects of public education.27  
Naturally, there were benefits and drawbacks to such interventions.  On the one hand, 
the federal government under Lyndon Johnson was able to exert pressure on the schools 
in the South to desegregate, but on the other hand there was and continues to be an 
increase in categorical demands made by the federal government without a parallel 
increase in funding. 
 Whatever else one might say about the evolution of the push and pull between 
federalization and local control of education, it must be said that the 1960s produced a 
                                                
27 Patrick McGuinn and Frederick Hess, “Freedom from Ignorance? The Great Society and the Evolution 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.”  Taken 5/10/2012 from: 
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hybrid system of public education that had little semblance to a liberal enterprise.  From 
the necessities of war to the needs of a newly enfranchised African-American 
community, the allure of subjects deemed valuable to the military and industrial 
aspirations of the federal government remained the focus of federal reform efforts.  If 
there was a weakness to Green’s systems analysis approach to the study of policy, it 
could be found in its ideological aloofness.  The EPRC did not produce criticisms of 
implicit curricula.  It was perhaps one area in policy research where Green exercised too 
much optimism. 
 
Guggenheim Fellowship and Work, Leisure Published, 1968-70 
 During the 1968 school year, Green was gearing up for a much-deserved 
sabbatical, but it would not be a period of rest and recreation.  He managed to secure 
not only a Guggenheim fellowship but also an Alfred North Whitehead fellowship 
through Harvard’s College of Education.  The Whitehead fellowship was awarded to 
education professionals—administrators, professors, high school teachers—in order to 
use university resources “to carry out independent research studies.”28  Green proposed 
to study “Education and the Transmission of Moral Ideals.”  It was to mark a transition 
from the specific interests that drove the manuscript on work and leisure to a new phase 
of research that confronted in a more direct way the problem of moral education.  It will 
be best, before proceeding into this new phase of his work, to say a bit about the final 
version of the manuscript on work and leisure in its published form. 
Work, Leisure, and the American Schools was, as with all of Green’s subsequent 
books, developed out of a series of projects over the course of several years: lecture 
                                                
28 Staff Writer, “Saltonstall Will Chair Whitehead Fellowship” in The Harvard Crimson.  April 16, 1968. 
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series, seminars, correspondences with scholars in other fields, prestigious fellowships, 
work with government agencies and addresses to professional organizations.  He was 
never one to work in isolation from the broader intellectual life of the scholarly 
universe.  The same could undoubtedly be said of many works of scholarship, but it is 
nevertheless true that few scholars then or now came as close as Green to recognizing 
the Deweyan ideal of thinking as a social activity.   
It remains an important book if for no other reason than out of a biographical 
interest in Green’s intellectual development, because in the preface and opening chapter 
one finds an overview of his early understanding of the philosophy of education.  More 
particularly, these eleven pages disclose in summary fashion clues to more than a 
decade of reading and reflection on what it means “to think philosophically about 
education.”29  Those clues inevitably lead to Green’s readings of John Dewey, from 
whom he derived the idea that education may be a necessity of human existence but the 
schools are not.  That is certainly not to say that the schools are unnecessary in 
contemporary American society.  Green did not believe that any more than John 
Dewey, but it is to say that “[w]ithin a particular society—our own, for example—a 
system of schools may become as indispensible as education itself.”30  And this is so not 
because schools are necessary to education but rather that the complex demands of our 
society require education to be “carried out institutionally—that is, consciously, 
                                                
29 Green, Work, Leisure, vii. 
30 Green, Work, Leisure, 4. 
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deliberately, and over long and sustained periods of time.”31  It is a close restatement of 
Dewey’s own view in the opening pages of Democracy and Education.32 
There is also a happy concurrence of thought between Bouwsma and Dewey on 
the role of ideological critique in the philosophy of education, in that both took it to be 
central to the enterprise.  No doubt Green would have picked up on this quickly, and yet 
it is Dewey who gave the thought a more explicit treatment and he who is echoed in the 
statement of Green that whenever education becomes a conscious activity it invokes the 
necessity of choice, and those choices will reflect a particular view of human nature.33   
The influence of Dewey on Green’s thought at this point does not mean that 
WLAS should be seen as a Deweyan book.  In style—in the use of creative thought 
experiments and clarity of conceptual analysis, it bears closer affinities to Wittgenstein 
or Bouwsma.  If anything, the mission of the book and the process of its composition 
are Deweyan.  Take, for example, the emphasis Green places on the heuristic value of 
his analysis over its truth value, the latter being the primary concern of Wittgenstein and 
Bouwsma: 
It can happen, after all, that the world will change in such a way that those 
beliefs that have served well in the past will no longer suffice.  There are 
occasions when it is not enough for men to believe what they have received out 
of their history as true; for in some respects at least, what they believe to be true 
may in fact be quite irrelevant…From time to time, therefore, men are called 
upon to change their minds and to change them precisely with regard to those 
beliefs and ideals that they have been most disposed to take for granted.  Thus, 
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the task of “making a case” begins by patiently examining and reconstructing 
our beliefs, not in total disregard for the measure of their truth, nor yet in abject 
servitude to some ideal of truth, but with our sites set firmly on what is 
functionally adequate to believe.34 
 
No reader of Dewey could miss the reference to the reconstruction of beliefs in light of 
their social adequacy, and no critic of Dewey will overlook Green’s enduring regard for 
the truth of a belief.  What Green leaves us in the introduction to WLAS is a broad-
minded pragmatism that can encompass both religious insights and change, and it is a 
work that reflects his vision—a work that, with trembling hands, grasps at both ideas.  
The result is a carefully written book, a book respectful of the history of the ideas it 
handles, but at the same time it did not aim to establish firm objective principles from 
which to derive durable educational truths (or Truths).   
I had said before that the book would be important if for no other reason than 
the richness of clues to Green’s early reading in the philosophy of education, but there 
are of course other reasons for studying WLAS, even for advocating the book’s place 
among the canon of works in the field.  For starters, it presents a profound philosophical 
treatment of time as it bears on educational thought—a treatment that remains without 
parallel in the field.  His insight that leisure, in a contemporary American context, is 
defined through categories of work (e.g. as “free time”) led him to reject writers such as 
Sebastian de Grazia and Joseph Pieper who invoke classical—and therefore irrelevant—
notions of leisure (unrelated to clock-time) in their criticisms of contemporary 
education.35  On the other hand, it led him to embrace a fruitful and too long neglected 
distinction for educational planning between job and calling, between finding a job and 
finding a work, that described the former as a way of earning one’s keep and the latter 
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as an activity that invested life with meaning.36  This move had the further effect of 
diminishing the moral import of modern vocational life, of attacking the Calvinist 
conflation of “calling” and “job.”  For Green, and in spite of his Calvinism, moral 
importance is found in a person’s work, not in a job.  This is not, in his hands, a 
prescription for the way things should be but rather a more accurate description of the 
way things in fact are.  Nevertheless, he did seem to regard it as happy news for some 
people in certain jobs: 
The point of the distinction…is altogether different: it is that in a leisure society, 
and indeed in contemporary America, there are many jobs that need doing, 
which need not and ought not be viewed as a calling for a “heavy investment of 
identity.”  To speak of a job as a “mere method of providing for material needs” 
is one way to express this point.37 
    
The problem of leisure connects to his larger project, that of defining the sphere 
of moral education.  As his explication of the meaning of work makes clear, moral 
education requires an arena for consequential action, a place obviously other than one’s 
job, but he leaves the exploration of such an arena for a later work.  In 1968, the 
manuscript was off to the publishers, and Green was making preparations for a year at 
Harvard for a new leg of his professional life. 
 Green had happy memories of the year at Harvard, calling it a time of “[t]otal 
freedom to work and write.”  His only regret about the year was having little contact 
with Harvard students.  Writing twelve years later to Patricia Graham, the new dean of 
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, to propose another year there to work on 
what would become Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience, Green 
expressed the hope that he might teach while at Harvard.  But in 1969 and 1970, he 
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would spend his time in fruitful isolation, aside from the occasional discussion with 
faculty.38  He took frequent trips between Syracuse and Cambridge for his work with 
the EPRC, and the result of such a busy sabbatical was a couple of papers expressing 
new lines of thought and a lengthy report for the work of the EPRC.  While at Harvard, 
he wrote and published a short article on the history of education, “Post-Secondary 
Education: 1970-1990” and a longer piece titled, “Education and Schooling in Post-
Industrial America: Some Directions for Policy,” for a panel on Science and 
Technology to be delivered during the second session of the United States Congress.  It 
may have been a wildly productive period, but it was hardly unmatched in his career 
though certainly the first of its kind.  However that may be, the year he returned to work 
at Syracuse, the 1970-1971 school year, was even more productive.  
 
Activities of Teaching, 1970-1971 
 In 1970, Green returned to work at Syracuse where he continued his three-
quarters time responsibilities with the EPRC, this time as Co-Director to allow for a 
busy year, and took up a role as consultant to the newly formed OECD in Paris, France.  
His work with the Country Planning Program of the OECD was accomplished through 
his acquaintance with Beresford Hayward, because of whom he was able “to meet with 
and learn from the major educational planners of the OECD countries.”39  He had also 
agreed, albeit reluctantly at first, to write a work on the philosophy of education with 
the proviso to the publisher that the book would not be written as an overview of a field 
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of inquiry, a prospect he ranked “at the bottom of the world’s lesser needs.”40  The book 
was titled The Activities of Teaching, and it is significant because it lays bare Green’s 
process; whether an act of vulnerability or of unusual confidence, it is a courtesy that 
few philosophers have extended to their readers. 
 As with WLAS, Green presented an important snapshot of his thoughts on the 
philosophy of education in his introduction.  An important part of this glimpse into his 
opinion of the philosophy of education can be found in a comment he made about why 
he refused to write a traditional sort of textbook, a genre of writing that he regarded as 
“everything that philosophy is not.”  After all, a traditional textbook is “coldly objective 
and never personal, supremely confident and never admittedly inadequate or puzzling.”  
Philosophical thinking, on the other hand, is “always incomplete, usually tentative, 
never impersonal, full of false starts and blind alleys, replete with admissions of 
puzzlement, and almost always partisan.”41  Here it should be noted that this is one way 
to describe the philosophical enterprise, a way that grows out of Green’s longstanding 
and Wittgensteinian conviction that philosophy is “an activity and not a subject, 
something to do rather than something to study.”42   
 If a book that introduces students to the philosophy of education cannot be a 
traditional textbook, then one might reasonably be led to ask what Green thought of a 
course in the philosophy of education.  He had a ready answer.  It is “an exercise in 
seduction, aimed at leading students, whether they realize it or not, to formulate their 
questions with more precision and answer them with a more complete grasp of their 
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tentativeness.”43  Correspondingly, reading The Activities of Teaching was to be 
construed as a sort of apprenticeship in philosophy, something akin to watching the 
master at work in his workshop and emulating him until one’s head was wrapped 
around the work.   
 While Activities is indeed an introduction to thinking philosophically about 
education, it is limited in regard to method and content; it explores only the analytic 
method and examines only epistemological problems.  This is by design.  Originally, 
Green intended to write a trilogy of introductory books on how to think philosophically 
about education, beginning with the study of epistemological problems in education, 
moving on to the problems of social philosophy that arise when examining the 
institutional structure of education, and ending with a phenomenological and 
anthropological study of the problems that grow from the internal experiences of 
students and teachers.44  Sadly, he only wrote the first book. 
 It should also be said that Green began this planned trilogy with conceptual 
analysis not because he thought it the privileged mode of philosophy but because it was, 
in his estimation, the easiest to learn with the broadest possible application.  It was 
simply the “skill in making distinctions.”45  More specifically, it is skill in recognizing 
the most relevant distinctions and then thinking about the distinctions themselves.  As 
Green himself put it, “The important truth is not that the analytic task is reflective, but 
that it is reflexive.  It is thinking turned back upon itself.  It is thinking about 
thinking.”46   
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 One important consequence of this way of conceiving the philosophical task is 
to view philosophy as a method rather than a doctrine.  The upside of this view is the 
“almost unlimited expansion” of philosophical interests; analytic treatment can be made 
of virtually any concept.47   
The restrictive focus of analysis on method rather than doctrine thus proves not 
to be a narrow limitation at all.  It is simply the manifestation of an underlying 
commitment to be specific.  It is not philosophical analysis that is sometimes 
barren and inconsequential so much as it is philosophical analysts.  The analytic 
approach to philosophy is as broad and inclusive as the imagination of the 
analyst can make it.  It is made sterile only by infertile minds.48    
 
If Green justified the analytic method on the grounds that it made way for the broadest 
range of interests, he remained nevertheless clear that the data of analysis were found in 
the mundane.  Philosophy, in whatever mode conceived, is reflection on human 
experience, and therefore “its data are always concrete and specific.”49  It examines 
particular experiences, particular thoughts, feelings, and actions, had by particular 
individuals.  And so, he concludes, “[i]f we wish to understand the full breadth and 
depth of human experience, then a careful attention to language is strategic, because it is 
there that human beings make most explicit the form and content of their thoughts.”50  It 
is an impressive sales pitch. 
 An assumption follows from the view that philosophy must attend to concrete 
phenomena and language; namely, that philosophical analysis must proceed through the 
successful deployment of examples.  It is not that examples are needed to illustrate a 
point, but rather that an investigation of examples is the object of philosophical study.  
He offers four types of examples (though there are more): model or paradigmatic cases, 
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contrary cases, borderline cases, and invented cases.51  The development of model cases 
is “very nearly the first step in analysis,” but invented cases are the most profitable; the 
best way to understand the importance of a concept is to imagine a world without it.52  
This was the method Green employed to remarkable effect in WLAS. 
 It is interesting to think that Green, just eight years earlier, had complained of 
having no sense of proper philosophical method and no vision of a work to perform, and 
yet, by 1971 he was able to produce what is undoubtedly one of the most candid and 
helpful introductions to doing analytic philosophy of education.  Activities is not the 
product of a mind at a loss.  In fact, it announces a new intellectual superstar for a field 
in its prime and a coming two decades of fecundity that have rarely been matched by 
another philosopher working in any field of practical inquiry. 
 A word about what this transition period looked like.  Green capped off the 
1970-71 school year with a paper read for the EPRC titled, “Redistribution of 
Educational Goods,” and a few months later saw the publication both of Educational 
Planning in Perspective and Activities of Teaching.  He ended his consultancy with the 
OECD in 1971, but his reputation for practical wisdom had grown so that he was hired, 
in 1972, as a consultant for the development of a new planned community under the 
auspices of HUD called Gananda, New York.  He continued, over the next few years, to 
publish articles about problems that had occupied him in his work at the EPRC, mostly 
on the matter of equal educational opportunity.53  But there was also, between 1971 and 
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1978, a shift in attention to the curriculum of higher education, as well as a continuing 
interest in the problem of work and leisure.54  During this period Green was elected to 
the position of president of the Philosophy of Education Society in the 1975-76 school 
year, a job that he found exhausting and yielding few rewards for the effort.   
 Throughout the nine year period following publication of Activities and 
Educational Planning, between 1971 and 1980, Green had accepted a number of 
important roles outside of Syracuse University, had published twenty-four articles, had 
managed to fulfill his teaching responsibilities at Syracuse, and served as Director and 
founder, starting in 1978, of its Educational Studies program.  Some of these roles will 
be touched on in greater detail in the next chapter.  Most significantly, this was a period 
in which Green had been quietly developing his project on moral education, sketching 
out early ideas for what would become his landmark paper, “The Formation of 
Conscience in an Age of Technology,” as well as his next, and some would say most 
important, book, Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System.  All of this will be 
gone over in greater detail later, but I want to convey the tenacity with which Green 
held onto this project despite the constant demands on his time during this period.  It 
was a characteristic of his career that he could hold problems in mind for decades, 
patiently turning them over for new insights.  For example, in 1978, when Green was in 
the thick of research for Predicting, he returned to the decade old problems of work and 
leisure, this time in a restatement published as a chapter in a monograph, “Career 
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Education and the Pathologies of Work.”55  It is largely a restatement, in miniature, of 
WLAS, with an addendum on the one-way structural relationship between workplace 
arrangements and educational policy.  It deserves comment here not only because it 
shows Green patiently chipping away at a single set of problems over a long period of 
time, but also because of a revealing comment Green makes about educational policy 
that sheds some light on how he felt about his work with the EPRC: 
Education has never proved to be a very useful policy instrument for the 
transformation of basic social institutions.  One reason is that its effects are too 
indirect and too long in appearing for it to be a very effective force in changing 
basic institutions over the short- and middle-range periods within which 
educational policy is likely to be framed and sustained.56 
 
Here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else, we find the greatest divergence between 
Green and Dewey.  Dewey was an unbridled optimist, a near delusional meliorist who 
believed that education could change every social institution for the better.  Green’s 
time entrenched in education policy—at the EPRC, the OECD, and the NIE—led him to 
feel otherwise.  But it was his disaffection from policy that led Green back to full-time 
work on his main project, a new understanding of moral education.  That journey is the 
subject of Chapter Three. 
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Chapter 3: The System 
The 1976 to 1977 school year was busy for Green, despite being a sabbatical 
year, but the flurry of activities actually kicked off in the spring semester leading up to 
his sabbatical leave.  Having made a name for himself in Educational Studies through 
the publication of two well-received books, he now found that requests for his attention 
came from all sides.  In April of 1976, the Philadelphia-based group, Research for 
Better Schools, Inc., under contract with the National Institute of Education, asked 
Green for a critique of a paper for a scholarly conference called “Planning for 
Moral/Citizenship Education.” 1 The full request was for Green’s help “developing 
recommendations” for the intersection of moral and citizenship education, to which end 
the paper critique was a first step.  He had been on an “extensive trip” to the west coast 
when the letter arrived at his office in Syracuse, and so he was not able to formulate a 
reply until 21 days later.  He made a provisional acceptance of the offer to write a 
critique for a paper by University of British Columbia scholar, Jerrold Coombs.  He 
would gladly write it within the time frame suggested by the letter, but he would not be 
attending the conference.2   
It is difficult to say why Green did not, at first, feel tempted to attend the 
conference in Philadelphia on June fourth through the sixth, especially as the host 
organization was affiliated with the N.I.E., with whom he was actively courting a 
professional relationship,3 because their work was directly pertinent to Green’s 
research; but his busy travel schedule and his father’s illness likely played some part in 
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the initial decision to forego attendance.  And then there was Russell Hill’s closing 
remark that the committee had been “rigorously selective” in selecting invitees, and it 
had to help that the Resource Panel for the Planning for Moral Citizenship Education 
included Lawrence Kohlberg.  In any event, between April 28th and May 4th, Green had 
a change of heart. 
 This would be the first concrete step Green took toward participation with the 
N.I.E., and it would be followed, a few weeks later, by the more formal acceptance of a 
fellowship at the Institute.  He had gone to D.C. to visit in the middle of May and 
informed Corrine Rieder by letter that he was coming back for yet another visit at the 
end of the month.4  His letter was, in fact, a follow-up on things discussed during that 
meeting.  During his fellowship with the NIE, Green planned a debate on career 
education and its relation to liberal studies as a part of his contribution to the NIE’s 
evaluation, a debate that would bring to light the political and moral arguments behind 
the work of the NIE.  It is quite feasible that this was a sign that his new work on “the 
system” had everything to do with moral and political arguments first put forward in the 
earlier book on work and leisure.  Thus, we might regard his work on “the system” as 
connective tissue holding his early concern over liberal education together with his later 
work on the formation of conscience.     
Green asked to be placed with the Office of Planning and Budget, an executive 
office within the N.I.E., because it would enable him to work among the broadest range 
of offices within the institute.  At the same time, he was anxious not to be connected too 
closely with the power structure of the office, which would have placed him in a 
perceived supervisory position over the groups with which he wished to work.  He felt 
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that such a position would hamper the free exchange of ideas with members of other 
offices.  He also felt that, logically, this would place a priority among his proposed 
activities at the N.I.E., which he identified as long-range planning, moral and civic 
education, the principles of education and work, and job mobility.5 
Financing this sabbatical leave proved to be trickier than before.  Green was in 
New York for a meeting on June thirtieth to ask for money from the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund (RBF).  The traffic was the heaviest he had ever experienced in the city 
and the sidewalks more crowded than he could remember them being.  This was a 
period of growth for Manhattan, when new blood took advantage of cheap rents and an 
explosion of cultural life in the city.  In a letter to Franklin “Chris” Camwell of the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Green apologized for a late change in schedule.  The 
meeting was to have been on July first.  It was moved back for reasons Green does not 
relate, but it probably had to do with his meeting with Corrine Rieder of the N.I.E.  
Whatever the case, he does apologize for inconveniencing Chris, whom he wished to 
query regarding possible funding from RBF to pay for the work of his graduate 
assistant, Dan Tobin, on his “system” project.  Whether he was successful or not was 
never explicitly disclosed in his correspondences of the period, but Tobin’s salary came 
instead from the Lilly Endowment.6   
The Kettering Foundation and the Lilly Endowment came through, and Green 
was able to bring aboard two assistants to help with data gathering and creating graphs.  
The first part of his work required Green to gain an insider’s understanding of the 
primary policymaking institution in the United States, which would be accomplished in 
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Washington with the N.I.E.  Wasting no time, Green proposed an itinerary that would 
permit him to work in Pompey from September to December, taking one trip a month to 
D.C. where he would stay for three to five days, and then he would reverse his work and 
living situation sometime in January to last until May 15th, the end of his salary period 
for Syracuse.  The point of his commuting plans was to enable him to spend the 
majority of the early part of the sabbatical year working on “the system.”   
While he began work in earnest on the system, he kept up a busy professional 
schedule, especially regarding opportunities to work on policy matters.  For example, 
for his work with the Education Testing Service (ETS), Green travelled to Washington, 
D.C. for July twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth to interview John Porter and Robert 
Andringa.  Then, from August tenth through the seventeenth, he headed to East Lansing 
to interview Keith Goldhammer, from there to Ann Arbor for Wilbur Cohen, and then 
finally to Minneapolis for John Davis.  Due to his growing reputation, Green was 
extended and accepted an invitation travel to Hamilton, New York to serve as speaker 
for Colgate University’s Summer Session Commencement on Sunday, August eighth.  
He was asked to speak on “Public Goods and Pivate Good: An American Problem.”  
For the following month, Green accepted an invitation from Robert L. Belknap7 to 
address a Thursday Seminar, the “General Education Seminar,” a popular forum for 
addressing matters of pressing educational importance that drew large audiences and 
speakers of repute.  The forums were put together by the University Committee on 
General Education at Columbia and held in the Kellogg Conference Center, Room 
1501, in the International Affairs building.  The topic for the Fall session was 
“Liberalism and Liberal Education,” and Green was asked to speak on “The American 
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Theory of Liberal Education” at the second meeting of the forum.  The invitation 
coincided with his upcoming sabbatical leave from Syracuse, so he gladly accepted. 
Finally, in October, Green was invited to be a discussant for a panel at a 
conference on Metaphor and Thought at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champagne, a conference sponsored by the N.I.E. to be held between September 
twenty-sixth and twenty-ninth of 1977.  A number of aspects of the conference appealed 
to Green: its interdisciplinary approach and its affiliation with the N.I.E., not to mention 
that its keynote speaker was his former mentor at Cornell, Max Black.  Other speakers 
were his former Cornell classmate, the novelist and philosopher William Gass, the well-
known Reformed philosopher William Alston, the philosopher of artificial intelligence 
John Searle, the famous cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner, and Thomas Kuhn, 
known for his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  It would be for Green an 
unparalleled company of thinkers.8  
 
Durkheim’s Influence 
Before going into a description of the system, it will be worthwhile to examine 
the primary influences that led Green to thinking about the rational structure of the 
educational system, and there is none more important than Emile Durkheim, whom 
Green had been reading since the early days of the manuscript on work and leisure. 
Durkheim was the father of sociology, a scholar who almost seemed to say that 
psychology asked the wrong questions, who shifted the unit of analysis from the 
individual to the member.  He was best known for his sociological studies of suicide and 
the division of labor, but it was his book titled Moral Education that clued Green to the 
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fact that there were certain enduring structural features of the moral environment.  In 
fact, Green’s claim at the heart of his investigation—that there are durable rational 
structures that constitute “the educational system”—can be viewed, fairly accurately, as 
analogous to Durkheim’s idea that there is a common moral reality behind the various, 
particular systems of belief and practice.  As Durkheim put it: 
We must seek, in the very heart of religious conceptions, those moral realities 
that are, as it were, lost and dissimulated in it.  We must disengage them, find 
out what they consist of, determine their proper nature, and express them in 
rational language.  In a word, we must discover the rational substitutes for those 
religious notions that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most 
essential moral ideas.9 
 
Likewise, Green felt that the educational system would benefit from a rational account, 
so that its behavior and “inherent processes, may become intelligible in a way that is 
independent of differences of economic and political ideology.”10  That is not to say his 
intention is to sanitize education of the manifold irrational and arational motivations of 
maximally interested stakeholders.  Throughout the book and elsewhere in his published 
work Green acknowledges that individuals come to the educational system with certain 
ideological commitments, and he understands that those commitments influence their 
expectations of the system.  The point he makes in his work on “the system” is simply 
that, whatever the stakeholders’ ideological commitments, the policy choices they 
support will be conditioned by and affirm the rational structure of the system: the need 
for schools and colleges, the relationship of those schools and colleges through some 
medium of exchange, and their arrangement through some principles of sequence.   His 
purpose is sociological as much as philosophical, bringing together the insights of 
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functionalism and interaction theory to unmask the influence of social structures on our 
education policymaking, of which more momentarily. 
Somewhere, amid the bustle and seriousness of his scholarly successes, Green 
found the time and, in the libraries of Harvard, the peace and quiet to develop his 
thoughts on the system.  For many, this would become his magnum opus. 
 
The System, 1979-1980 
 In many ways, Green’s first published work as Margaret Slocum Professor of 
Education at Syracuse, a work on “the system,” was destined for some measure of 
controversy.  It was born from it, after all.  Green had started preliminary work on “the 
system” back in early 1970, in a time when Syracuse University was rocked by violent 
student protest.  The “Syracuse Eight,” a group of eight talented black football players, 
famously boycotted playing football until the university agreed to address its own 
institutionalized racist practices.  Their protest drew the nation’s attention, as well as the 
attention of political agitators on both the right and the left, who came to the campus 
and stoked the fires of student discontent.11  The most famous agitator was Tommy 
Tongyai, popularly known as “Tommy the Traveler,” a salesman who infiltrated college 
campuses across Western New York in order to expose the group Students for a 
Democratic Society (S.D.S.) as communists.12  He arrived at Syracuse shortly after 
relations between conservative and progressive student groups hit a fever pitch in April, 
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and in no time the campus bookstore was in flames and windows were broken around 
campus.  Despite the violent disagreement between the groups, they were in strong 
agreement over where to place the blame: it was the system.13   
 In the opening pages of Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System, 
Green offered his first explicit statement in a published work regarding his presiding 
project on moral education.  He had in mind a two-pronged approach, first laying out 
the rational form of the educational system and then following up, in a planned second 
work (which would become Voices), with an exploration of the moral foundations of the 
educational system.  But his task in the present work is: 
[T]o give an account of that rationality so that the behavior of the system, its 
inherent processes, may become intelligible in a way that is independent of 
differences in political and economic ideology.  It follows that the account of the 
system given in these pages is a formal account.  It deals with the rational form, 
structure, and behavior of the system, but it makes no reference to its 
educational content.14 
 
This idea—that the form of the system contributed significantly to its intelligibility—is 
what caused the most forceful critical responses to the book, but before examining a 
representative criticism from sociologist Margaret Archer it will be necessary to say a 
little about the complex investigation Green presents in his book. 
 He begins with a disarmingly bold proposal, that there is indeed a global 
phenomenon called “the educational system,” that it emerged out of social forces 
peculiar to the twentieth century, and that, though there are many instantiations of 
educational systems, it is the same reality in each that we point to with the phrase “the 
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educational system.”15  The system therefore encompasses many types of school, public 
and private, as well as what are now referred to as career or vocational-technical 
schools.  There are obvious important variations in these assorted institutions.  The 
system is “precisely what doesn’t change in the established arrangements of educational 
institutions and in the reiterated arguments that guide their behavior.”16  Consequently, 
the object of his investigation is to identify the stabilities, the “fundamental realities,” 
that cannot “be touched by so crude an instrument for change and control as public 
policy.”17 
 Part of the criticism of Green’s project stems from his belief that there is a 
fundamental structural reality to the system that follows its own structural logic, quite 
apart from the ideological commitments of the stakeholders within the various 
educational institutions.  Such a claim, if true, puts a significant damper on institutional 
meliorists; whatever changes are fought for must ultimately abide by a durable 
structural logic over which stakeholders have no control.  Such an understanding of the 
logic of the system led Green to express serious doubts about the future of equal 
educational opportunity,18 and he seemed to be well aware of the potential for crippling 
cynicism to take hold of the person who studies educational policy too closely: 
The sustained and scholarly pursuit of such counter-questions has extraordinary 
consequences.  It certainly heightens one’s sense of irony.  But anyone with a 
boundless taste for irony will appear perverse to others.  I drew some 
satisfaction from the principle that whatever you think the future will be like, I 
will show you why it won’t happen that way, or, if it does, then why it 
shouldn’t.  It is hard to prevent such practiced skepticism from lapsing into an 
unbecoming kind of automatic cynicism.19 
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The durability of the system’s structure was therefore to be a kind of anchor; while it 
constrained the range of changes that could affect the system it also made the 
continuing existence of an educational system possible.  That, at least, was his thinking. 
 In addition to his conception of the structural logic of the system, some critics 
took exception to Green’s methodology.  It was not enough for Green to simply notice 
that some features of formal education did not change; he had to test the observation 
against something, and that something was the “quite ordinary and commonsense 
conception of the educational system.”20  The question that naturally follows is who’s 
commonsense?  The persuasiveness of Green’s investigation could have hinged on how 
he answered that question, but instead of focusing long on the question of whose 
perspective, he proposes for his readers’ consideration three properties of the system 
found in common discourse: 
All that we require, by way of definition, is to consult the conception and we 
shall discover that it refers (1) to a set of schools and colleges, (2) related by a 
medium of exchange, and (3) arranged by some principles of sequence.  The 
best we can say, at the outset, is that “the system” is a social structure and, at the 
same time, a kind of social process the rationality of which is heavily 
circumscribed by that structure.21   
 
If his idea that the system was driven in some measure by its own logic generated a fair 
bit of contention, then Green only managed to intensify the controversy by the 
qualification that the rationality of the system was “heavily circumscribed” by the logic 
of the structure. 
 The assumption of the rationality of the system leads him to adopt, in addition to 
the method of common language analysis, the method of practical rationality.  To say 
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that the system is rational is simply to acknowledge that it is “guided by rational 
arguments.”22  It is important to note what this claim is not.  Green is not saying that all 
stakeholders arrive at their positions on educational policy through rational deliberation, 
as if parents, administrators, and legislators hold policy development meetings to run 
cost-benefits analyses on ideas for the schools.  He means only that, when it comes time 
to propose policy for the schools, the stakeholders—regardless of how they arrived at 
their positions—will offer reasons in support of their proposals.  This is what it means, 
for Green, to call the system fundamentally rational, and it is on this basis that he 
invokes the method of practical rationality. 
 What is the method of practical rationality?  In short, it involves treating the 
behavior of the system as the outcome of rational arguments.  The task is twofold.  
Green must articulate the observed behaviors of the system as a series of directives or 
commands, e.g. “expand the system” and “prepare all students for the workplace.”  
Then he must state the premises of the argument. 
Those premises may consist of social beliefs, general principles, and even 
judgments about the relative worth of different things.  We do not care whether 
those premises are true or whether the principles they express are good.  We are 
concerned only to make explicit the rules, beliefs, or principles that are required 
as premises in the system so that its observed behavior becomes rationally 
intelligible.23 
 
The key is to understand that the premises will be the rational arguments for the 
system’s behavior, and that, though they explain the behavior, they do not explain it 
causally.  In other words, they explain why a command or directive came about (i.e. 
because this argument or that was accepted by the stakeholders as issuing in a particular 
directive), but they do not offer a conditional logic whereby a conclusion will follow 
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necessarily from valid premises.  His critics’ failure to grasp the distinction between a 
practical argument and a causal argument led many of them to decry his hunt for “a 
logic” of the system, a sort of clockwork mechanism wound up according to tightly 
defined relations of logical necessity.  Such a project is far from the one a perspicacious 
reader finds within the pages of Predicting. 
 So much for method, a word now needs to be said about the content of the 
system.  The most important, and perhaps most obvious, observation is that the system, 
because it has a structure, will feature primary and derivative elements.  The primary 
elements are (a) a system of schools, (b) related through a medium of exchange, and (c) 
arranged on some principle of sequence.  Derivative elements are things such as a size 
(which may change), some arrangement for social control, and a distribution of 
resources, benefits, and educational attributes.  He arrives at these “parts” of the 
structure through careful observation of the system’s behavior, but in a sense these are 
only the horizontal features of the system.  There are also hierarchical principles by 
which the system functions, principles that might be called the vertical features of the 
system.24  Green identifies these principles as The Hierarchies of Downward Drift of 
Learning, The Self-Regulating Hierarchies of the System as Employer, and The 
Hierarchies of Status.    
 Critics took exception to nearly every step of his investigation.  One critic, 
Margaret Archer, wrote an especially detailed critique of the book, one that was 
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intended to be, at least for half of Green’s investigation, a devastating criticism.25  It 
will be illuminating to quickly examine her response. 
 Archer’s primary target is Green’s claim that there is “a logic” to the system, 
although what she means by the expression does not accord with what he meant when 
he spoke of the rationality of the system.  For example, she takes Green to mean that 
abstract interests drive the system, although she appears to misconstrue his claim to 
mean that the rather concrete interests of abstract entities—such as the State—drive the 
system to the exclusion of the interests of concrete entities, e.g. particular parents of 
particular students in particular schools.  Thus, Archer: 
To deal only with abstract interests (and their derivatives) prevents interests 
from; (a) ever being seen as vested interests in a particular structure, that is 
firmly anchored in time and space and conditioned by that specific educational 
reality, and (b) as elements whose results depend exclusively upon interaction 
taking place in that context.26 
 
But this is very nearly to claim that Green cannot (indeed, no one can) speak intelligibly 
about schools at all, that whatever one says about schools must remain confined to the 
interests and interest groups peculiar to some particular school; and yet such a position 
is tantamount to the claim that there can be nothing universal about the interests of 
parents, administrators, and legislators who are confronted with the same task—to 
educate the young in a technologically complex mass society.  It is tantamount to the 
claim that there can be no logic of systemic goals and that the interactions of individuals 
are not themselves conditioned by systemic logic.  Put in more concrete terms, terms 
Green uses in his book, it is as if Archer is claiming that the hierarchies of status—a 
horizontal feature of the system’s structure—play either no role or an insignificant role 
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in particular parents’ motivation to enroll their children in Advanced Placement classes.  
But this is absurd on the face of it.  The existence of and belief in the efficacy of 
colleges is the primary motivator for any parent to put a child in Advanced Placement 
coursework.  Archer’s criticism seems to have it that one must look elsewhere for the 
real explanation of the behaviors of maximally interested participants in the schools.  
Surely, this is either a misunderstanding of Green’s investigation (he talks at length 
about particular interests)27 or it is an expression of a Romantic belief that persons 
living within systems are free from the influence of the system’s structural logic. 
 Perhaps the real sticking point for Green’s critics has to do with where the 
rationality of the system comes from, so to speak.  Archer is clear that the system 
receives its (context specific) rationality from the outcomes of agents interacting within 
the system.28  In fact, it is fair to say that she sees the system itself as an emergent 
property of interaction and explanatorily reducible to just that.  Correspondingly, she 
accuses Green of projecting “trends into laws,” as he presumably does in his discussion 
of the hierarchical principles of organization.29  Archer sets out to prove that Green has 
misidentified trends as laws by citing an instance—within the early mid-twentieth 
century French school system—wherein growth at the lower end did not lead to 
expansion at the top.  Her example is hugely problematic, because the system in France 
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not only has grown in the decades since Green’s book, but it grew in precisely the ways 
his theory predicted such an instantiation of the system would grow.30     
 The thrust of Archer’s—and indeed most of the critics’—misunderstanding of 
the system follows from her own mischaracterization of Green’s investigation as a 
search for laws and abstract interests that explain the behavior of the system.  It would 
be more accurate to say that Green examines actual behaviors of the system and then 
seeks out the rational arguments that explain those behaviors—not in a law-like way, 
but rather in a way that makes sense of the pattern of behaviors that obtains in the 
instantiation of the system.  It is the scientific-theoretical task of constructing models 
that render some particular, complex phenomenon intelligible.  Some of the arguments 
that his method uncovers will employ false premises, and some will not.  That does not 
concern him, as his interests here and always are descriptive and pragmatic.   
 A look at one more point might make this a bit clearer.  At one point, Archer 
charges Green explicitly with digging for logically necessary (i.e. law-like) rules 
governing the growth of the education system: 
When there is an over-supply of the educated, that is prima facie grounds for no 
growth, Green argues that the tendency of the system will, on the contrary, be to 
expand or to raise its qualifications or both.  This is undoubtedly what the 
profession would like to see, but continued expansion depends upon their 
convincing the polity to increase the number of positions…or convincing 
external interest groups in health, industry or the prisons of their need for the 
‘qualified’.  Neither group necessarily is convinced…which is why we need to 
                                                
30 The French system has become one of the most unified, centralized systems in the world, with the 
students moving from primary into secondary education uniformly.  The growth of the system can be 
characterized as uniform even though lycée students may move into different tracks, because (a) their 
respective tracks observe the same principle of sequence.  Namely, that when a student on one or the 
other track has completed n level, that will be sufficient grounds for inferring that he or she has 
completed level n-1 but insufficient grounds for concluding that he or she will complete level n + 1; and 
(b) the differentiation of programs (or tracks) is only intelligible if it is a single system that is 
experiencing differentiation, i.e. the tracks are a differentiation within the lycée system; they do not 
amount to the creation of two systems. 
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address interaction rather than assuming simply that the ‘practical argument of 
the system’ is always victorious.31 
 
Nothing about this description of Green’s project would merit Green’s approval.  Where 
he writes about the principle of uniform growth, he does so through the investigation of 
various models that propose different sets of conditions.  If X happens then Y likely 
follows.  Specifically, Green argues that only in a society that holds to the principle of 
educational efficacy will universal attainment at n produce strong pressures for 
expansion.  In a society that does not hold to the principle of educational efficacy, 
nothing follows from the fact of an over-supply of the educated.  The logic here is 
conditional, situated in a specific state of affairs.  Archer is unwittingly proposing a 
separate model, call it model ‘B’—a society in which the principle of educational 
efficacy does not obtain—and arguing that Green’s model ‘A’ condition does not hold 
for it.  Green would be free to agree that the conditions of model ‘B’ are such that 
education policy decisions about growth would not be made on the basis of reasons 
given by stakeholders in model ‘A.’  Nowhere does Green simply assume that the 
practical rationality of the system is monolithic (he says the opposite, frequently),32 nor 
does he argue that the structures are logically necessary but rather durable, common to 
all schools within the system, and the product of reasons (good, bad, and otherwise) 
offered by stakeholders.  That is what he means when he calls the system “rational.” 
 This is not to say that there was nothing to Archer’s criticism.  In fact, it is part 
of a larger debate within sociology about the value of a functionalist account of the 
                                                
31 Archer, “On Predicting,” 214-215. 
32 In a letter to Harold Noah dated February 17, 1982, he speaks, rather of similarities in “the way that 
expansion of secondary education, over the decade, was diffused.”  In his letter to Noah, he was relating 
how he came upon the notion of uniform growth after examining a decade’s worth of data on OECD 
countries for the 1970 OECD conference on educational growth. 
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relationship between schools and societies—an account that is premised upon the notion 
that the survival of the system is always a legitimate aim of the system.  The problem of 
this approach to the study of the social structures that comprise the education system is 
that it can be undertaken without any reference whatsoever to the power relations that 
may give rise to them.  At worst, the functionalist approach to sociological investigation 
can serve to intentionally mask those power relations.  This is a worthwhile objection 
and one that should be considered by anyone involved in sociological study, but there is 
reason to believe that Green anticipated and met such an objection.  For one, Green 
offers an account of the system that, while drawing upon the insights of sociology, is 
philosophical rather than sociological, and is therefore concerned with picking out the 
universal features of the system.  Indeed, it would be hard to say how, for example, the 
aim of “emptying the nursery” or using schools and colleges connected by a medium of 
exchange might be viewed as peculiar to some particular power structure.  It would 
appear to describe an education system in any political or economic situation, whether 
Western capitalist or communist.  While he does argue that the system will distribute 
educational benefits according to its own structural logic, he nowhere claims that the 
distribution of benefits will only follow the structural logic of the system.  In fact, he 
says early on that “[i]t is well enough to say that the interests of parents are maximal 
rather than minimal and individual rather than aggregate, and that they seek the best 
possible for their children rather than the minimum necessary.”33  And yet, the question 
of his research is one of formulating policy with regard to educational benefits, which 
requires that he think about what goals are and are not feasible from the perspective of 
the state.   
                                                
33 Green, Predicting, 29. 
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 Ultimately, readers were sharply divided over the virtues of the book.34  It is 
hard to resist the impression that, had his more critical readers retained the idea that this 
book was, in its totality, one leg of a larger project on moral education, they might have 
avoided some of the more egregious misreadings.35  As announced in the opening 
pages, it was a formal account of the system with a promissory note for the composition 
of a second work that would broach the issue of the content of education.  The question 
it sought to answer was fairly straightforward: why does the system seem so impervious 
to change?   
The answer in Predicting, crudely put, was that the system, as we have come to 
know it, answers fairly well to human basics of such simplicity that to depart 
very substantially from its arrangements would be to attempt something like a 
reformation of human nature itself.  Those basics we framed in such simplicities 
as “learning takes time,” “it takes twelve months to get a year older,” “every 
society must empty the nursery and none can be entirely indifferent to how it is 
done.”  How such simplicities shape the foundations of the educational system is 
just what the composition of Predicting was designed to show.36 
 
Where Green saw structure, his critics saw an unorganized mess of ideological conflict, 
and such a divergence of views may have as much to do with disposition as facts on the 
ground.  Green was someone who saw design in the world, and he carried that vision 
                                                
34 For positive critical appraisals, see: William H. Weber, III, “Predicting the Behavior of the Educational 
System by Thomas F. Green.”  The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 1981), 437-
439; and Jeanne Pietig, “Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System by Thomas F. Green, David 
P. Ericson, Robert H. Seidman.”  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 
1981), 83-84.  For a negative appraisal, aside from that discussed in Archer, see: Michael A. Oliker, 
“Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System by Thomas F. Green, D.P. Ericson, R.H. Seidman.”  
Journal of Thought, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 1983), 118-124.  It should be noted that Oliker’s analysis is 
premised upon a misunderstanding that Green was attempting a Transcendental Argument in his book, 
but I commend it because his is another example of an instructive misunderstanding. 
35 One glaring exception is James E. McClellan’s letter-review in which he, puzzlingly, took direct issue 
with the unseen second volume.  In fact, McClellan’s early draft response was full of personal attacks on 
Green’s character as well as such dignified and reflective criticisms as “horeshit” and bizarre references 
to Green’s “silly grins.,” from a letter to Hugh Petrie dated Feb. 17, 1981.  See also: James E. McClellan, 
“Review of Thomas F. Green, prepared with the assistance of David P. Ericson and Robert H. Seidman, 
Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (Syracuse: the University Press, 1980) 320 pp.”  
Educational Theory, Vol. 30, Issue 4 (Feb. 1980), 353-366. 
36 Green, Predicting, xi. 
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into his next leg of the project—to demonstrate how a conscience is formed within the 
social structure of the educational system. 
 
Voices and the Continuing Influence of Durkheim, 1982-1999 
 Things did not slow down after publication of Predicting.  Green had agreed to 
be the General Program Chairman for the AERA Annual Meeting in 1982, primarily for 
the opportunity to work alongside his friend, AERA president Maxine Greene.  Of their 
many accomplishments, they co-authored a profoundly important statement on the role 
of qualitative inquiry in educational policy formation: 
Our belief is that education, educational research, and educational practice, 
however technically successful in forming a public, however guided by 
scientific insight, is dangerous and puts us all at risk if it is uninformed by the 
arts, by literature, and by attentiveness to the kind of social memory that is being 
framed.  Policy research, for example, uninformed by The Federalist Papers, by 
the words of Shakespeare and Abraham Lincoln, is rootless research whatever 
its excellence by scientific standards.37 
 
His relationship with Greene was one of the most fruitful and intellectually fulfilling of 
his career.  By the time of their partnering up for the AERA their friendship had already 
spanned more than twenty years.  He once wrote to a young acquaintance that Greene 
had been the major influence in his professional life, especially in his choice to make 
the study of education his life’s work: “She has been my teacher, my inspiration, and 
my model for a long time.  Also, oddly enough, my most difficult critic.”38  The 
pleasure of friendship was reciprocated by Greene, who a few months after their AERA 
collaboration had ended wrote Green to tell him that she missed him and to suggest they 
come up with some new project to work on together. 
                                                
37 Maxine Greene and Thomas F. Green, “1982 Annual Meeting Program.”  Educational Researcher,  
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Feb., 1982), 19-20 
38 Letter to Sari Knopp Bilkin dated January 29, 1982. 
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 A future project would have to be put on hold.  Green had just been elected to 
the National Academy of Education, in section I, and he was quickly enlisted to help 
create an agenda for the academy going forward.  He had also been asked, along with 
Gerald Grant, to organize an educational program for school leaders in upstate New 
York.39  All of this happened in the midst of what turned out to be an unsuccessful run 
for the New York Board of Regents.   
 At school, Green’s teaching revolved around three areas of interest.  He taught 
courses on moral education through a reading of classical texts, especially Aristotle’s 
Ethics.  He also taught a course on the vocabulary of the social sciences that examined 
the philosophical problems inhering in it, and then there was a new faculty course that 
had been entrusted to him for some time.  Of these, the courses on moral education are 
of most interest to his ongoing project.  It was in these courses that he hammered out an 
outline for the main themes he would tackle in his manuscript.  Perhaps most valuable 
was his reading, with his students, the commentaries of classical philosopher Terrence 
Irwin, who pointed out the craft analogy in the thought of Plato and Aristotle.  This 
ancient analogy between virtue and skillfulness drove his understanding of the 
formation of conscience as encompassing matters of prudence in addition to more 
traditional moral problems.   
 He was also reading the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, who proffered a 
belief in eternal strife between the one and the many, the “bow and the lyre,” a tension 
of opposites.  Green, characteristically concerned to connect his philosophical reading 
to the messy experiences of the everyday, seized upon the marginally abstruse 
Heraclitean opposition between “upwards” and “downwards” as an opportunity to think 
                                                
39 Letter to Gerald Grant dated May 17, 1982. 
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about the tension in thought between generalities and those particulars that seem ever 
intent on foiling them.40  He puts the matter thus, “Principles framed or applied without 
attention to cases are dangerous, and cases are fruitless to even entertain if we do not 
learn from them.”41  The observation is prologue to a discussion of a paper by Maxine 
Greene, who focuses on the particular, and Kieran Egan, whose object is the general, in 
a sort of Janus-faced meditation on Social Studies education.  The purpose of the paper 
is less interesting than a few of the particular observations made by Green, observations 
that give a glimpse into the development of Green’s work on conscience. 
 For example, Green points out that the very idea of the “use” of history, as 
voiced by J.H. Plumb, is grounded firmly in Enlightenment, and specifically utilitarian, 
rationality.  This is not merely to nitpick at language.  One can imagine asking after the 
use of history in a more traditional political community, say Greek Orthodox or a Plains 
Indian Nation, and straightway the strangeness of the question should be apparent.  The 
matter of the educational “uses” of history is discoverable in an Enlightenment society 
because the conscience of such individuals can find value only in utility.42  This is 
Green as the expositor of moral education as formation of conscience.  He goes on: 
I think that the creation of a sense of social membership or identity is the first 
aim of education wherever it occurs and that Plumb's view of the nature of 
historical scholarship, though acceptable for historian-observers of society, will 
not serve well as a model for the education of participants…Even becoming a 
philosopher is substantially a task of socialization. It means entering the historic 
parade of courageous thinkers, adopting severe standards of craft and relevance, 
acquiring the shared values and intellectual habits of the great exemplars of the 
tradition revealed in texts.  It may be that one of the aims of socialization is to 
make persons more alike. But that seems to me a good thing, on the whole. 
Partly, what allows us to have symphony orchestras is that musicians are 
                                                
40 Thomas F. Green, “Social Studies and the American Dream: Responsive Notes.”  Curriculum Inquiry, 
Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn (1984), 327. 
41 Green, “Social Studies,” 328. 
42 Green, “Social Studies,” 334. 
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socialized to certain shared standards of critical judgment and values. But I do 
not see this as an obstacle to their education or as anything opposed to their 
education. Nor does their socialization, if it is complete, condemn them to play 
every riff in endless repetition. Indeed, among the standards of performance that 
they are socialized to are included those that encourage thoughtful innovation. 
We should not forget that even Dewey often spoke of the "habits of 
intelligence," and there are those in ordinary life from whom we learn to expect 
the unexpected.43 
 
In this brief passage are adumbrated the voices of conscience as craft, memory, and 
imagination.  Most significantly, it hints at an idea not yet fully formed but ultimately to 
become crucial to Green’s exposition of the voices of conscience, and that is the idea 
that the voice of memory and imagination is orthogonal to the other voices of 
conscience.  As Green says in Voices, “[T]he voice of memory and imagination does 
not stand simply as another voice beside these others.  Memory and imagination provide 
a distinctive voice within the domains of craft, membership, and sacrifice.”44  In fact, he 
claims no less than that the formation of conscience is “largely a project in the 
reconstitution of memory.”45  And yet the thought is not quite fully grasped in 1983, 
when Green writes this thoughtful response to his colleagues.  In order to arrive at its 
full articulation, he would take another sabbatical leave from Syracuse. 
 For the 1983-84 school year, Green not only took a sabbatical but fully intended 
to complete his manuscript on conscience.  The manuscript was not to be completed for 
fifteen more years, but it did so happen that, during this sabbatical year, Green was 
asked to deliver the 1984 John Dewey Lecture, and for that he wrote what would be 
published as “The Formation of Conscience in an Age of Technology.”  It amounted to 
just one small but key part of the investigation into moral education, the opening shot, 
                                                
43 Green, “Social Studies,” 335. 
44 Green, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience.  Notre Dame: The University of Notre 
Dame Press (1999), 102. 
45 Green, Voices, 103. 
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as it were, in which he suggests that the expression “moral education” should be 
displaced by the more accurate and more expansive phrase “formation of conscience.”46  
Because it is a crucial move in his project on moral education, it will be necessary to 
quote from his article at some length: 
[T]here is something in favor of speaking about the formation of conscience 
rather than moral education.  It is a simple fact that each of us has the capacity to 
judge our own conduct and even to stand in judgment on what we discern to be 
the composition of our own affections.  The point I want to stress about this 
experience is not that it involves judgment of moral approval or disapproval but 
simply that it is judgment that each of us makes in his or her own case.  In short, 
it is reflexive judgment.  Furthermore, it is judgment always accompanied by 
certain emotions that, if not exactly the same, are nevertheless like the moral 
emotions.  I can feel guilt, shame, or embarrassment at a job poorly done, and 
these are the same feelings that I have when viewing some moral failure of 
mine.  This capacity of ours to be judge, each in his own case, is all that I mean 
by conscience. 
 
The distinction between the formation of conscience and moral education is one that 
makes an important difference; it amounts to saying that moral education, insofar as its 
aim is public life, must include matters that are not traditionally moral, such as 
prudential concerns.  It must teach the young to feel the normative importance of 
showing up to work on time, of voting conscientiously, of performing a task with skill, 
and so forth.  All of these activities are “subject to the commentary of conscience.”47 
 Green also proposes in the article that conscience speaks to us in different 
voices, as when it speaks to us of what is “wise, foolish, or skillful,”48 as in the 
conscience of craft; of our affections, as in the conscience of membership; of duty, 
“even against our inclinations,”49 as in the conscience of sacrifice; and also of memory 
                                                
46 Thomas F. Green, “The Formation of Conscience in an Age of Technology.”  American Journal of 
Education, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Nov., 1985), 3. 
47 Green, “The Formation,” 3. 
48 Green, “The Formation,” 3. 
49 Green, “The Formation,” 4. 
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and imagination.  These are the five voices, five expressions of conscience, existing 
“side-by-side,” as it were, without any particular horizontal development, contrary to 
Kohlberg and his ilk.  Green tends to give priority to the voice of craft, because our 
society is such that has produced a “technical conscience,” one that prizes skillfulness 
above sincerity and fears the accusation of ineptitude over dishonesty.  This tendency in 
his article (and later in his book) to depict the moral culture of twentieth century 
America with categories of thought related to work has its springs in his earliest 
writings.  It was, after all, the central thesis of WLAS.  So, while Green does not put 
forward a theory of moral development based on his voices of conscience, there is some 
sense clearly that the voice of craft presides over the development of the other four. 
 Green’s investigation of conscience may be grounded in the realities of a work-
centric technological society, but the emphasis on the “craft analogy” in moral 
development comes from ancient Greece.  He says as much in his article.  The Greek 
view, in short, is that every kind of thing possesses an excellence: shoes, tables, 
watches, human beings, etc.  The moral sense of excellence is then clearly captured by 
the notion of skillfulness.  A table is excellent when it is skillfully made, a watch when 
it keeps time, shoes when they stand up to wear, and a human being when he or she 
navigates the complex skills required of a life lived well.  Green’s observation of the 
connection between ancient Greek moral thought and our present day categories of 
thought was not particularly original; Alasdair MacIntyre had already written several 
popular philosophical works drawing that connection.50  Green’s original contribution 
consisted in two things: (a) the focus on moral education as the formation of 
conscience, and (b) the elaboration of the voices of conscience. 
                                                
50 Alastair MacIntyre, After Virtue.  Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press (1981). 
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 The article was widely acclaimed.51  One scholar called it “critical in the late-
20th century turn from seeing morality as a special arena of life to understanding 
"conscience of craft" as the foundation of professional ethics for all.”52  Its publication 
also marked a period of slowing down for Green, with no publications coming from him 
for two years.  He had been struggling with lung disease and needed a reprieve both 
from the demands of work and of travel.  Even so, he could not turn down the prestige 
of a Fulbright Lectureship in Kyoto, Japan in July of 1985. 
 On returning home to Pompey, New York, he took up gardening with a renewed 
passion.  He and Rosemary had kept beautiful gardens around their property, both floral 
and vegetable, and it is tempting to think that the activity of gardening furnished Green, 
a child of Depression-era Nebraska, with some key insights into craft and memory.  
Whatever the case, a year of recreation and gardening had born fruit: when he finally 
did publish again—four articles in 1987 and 1988—he had clearly been thinking about 
the formation of conscience from a virtue ethical point of view.  These included articles 
on the excellences of professional scholars, on virtue and prudence, and on moral 
education—all areas touched upon in his work on the formation of conscience.53 
 It is around this time that Green clearly articulates what he sees as the difference 
between moral philosophy and a philosophy of moral education.  In a paper written in 
                                                
51 See particularly: James M. Giarelli, “Education, Excellence, and the Formation of a Public: A 
Response to Green.”  American Journal of Education, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Nov., 1985), pp. 33-38;  
52 Craig A. Cunningham, “Tom Green, In Memoriam.” Education Policy Blog: 
http://educationpolicyblog.blogspot.com/2006/12/tom-green-in-memoriam.html.  Last retrieved 
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53 See, Thomas F. Green, “On Seeing the Point and Knowing the Risks: Ethics in the Academic 
Community.”  Journal of Thought, 22 (1987), 12-15; Thomas F. Green, “The Economy of Virtue and the 
Primacy of Prudence.”  American Journal of Education, Vol. 96, No. 2, February (1988), 127-42; 
Thomas F. Green, “On Moral Learning.” Philosophy of Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of 
the Philosophy of Education Society, 44 (1988), 109-123; and Thomas F. Green, “A Tale of Two 
Controversies: Comment.”  Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, 23 (1988), 341-346. 
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1987 and published in the 1988 Philosophy of Education Yearbook titled “On Moral 
Education,” he proposes three ways that a philosophy of moral education diverges from 
moral philosophy: (a) it has different aims, (b) it has a different starting point, and (c) it 
emerges from different interests.54  Traditionally understood, morality attached a special 
notion of obligation to certain ethical ideas, so that, for example, showing kindness to 
strangers was regarded as moral in some places whereas, in those same places, doing a 
job to the best of one’s ability was not so regarded.  Yet both, being kind and doing 
one’s work skillfully (as opposed to negligently), are doubtless ethical notions.  Failure 
to do the former habitually might lead one to expect a future in hell; failure to do the 
latter habitually and one might expect to end up unemployed.  The idea, on traditional 
morality, is that there is a duty to be observed, whereas the relationship between agent 
and performance of a merely ethical action may not rise above contractual obligation. 
 The problem became suddenly obvious to Green.  Moral education must, if it is 
to prepare the young for a good life, take account of ethical notions that lie outside the 
purview of traditional moral philosophy.  A sound moral education must ask the broader 
question, “How ought one to live?”  The answer to that question must include some 
non-moral matters, such as prudential concerns, e.g. learning the courtesy of being on 
time, of listening to others, of expressing oneself politely, and generally avoiding a life 
of folly.  This means that the ethical considerations of a philosophy of moral education 
should be broader than those of moral philosophy, and unlike the general aims of moral 
philosophy, they will be rooted in the workaday realities of specific social roles, jobs, 
stations, offices, and so forth.  In order to accommodate this broader understanding of 
                                                
54 Thomas F. Green, “On Moral Learning.” Philosophy of Education: Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 44 (1988), 109-123.  
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morality found in moral education, Green suggests a vocabulary that can readily 
entertain prudential concerns, and for that he shifting the language of moral education 
from moral philosophy to the formation of conscience and its different voices.  By 
conscience, Green means simply the capacity to make reflexive judgments on one’s 
own behavior.  At this point, he had worked out his theory in these two key papers, 
Green’s road was clear.  He had only to fill out the image in its minute particulars. 
Another way to say what was happening in Green’s research is to characterize it 
as a closing in on the fundamental point of his decades-long inquiry.  His scholarly 
publications, which had cast a wide net within the study of moral education, focused 
more narrowly on the formation of conscience.  However, within that narrow focus 
Green developed the complexity of his investigation.  For example, from the publication 
of the article to the final version of the manuscript that would come to be called, Voices: 
The Educational Formation of Conscience, Green had expanded his inquiry to include 
the role of conscience in the public aims of education, a move that led him to some 
unique statements about norm acquisition.  Perhaps the most important point he makes 
is “that the formation of conscience occurs by the acquisition of norms.”55 
 For this point, Green returned to Durkheim, but as with his other intellectual 
influences, e.g. Alasdair MacIntyre and John Dewey, he did not merely borrow ideas 
but extended the analysis into new areas.  Durkheim, a functionalist, argued that a 
society must bring students into the moral community through a series of imperatives, 
i.e. norms, delivered through the school.  The primary obstacle to such normation 
resides in the fact that children do not come to the schools as blank slates, and so the 
                                                
55 Thomas F. Green, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience.  Notre Dame: The University of 
Notre Dame Press (1999). 
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crucial question arises—for the functionalist—as to just how accessible the student is to 
the state of mind the schools wish to stimulate in him or her.  The educational task is 
clear: to cultivate the dispositions favorable to normation, such as a child’s innate desire 
for regularity and the appreciation of the authority of moral rules that grow from his or 
her habitual nature and suggestibility.  This, of course, raises the problem of coercion 
that plagues much of the educational theory of the early twentieth century, but 
Durkheim, in appealing to the innate dispositions of the student, is actually theorizing a 
way around physical coercion while yet holding to a deterministic role for the schools in 
the formation of a public.  This goes back to the functionalist perspective that an 
individual within a system necessarily will be subject to the rational structure of the 
system, so what matters is not whether the individual will undergo normation but 
whether the norms to which he or she is subject work to build or destroy public life. 
 Durkheim stood at the apex of the Golden Age of the public school movement in 
France, a figure comparable in time to John Dewey in the U.S. and bearing certain 
affinities with him.56  Institutional melioration, in the totalizing sense held out by 
Dewey and Durkheim, looked less plausible by the midcentury.  Indeed, Green had no 
illusions about the romance of the public school movement; it had played out and, as he 
put it in the opening pages of Voices, “is now in that fading-away in which all romances 
end.”57  Thus: 
Faced with such a prospect, we must be at the difficult business of building once 
again a public commitment to education in the commons, but this time out of a 
deeper understanding of the mutual need of sect and commons.  The sect, on the 
one hand, offers the moral resources that the commons needs but by itself cannot 
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provide; the commons, on the other hand, affords the protection of all partial 
communities and views of life, so that the fevers always provoked when such 
advocates meet nose to nose and toe to toe may be cooled and kept at a 
distance.58 
 
Though Green traffics in the language of functionalism, he is clearly here making a 
concession to the insights of postmodern philosophies of difference and Aristotelian-
Thomistic philosophies of situatedness.  The neutral space of the commons is not the 
appropriate sphere for the development of conscience, because there is no universal, 
rational morality to which all reasonable people might give assent.  Such a conception 
of the commons is a product of mistaken notions of rationality handed down to us from 
Enlightenment rationalism.   
 What does Green keep and what leave out from Durkheim’s understanding of 
education?  The short answer is that he keeps the idea that the commons is a moral 
sphere, but unlike Durkheim he does not believe it capable of generating deep moral 
identities due to its commitment to neutrality.  For Durkheim, reason is always up for 
debate, but morality cannot be.  For Green, both reason and morality can be up for 
debate, but what cannot be is the commitment to discovering public language in which 
to debate our moral differences.  In other words, unlike Durkheim Green’s project “is 
neither evangelical nor foundational.”59   
Despite Green’s differences with Durkheim, the similarity between the two is 
highlighted in their shared understanding of norms.  Speaking of the experience of 
norms, Durkheim wrote that “the individual controls himself only if he feels himself 
controlled, only if he confronts moral forces which he respects and on which he dare not 
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encroach.”60  Likewise, for Green, norms prescribe how individuals should or ought to 
behave.  They do not describe how individuals in fact behave.  Yet, even on this point, 
Green departs from Durkheim in the particulars.  For Green, the same norm may be 
more restrictive in one setting than in another, such as one that informs cooperation.  
For example, cooperative behavior within the family might easily be construed as 
cheating in a school environment.61  As Green is quick to point out, in real life people in 
fact do understand the boundaries of most norms in practice, that learning these 
boundaries, acquiring judgment with respect to one’s norms, goes hand in hand with 
norm acquisition.62  Durkheim, on the other hand, regarded norms as above critical 
judgment.  In fact, he felt that once an individual’s judgment encroaches on the full 
force of the norm, the norm is already dead. 
This difference leads to different conceptions of conscience.  For Green, it is 
defined as “reflexive judgment about things that matter,”63 whereas for Durkheim the 
voice of morality is Society writ large, a sort of ideal toward which the moral efforts of 
a particular society are pointed.  Green’s treatment of moral development is a more 
nuanced approach,64 a balancing act between the agency of the individual and the social 
structures that verify the individual’s belief about the worth of things, his or her values.  
This point, central to his decades long project on moral education, was to receive a 
fuller development in the companion books to Voices, a work titled Walls.  Walls was to 
show how a conscience forged in the sect could enter into the commons, indeed 
speaking the language of the commons, with integrity.  This would be a book to draw 
                                                
60 Durkheim, Moral Education, 193. 
61 Green, Voices, 44. 
62 Green, Voices, 47. 
63 Green, Voices, 21. 
64 In fact, Durkheim’s treatment of morality is totalitarian, Green’s is critical and interactionist. 
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together the insights of his previous investigations into work, the distribution of goods 
via the educational system, and the development of a technical conscience.  If 
successful, it would have shown how an individual could address the philosophical 
problems inhering in education while speaking from the experience of his or her own 
membership in a specific, sectarian community of identity.  It would not only have 
rounded off but served as a hermeneutic key to his decades long investigation into 
moral education in a pluralistic, democratic society.  The fact that this work was not 
even halfway to completion constitutes one of the great losses for the philosophy of 
education in the twentieth century. 
 




Chapter 4: Thomas Green in Conclusion   
Thomas Franklin Green was one of the most accomplished philosophers of 
education of the middle to late twentieth century.  He was a Guggenheim fellow, a 
Whitehead fellow at Harvard University, a fellow at the National Institute of Education, 
and president of the Philosophy of Education Society.  Nevertheless, he has been little 
written about or referenced in the work of other educational philosophers and theorists.  
There was no festschrift on the occasion of his retirement, and no societies have formed 
to further the unique work he began on moral formation, policy studies, or the 
conceptual analysis of teaching.  The purpose of the present work has been, on the one 
hand, to fill the gap in the literature and, on the other, to help explain why Thomas 
Green has been largely forgotten by educational philosophy. 
Broadly put, the previous chapters have examined the relation of the work of 
Professor Green to key philosophers and theorists of education across four decades.  
When first conceived, this project was slightly different, an assessment of Professor 
Green’s contribution to philosophy with specific attention given to his impact upon the 
philosophy of education as a scholarly field.  This seemed the natural approach.  After 
all, Professor Green was mentored by two of the most influential analytic philosophers 
of the mid-twentieth century, receiving his doctorate in Philosophy from Cornell.  All of 
his published work, though focused upon educational problems, was concerned with the 
distinctly philosophical problems of moral education.  Furthermore, he had been a John 
Dewey lecturer, a DeGarmo lecturer, president of the Philosophy of Education Society, 
a senior research fellow at Princeton Theological Seminary where he worked on matters 
of religious education, etc.  In short, it struck me as being both the natural and logical 
 93 
choice to assay the importance of Professor Green’s body of work to the analytic 
philosophy of education, and so the original plan of the inquiry would focus on the 
heuristic value of his ideas with respect to that field. 
 During the earliest stage of my research, it was readily apparent that stating the 
importance of Professor Green’s work was itself intensely problematic.  If the 
importance of scholarly work refers to its relevance, its potential usefulness and value, 
then his body of work is of the highest rank.  However, there is another sense of 
importance used with greater currency indicating consequence, esteem, and reach.  In 
the history of ideas, this latter sense of importance has to do with the breadth of an 
idea’s reception, and in this regard the importance of Professor Green’s work is a matter 
of some ambiguity.  Here I am not referring to the innate quality of the work but rather 
to how that work has been judged and whether or not it has been put to use by those in 
his field.  Professor Green was not unaware of the lukewarm and sometimes hostile 
responses his work provoked in others.  Anger and disinterest were staple responses to 
his published work to the end of his career.  It may even be said that at the height of his 
influence among Washington bureaucrats he was little more than Merlin offering 
counsel to a deaf Round Table. 
 To speak of importance in the latter sense is not to assess his contribution itself 
any more than one might assess a gift on account of its use or neglect by its recipient.  
The quality of the offering matters.  Professor Green’s contribution to the philosophy of 
education consisted in redefining moral education as both the acquisition of social 
norms, understood in a particular way, and as a conversation between the voices of 
conscience.  Both prongs of his philosophy of moral education grew from entirely 
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unique analyses of norm acquisition, the proper role of prudence in moral education, 
and the meaning of conscience.  As a result, he managed to define the philosophy of 
moral education as a domain of inquiry distinct from moral philosophy and 
consequently left us with the most extensive philosophical analysis of the formation of 
conscience ever committed to print.  Were this enough to gauge the importance of his 
work, then this inquiry might have been a straightforward affair.  In the history of ideas, 
only a lucky few can claim to have defined a sphere for philosophical inquiry and fewer 
still whose ideas have the potential to impact the ways we initiate the young into 
society.   
 I have resolved to set aside the question of importance understood in the former 
sense as indicating the intrinsic, heuristic value of an idea.  I have no doubts as to the 
importance, so construed, of Professor Green’s work.  The real puzzle regards the 
uniqueness of his vision, the peculiarity of the historical moment that created the 
possibility of such a vision, and the fading felt urgency of his project among education 
professionals.  In other words, it is the fact of his discovery of the philosophy of moral 
education, its springs and its reception, that have served as the subject of the present 
inquiry. 
A biography of Thomas Green has not only been warranted by the extraordinary 
quality of his work but has, in terms of literary form, the advantage of illustrating how 
the balance in an abiding tension in American educational thought shifted in the wake 
of postwar uncertainties.  That shift began in the 1940s and continued into the twenty-
first century, occasioned in part by changing cultural attitudes toward race and gender 
that fueled the civil rights movement and in part by the (related) incursion of the federal 
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government into the affairs of local schools, for which Green attempted the role of sage 
counsel.  Whereas the causes of these changing attitudes are many and complex, they 
had to do in no small part with the growing religious, ethnic, and racial pluralism of the 
United States.  One important outcome of such a radical change in social thought and 
social practice was a growing suspicion toward claims of moral absolutes.  This cultural 
backdrop goes far toward explaining the fact that Thomas Green’s influence upon 
educational policy is modest when compared to figures such as Horace Mann, John 
Dewey, or Edward Thorndike; this period in educational thought has not been amenable 
to discussions of moral education, however creative or potentially important.  
Nevertheless, Thomas Green’s work, concerned as it was to situate the moral insights of 
Aristotelian ethics within a distinctly American narrative of growing suspicions toward 
moral absolutes in the public sphere, presents the most accurate description of the 
contemporary problem of moral education in the United States. 
Professor Green’s vision culminated in his last published work, Voices: The 
Educational Formation of Conscience, in which he crafted a nuanced philosophy of 
moral education that defined conscience as reflexive judgment (i.e. judgments one 
makes upon oneself) regarding matters of importance.  He suggested that conscience 
speaks in not one voice but many, each of which develops differently in different 
people, and those voices swell and fade in ways that are peculiar to the person.  Rather 
than mere cacophony, these peculiar fluctuations in the voices of conscience can be 
explained by looking at the moral membership(s) of the individual, by examining the 
beliefs of the moral communities to which the individual (whether consciously or not) 
belongs.  The novelty of Professor Green’s theory is that it acknowledges, in concert 
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with sociology, that an individual belongs to more than one moral community, that he 
or she is shaped differently by each and in ways that have little obvious relationship to 
traditional understandings of “moral” development.  To complicate matters, he also 
proposed that a tension between the voices of one’s consciously identified moral 
community (say, the Episcopal Church) and the voices of conscience inherited from 
one’s various other moral communities, e.g. school, teen culture, socioeconomic class, 
etc., must be mediated by a strong model of the moral life.  Without the moral model, 
the person feels lost in a crippling sense of lawlessness or anomia. 
Students may come to high school with a strong conscious identification with a 
religious community and if that religious community views public schools with 
suspicion then the voice of membership, which booms, “I am a fundamentalist Christian 
and the schools are our enemies,” will drown out the voice of craft, which squeaks out, 
“It is embarrassing for a sixteen year old to be unable to form letters properly.”  Green 
does not suggest an easy fix for the problem, only a way to diagnose it.  In fact, I think 
it fair to say that Green would have considered it possibly too late for such a student to 
willingly acquire habits from a public school teacher.  What the struggling student 
needs is a member of his community of identity, a person he looks to as a model of 
adulthood, to teach him that his handwriting is important.  In Green’s last, unpublished 
and unfinished, book Walls he seemed to be on the verge of suggesting that religious 
communities be allowed either to enter the public schools unfettered or that the law 





 Part of the purpose of this intellectual biography has been to dispel two common 
misconceptions about Thomas Green—that his writings ranged over a number of 
disparate topics related only as educational phenomena, and that he was a crypto-
conservative traditionalist working to justify the system.  To the former, the fact that his 
various writings constituted a single project is nowhere revealed more explicitly than in 
a letter Green wrote in 1982 to his friend, Samuel Halperin, who had been the architect 
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and, as director of the Commission on Work, 
Family, and Citizenship, co-wrote an important report arguing for the need to expand 
educational opportunity to the poor.1  Halperin had written Green to request that he send 
some of his published works to a friend tasked with developing educational policy in 
Israel, and in the course of the request he expressed some dismay at what he felt was a 
creatively frustrating sabbatical year in Jerusalem.  Picking up on Green’s language, he 
expressed the hope that he might find a “calling” and not merely more work to keep him 
busy.2  The first part of Green’s response reflects his faithfulness both to the earlier and 
to the later formulation of his project: 
You say the sabbatical has come to “the painful stage.”  I know exactly what 
you mean!  But getting INTO that stage is what a sabbatical is supposed to do; 
and recognizing it as a stage is what makes the pain redemptive and testifies that 
the person who has the sabbatical is the kind who deserves it… 
 
Although I do – still I think I needn’t – pray that you “find a calling,” not merely 
a job.  The calling is surely, by now transparent, isn’t it? --- Enlarge the domain 
of freedom, increase the spread of opportunity, serve the cause of civic decency, 
                                                
1 I mention Halperin’s accomplishments here only to lay the context for Green’s response quoted below.  
See: Adam Bernstein, “Samuel Halperin, Educational Leader, Dies at 83,” The Washington Post, May 9, 
2014.  Website: http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/samuel-halperin-dies-at-83-education-
policy-leader/2014/05/09/1369ac30-d794-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html.  Last retrieved on 
3/21/2015. 
2 Letter from Samuel Halperin to Thomas Green dated May 25, 1982. 
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enlightenment, peace between human beings, home-coming, roots, memory, and 
so forth. 
 
In this, one can hear Green’s earlier rejection of Martin Luther’s identification of work 
and job in his first book, WLAS.3  More telling, perhaps, is that he immediately connects 
the identification of calling and work with the formation of conscience—specifically 
with roots and memory, two terms that are central to his notion of the conscience of 
memory and imagination first found in his 1984 article “The Formation of Conscience” 
and later in his book Voices.4   
 It is tempting to read the comments that follow in the context of his next three 
books, connecting the insights from his work on the activities of teaching to educational 
planning and policymaking, as if Green’s intention is to provide a snapshot of his 
project for Halperin’s friend, who will doubtless read the letter:5 
Somewhere in this mélange of planning and leadership there lies the 
combination of polity, skill, and persuasion that will make for the career that 
you so evidently display.  What mix of virtue, principle, or aim is required I do 
not know.  But I know that my own “work” is to find out and to state it.6 
 
Thus he draws a direct line between planning and policymaking to moral formation, and 
resolves both in his understanding of a “work” that he has been at.  There is also some 
reason to believe Green directed these remarks in part to Halperin’s unnamed friend; he 
requests two lines later that he and his friend interpret the work he will send along 
(presumably an early draft of Voices) as provisional.  Before saying more, however, he 
                                                
3 Green, Work, Leisure, 78-79. 
4 Green, Voices, 101-121. 
5 In fact, Green shared the letter with others, notably “Jerry” or “Jenny,” from a letter dated August 20, 
1982.  The recipient was clearly a colleague who thanked Green for sending him/her the letter to Sam 
Halperin: “The letter to Sam Halperin was both penetrating and moving.  It gave me insight into your 
own work and expresses what is at the heart of scholarship with such splendid economy.” 
6 Letter to Samuel Halperin dated July 10, 1982. 
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wants to be clear about a final major piece of his “work” on the philosophy of moral 
education—the role of statistics, which was crucial to “the System”: 
I believe that ideals matter!  That is to say, their achievement matters.  Thus, my 
own work is grounded always—though I have nowhere stated it—in the idea 
that if our ideals matter, then the data matter provided they describe the degree 
to which our ideals are realized. 
 
And this point is relevant to understanding a personal proclivity. I have always 
thought that teaching, like writing, is a form of conversation.  Thus, I am no 
good at preparing syllabi, reading lists, and the like.  On the one hand, I like to 
turn to the data—census reports, histories, OECD reports, government 
documents and the like.  It is altogether pretty dull reading unless one goes to it 
with the idea that the numbers mask the transformation of particular lives when 
aggregated for whole societies.7 
 
 These remarks fall admittedly short of a systematic overview of his project.  
Nevertheless—and sufficient for the claim that there is a single project—he clearly 
treats his earliest thinking on “work” as if it is connected seamlessly to his middle work 
on teaching, on planning and policy, on “the System” and his later, more explicitly 
moral work in Voices and Walls.  This observation receives some teeth from the fact 
that early formulations of moral formation found in WLAS are present in everything else 
he wrote.  Green was, by his own admission to Halperin, engaged in “a work.”  It is also 
interesting to note the continuing influence of his old mentor, O.K. Bouwsma, in 
Green’s understanding of what it means to teach a class.  Further evidence, perhaps, of a 
man disposed to stick to his earliest inclinations. 
 To the latter claim—that Green was an apologist for the system—some words 
have already been said in the previous chapter.  Much of this misconception is grounded 
in a misunderstanding of Durkheim’s functionalism, which is all too commonly viewed 
as totalitarian and conformist by people who have not bothered to read him.  But this 
                                                
7 Letter to Samuel Halperin dated July 10, 1982. 
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understanding of Durkheim must have been far from Green, who remarked in the same 
letter to Halperin, “Planners run the risk of being among those that Durkheim described 
as willing to do good to everyone—even those who do not want it done to them.”  Nor 
did Green subscribe to any notion of a fixed cannon of literature, as was practically 
mandatory among so-called conservatives working in education, such as Mortimer 
Adler, Robert Hutchins, Alan Bennett, and the like.  In answer to a question about a 
canon of literature that might help develop the thoughtful educational planner, Green 
provides a nuanced answer: 
The answer, of course, is that there is such a body of material.  But, in my case, 
it draws heavily upon the classics of philosophy—Plato, Aristotle.  But also 
from the Biblical material, from a rather standard body of English and French 
philosophy of the enlightenment, and from the history of economic thought.  It 
is this tradition that I take to be at the heart of conversation always in my writing 
and my teaching. 
 
But this tradition I speak of, though foundational, is not a fixed thing.  I am 
reminded, on the one hand, of a statement of Karl Barth in one of his sermons—
that one should preach always with the Bible in one hand and the newspaper in 
the other.  Taken literally, such an injunction makes for awkward gestures, but 
the intent is right—the one part timeless and the other incredibly temporal.  
Which goes in which hand, I do not know.8 
 
In fact, Green’s “floating foundationalism” is closely akin to the view of 
knowledge espoused by pragmatist C.S. Peirce, who argued that, over time, knowledge 
was amenable to some measure of fixity within a community of knowers while always 
in some sense revisable.9  Such a view points to the mentality of a cautious iconoclast 
rather than to the sentiments of a conservative traditionalist.  It speaks of the boy who 
sat on his family’s roof in Lincoln with his feet in the gutter, a comical portent of the 
iconoclastic tendencies of later life.  And yet, there may be more to the idea that Green 
                                                
8 Letter to Samuel Halperin dated July 10, 1982. 
9 Charles S. Pierce, “The Fixation of Belief.”  Popular Science Monthly, 12, November (1877), 1-15.  
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was by disposition iconoclastic than mere jest.  For example, one of his two favorite 
novels from his boyhood was the folksy, deeply democratic Parnassus on Wheels, by 
Christopher Morley, a book he held in high esteem even to the end of his life.  A telling 
monologue-style manifesto delivered by one of the main characters, Roger Mifflin, 
speaks directly to an early, pragmatic sensibility in Green: 
“The world is full of great writers about literature,” [Mifflin] said, “but they’re 
all selfish and aristocratic.  Addison, Lamb, Hazlitt, Emerson, Lowell—take any 
you choose—they all conceive the love of books as a rare and perfect mystery 
for the few—a thing of secluded study where they can sit alone at night with a 
candle, and a cigar, and a glass of port on the table and a spaniel on the 
hearthrug…The mandarins of culture—what do they teach the common folk to 
read?  It’s no good writing down lists of books for farmers and compiling five 
foot shelves; you’ve got to go out and visit the people yourself…”10 
 
Is each of these points cumulative evidence for a single philosophical project 
driven by a pragmatic, iconoclastic sensibility?  When taken together with a close 
reading of his body of work, the answer is a straightforward yes, but for many of his 
colleagues, who were understandably too busy with their own projects to study his 
carefully, the evidence would appear to be more than circumstantial but admittedly less 
than definitive.   
  
Green and the Academic Community 
 In order to unravel this last claim about the reception of his work among his 
peers, it will be necessary to devote some space to the importance of his friends and 
colleagues in academe.  Green put it best in the opening pages of Predicting: 
The unremitting loneliness of composition is made bearable and becomes 
possible to endure only by the continuing encouragement and interest and by the 
unbridled criticism and shared reflections of colleagues.  And so, with the 
passage of time, one’s indebtedness grows, extending to larger circles, including 
                                                
10 Christopher Morley, Parnassus on Wheels.  New York: Doubleday, Page & Company (1917), 67. 
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more persons than can be listed.  Such indebtedness not only widens, but also 
deepens and is transformed from debt to gratitude.  And from gratitude it often 
ripens into a kind of kinship seldom found outside the academic community.11 
 
The sentiment expressed here was not merely lip service.  Green’s relationship to the 
academic community was largely, from his point of view, constructive.  He sought to 
learn from others, and as a consequence he disliked writing reviews of others’ work 
because it required him to judge the flaws of their work publicly.12  When he did offer 
criticism of another’s work, it was often wrapped in humorousness, as when he wrote to 
a correspondent, “I am awed by anyone who would try to “apply” Rawls to anything.”13   
 His interlocutors were not always equally loath to offer judgment on the 
shortcomings of his work.  The tone and content of these reviews runs the gamut from 
fair to vicious.  For an example of the former, in what is really a level review of Voices, 
Joseph Dunne points out that Green’s analysis “bears much more on the requirements of 
being morally well formed than on the problems of moral formation.”14  This is an apt 
criticism that, however graciously put, throws cold water on Green’s ambition to carve 
out a unique niche for the philosophy of moral education—in fact, it amounts to the 
claim that he is doing nothing other than moral philosophy.  Of course, whether this 
judgment holds for his larger project is far less certain; much depends upon Green’s 
intentions regarding the content of the companion volume, Walls, which was left 
incomplete.  Dunne’s criticism may have been devastating, at least with regard to one 
important claim of Voices, but taken all in all it was gently put forward.  There were 
                                                
11 Green, Predicting, xiii. 
12 Letter to Alan Mabe dated June 18, 1976.  Mabe was the Chairman of the Editorial Committee for 
Social Theory and Practice. 
13 Letter to Ernest R. House dated April 8, 1976. 
14 Joseph Dunne, “Reviewed Work: Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience by Thomas F. 
Green.”  The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 204, July (2001), 414-417. 
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more far more cutting criticisms than this.  Victor Worsford, in an exhaustive exercise 
in missing the point of Green’s paper, “Values: Linguistic Conjecture, Constructive 
Venture,” first mocks him for using the expression “slovenly educational discourse” to 
refer to the common running together of beliefs, virtues, hopes, aspirations, and public 
goods under the expression having values.  He then proceeds to show how slovenly 
Green’s own treatment of the topic has been, although he clearly misunderstood all of 
the principal points of Green’s paper.  Taken all in all, the response is an obnoxious 
combination of clueless and condescending.15  
It was not the harshest response to a work of Green’s.  In 1981, after publication 
of Predicting, another philosopher of education and close colleague, Jim McClellan, 
wrote a draft review of the book which contained a good deal of personal insult.  To his 
credit, Green responded both to McClellan and to the editor of Education Theory, Hugh 
Petrie, with characteristic grace.  First, to Petrie, he complains that the review is off the 
mark, even in its more serious moments, but in addition to the serious aims the review is 
full of jabs: 
But what, I am afraid, offends me is the fact that he includes personal matters 
that would be appropriate for a letter, but not a letter written for print.   
 
I allude not only to the fact that “nonsense” is as good a word as “horseshit”, 
and better in print, but the fact that he also alludes to such things as “silly grins” 
and caveats and so-called personal aspirations of mine, as in the last 
paragraph…in these matters Jim crosses the border into matters that he does not 
understand…16 
 
Green’s response to McClellan is even more measured, and could serve as a model of 
response in similar situations: 
                                                
15 Victor L. Worsford, “Green’s Objectivity: A Stance for Today?”  Philosophy of Education: 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 49 (1994), 76-78. 
16 Letter to Hugh Petrie dated February 17, 1981. 
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A quick note – not well thought out – but pondered for a very long time.  
Whether the quality of your letter as review is good or bad, does not bother me 
much, as I have said in my note to Hugh Petrie. 
 
But I am bothered terribly by the personal allusions you make, most of which 
insofar as I understand myself (none of us does completely) are just plain wrong, 
and I think offensive…if I ever had any aspirations to be an educational 
statesman, then that passed long ago… 
 
But the point is this.  I write to you as a friend whom I dearly love.  I admit that 
I do not fully understand the perspectives that you adopt, but I always learn from 
you.  Your honesty is glaringly present, but it comes on also as foolish 
imprudence and a lack of respect for others – at least that is the way others are 
likely to view it.  Although as I say, I do not understand your thought, I think I 
come closer, than you come to understanding the nature of my deepest 
motivations.  Again, I say, I do not think that any of us can see ourselves just as 
others see us.  But we have got to consider that fact whenever it surfaces and 
surprises us.17 
 
He closes by admitting that he may simply be trying to protect himself, but he does not 
think that a serious possibility, and signs the letter “With durable affection and love.”  
There is another letter, dated three weeks later, in which Green indicates a mending of 
fences between McClellan and him.18   
 To discover Green’s affection for the scholarly community, one need not turn to 
how he handled moments of conflict.  There is an abundance of quieter moments, times 
when his endorsements of colleagues or referrals of graduate students for positions, 
brief letters of encouragement and condolence, went beyond the usual bounds of 
professional courtesy.  An excellent example of Green’s care for his colleagues, both at 
Syracuse and elsewhere in academe, can be found in a letter of response to a Dean of a 
prominent school of education who elicited Green’s opinion about the promotion of a 
member of the college’s faculty.  Green begins by remarking that the request greatly 
bothers him.  He then goes on to explain in detail why: 
                                                
17 Letter to Jim McClellan dated February 17, 1981. 
18 Letter to Hugh Petrie dated March 9, 1981. 
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Neither do I know whether this request comes originally from him, from the 
committee itself or from you personally—whether it is extended to me in 
particular in order to routinely satisfy a requisite of law and custom or whether it 
is an earnest request for my views. 
 
But aside from these difficulties, the point is that if E--- were to personally 
invite my comments on his work in progress, then I could address my response 
to him as a contribution to his work.  That would constitute the most decent 
exchange in the best tradition of the academic community.  He would then be 
free to share that “communal” exchange with anyone.  If he decided to share it 
with the committee, then the committee would get the independent judgment it 
seeks.  But, as far as I know, E--- has never asked for my consultation, advice, 
or assistance in his work.19 
 
He goes on to mention the reasons why E--- would not have sought his input, as he 
worked outside Green’s areas of expertise.  He then offers three pages of advice to the 
Dean on how best to proceed with an evaluation, given his own reading of the faculty 
member’s CV.  He urges the committee to consider more heavily the candidate’s 
potential to contribute a scholarly project to the academic community, deemphasizing 
the importance of his previously published papers.  He mentions again the examples of 
David Riesman and himself as faculty who would never have received tenure had their 
committees focused primarily on their publications: 
I know, with absolute assurance, that had I been subject to the kinds of standards 
that I suspect the committee will entertain in the case of E---, then I would have 
spent the last twenty seven years in the personnel office of White Rogers—a 
company long engaged in the manufacture of heavy industrial equipment and 
last week reported in the New York Times to be filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
That is one measure of the irony I detect in your request. 
 
He ended his letter by assuring the Dean that he would send along a copy of it to E---, 
while formally declining his request to offer commentary to the committee.  As he says 
in his letter, he wanted nothing to do with that particular institutional process.   
                                                
19 Letter to C. Wayne Gordon dated July 21, 1982. 
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 Green’s faculty archive is full of similar letters, resisting the bureaucratization of 
higher education, sometimes forcefully, many times on behalf of other scholars.  And 
yet, this was a side of Green that many of his colleagues never saw up close.  An earthy, 
Depression-era Presbyterian, he greatly disliked the image of philosopher as guru or 
revolutionary, but he had also counted himself a friend of and to some extent simpatico 
with such revolutionary philosophers as Paolo Freire and Maxine Greene.  Green was 
not out of sympathy with the twentieth century. 
  
Final Years 
 In lieu of the time-honored festschrift, Green has been the subject of several 
insightful obituaries, memorials to a man who never quite enjoyed the notoriety of his 
mentors (nor of some of his former classmates), but who touched the lives of those who 
knew him and those who read his work.  In these, one discovers a man who was 
sometimes “blunt but not cordial,”20 was at other times deeply, personally concerned 
about the welfare if his students, was quick to lend beloved books, of which there were 
many, but was not a “book lover” in the vulgar sense—he held high standards as a 
reader.  A childhood spent in Depression-era Nebraska formed in him a love of 
gardening and a passion for yard work, and the chatty sociability of his Midwestern 
childhood home made him a willing communicator: 
His discussions of college and graduate school moved from his growing sweet 
corn to make money at a roadside stand to working with legendary figures like 
Max Black and Wittgenstein when he was at Cornell to Rosemary and his 
family. Tom loved Rosemary deeply and spoke frequently and fondly of his 
children. Tom could be a difficult human being to have as a husband or father, 
                                                
20 Tom Mauhs-Pugh, “Memories of Tom Green.”  Education Policy Blog website:  
http://educationpolicyblog.blogspot.com/2006/12/tom-green-in-memoriam.html  Last retrieved: 
03/27/2015.   
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and, at some level, he knew that. We didn't dwell with introspection or analysis 
on his family or youth, it wasn't that kind of relationship, nor do I think Tom 
was that kind of a person. He told stories, and those stories, often brief, touched 
on centers of wonder in his life: the green of plant life, his wife and family, and 
his life-long love affair with words, moral philosophy, and the relationship 
between education and a moral life.21 
 
 By at least two separate accounts, Green had fallen out with contemporary 
literature.  He felt that the authors of the middle to late twentieth century had failed to 
grapple in a serious or insightful way with moral questions, but he was also open to 
being challenged.  When one acquaintance said something about reading novels that he 
thought profound, he thanked her for reconciling him to literature “with tears in his 
eyes.”22  This love for people, an open-hearted gratitude, was a staple of his life.  A 
former student and friend shared an illustrative and colorful anecdote of this 
characteristic of Green: 
Tom had convinced me to submit something I'd written to a conference at 
Widener University.  The paper was accepted. Tom was also delivering a paper 
and he told me we could drive from Syracuse together. I had an infant daughter 
at the time and hadn't been getting much sleep. The day before we left I got the 
flue and spent twenty-four hours getting closely acquainted with the porcelain 
fixtures in our apartment.  So, I hadn't slept more than a few hours in the past 
several days, hadn't eaten in the past twenty-four, and was dehydrated when 
Tom honked his horn early on the appointed morning.  It was one of the scariest 
rides of my life.  Tom carried on, mostly solo, a multi-hour disquisition on 
something or other while I kept warning him to return to our lane, watch out for 
this or that obstacle, brake, and the like. I didn't dare fall asleep. Tom seemed 
contentedly oblivious or fearless. Then, at Widener, when I got up to give my 
presentation, Tom left the room.  Afterwards, I asked him what had happened. 
He said watching me present made him too nervous, he couldn't bear it. A 
colleague confirmed that he had spent the session in the hallway listening at the 
door. I drove on the way home.23 
 
 Green spoke often and tenderly of his boyhood in Nebraska, especially in the 
last years of his life at Nottingham Senior Living Center.  Perhaps most tellingly, the 
                                                
21 Maughs-Pugh, “Memories.” 
22 Eileen E. Schell, “Memories.” 
23 Maughs-Pugh, “Memories.” 
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philosopher who wrote so eloquently of the sense of wonder at the heart of education 
impressed others even in his last years by the simple, visceral joy he could take in 
hearing another’s life stories.24  He also loved to share his favorite memories of the 
intellectual circle of his parents, which included his mother’s girlhood friend Willa 
Cather, and he spoke lovingly of his mother’s biographical works about prairie 
educators.  Once or twice he even spoke of the brother he lost to the Battle of the Bulge 
in the closing days of WWII.  Sometimes he talked about Max Black and Norman 
Malcolm, or he would tell of being surprised to discover a shabbily dressed 
Wittgenstein, who everyone mistook for a senile old janitor, on his first night in his 
graduate program at Cornell.  Always he continued with his work, leaving the 
unfinished Walls on his computer at Nottingham.  It was a faithful end for a man rooted 
with integrity in the conscience of memory, imagination, and craft, whose life was 








                                                
24 Eileen E. Schell, “Memories.” 
25 The phrase, “a nearly endless tangle of problems,” is a description of Green’s own about his work, 




Published Books, Monographs, and Chapters of Thomas Franklin Green 
Green, Thomas F. “Authority and the Office of the Teacher,” “Education and the 
Theory of Man,” and “The Nature of Wonder,” in Marjorie Reeves (Ed.), Essays 
in Education and Theology.  Geneva: World Student Christian Federation 
(1965). 
------. Education and Pluralism: Ideal and Reality.  Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press (1966). 
------. Work, Leisure, and the American Schools. New York: Random House (1968). 
------. “Citizenship or Certification,” in Murray L. Wax, Stanley Diamond, 
and Fred O. Gearing (Eds.), Anthropological Perspectives on Education.  New 
York: Basic Books (1971). 
 
------. Educational Planning in Perspective: Forecasting and Policymaking.  Surrey, 
England: IPC Business Press Limited (1971). 
------. “Man’s Work and Leisure,” in Sylvan J. Kaplan and Evelyn Kivy- 
 Rosenberg (Eds.), Ecology and the Quality of Life.  New York: Charles C. 
Thomas (1973). 
 
------. “The Public’s Changing Interest in Education,” in Stuart A. Sandow  
 and Wesley Akper (Eds.), The Politics of Education: Challenge to State Board  
 Leadership.  Bloomington, IN: PDK Press (1975). 
 
------. “Stories and Images of the Future,” in Robert Bundy (Ed.), Images of 
the Future: The Twenty-First Century and Beyond.  Buffalo, NY: Prometheus  
Books (1976). 
 
------. “Education and Work: Which Agency?  What Responsibilities?” in  
 Thomas F. Powers (Ed.), Educating for Careers: Policy Issues in a Time of  
 Change.  University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press (1977). 
 
------. “Career Education and the Pathologies of Work,” in Kenneth A. 
Strike and Kieran Egan (Eds.), Ethics and Educational Policy.  International  
Library of the Philosophy of Education.  London: Routledge and Kegan Paul  
(1978). 
 
------. “Learning Without Metaphor,” in Andrew Ortney (Ed.), Metaphor  
and Thought.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1979). 
 
 110 
------. Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System.  Troy, NY: Educator’s 
International Press, Inc. (1980). 
------. “Acquisition of Purpose,” in Arthur Chickering (Ed.), The Modern American 
College.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. (1981). 
------. “Excellence, Equity, and Equality,” in Lee Schulman and Gary Sykes (Eds.), 
Handbook of Teaching and Policy. New York: Longman, Inc. (1983), Chapter 
13, 318-341  
------. “Liberalism and Liberal Learning—Within Limits,” in Seymour Fox  
 (Ed.), Philosophy for Education.  Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem  
 Foundation (1983).  
 
------. Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience.  Notre Dame: The University 
of Notre Dame Press (1999). 
------. Walls (unpublished, unfinished manuscript). 
 
Published Articles, Addresses, Reports and Reviews of Thomas Franklin Green 
Green, Thomas F. “A Humanities Teacher Looks at Engineering Education.”  Journal 
of Engineering Education, Vol. 48, March (1958), 573-576. 
 
------. “The Importance of Fairy Tales.”  The Educational Forum, 
November (1963), 95-102. 
 
------. “Religious Education, by J. Donald Butler.” Studies in Philosophy 
and Education, 3, (1963), 64-69.  
 
------. “A Topology of the Teaching Concept.” Studies in Philosophy and 
Education, Vol. 11, No. 4, (1964), 284-319. 
 
------. “Teaching, Acting, and Behaving.”  Harvard Educational Review, 
Vol. 34, No. 4, (1964), 507-524. 
 
------. “More on the Topology of Teaching: A reply to critics.”  Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1965). 
 
------. “The Person and Education, by Harold O. Soderquist.” Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, 4, (1965), 14-21. 
 
------. “Teaching, Acting, and Behaving,” A discussion.  Harvard 
Educational Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1965). 
 
 111 
------. “The Concept of Teaching: A Reply.” Studies in Philosophy and 
Education, 4 (1966), 339-345. 
 
------. “Response to the Presidential Address.”  Education Theory, Vol. 17 
(1967), 289-294. 
 
------. “The Educational Policy Research Center at Syracuse: Problems and  
 Prospects.”  Journal of Research Development in Education, Vol. 2, No. 4,  
 Summer (1969), 49-66. 
 
------. “Post-Secondary Education: 1970-1990.”  Dilemmas in American 
Policy: Crucial Issues of Contemporary Society.  Syracuse University 
Publications in Continuing Education, No. 62 (1969). 
 
------. “Report of Activities and Accomplishments: March 1, 1968 to  
 February 28, 1969. Final Report.”  Syracuse: Educational Policy Research  
 Center (1969). 
 
------. “Schools and Communities: A Look Forward.”  Harvard 
Educational Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1969), 221-252. 
 
------. “Some Aspects of Socialization Through Formal Schooling Relating  
 Primarily to Civic and Moral Education.  Final Report.”  Syracuse: Syracuse  
 University School of Education, March (1969). 
 
------. “The Concept of Relevance: Some Useful Distinctions.”  Delivered 
at a symposium on education at the 1970 meetings of the American  
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. 
 
------. “Education and Schooling in Post-Industrial America: Some  
 Directions for Policy.”  Eleventh Meeting, panel on Science and Technology,  
 Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety- 
 First Congress, Second Session, January 28, 1970. 
 
------. “Letter to the Editor.”  The American Statistician, Vol. 24, No. 3,  
 June (1970), 20-29. 
 
------. “Breaking the System: The Redistribution of Educational and Non- 
 educational Goods.”  Notes on the Future of Education.  The Education Policy 
Research Center at Syracuse, Fall (1971). 
 






------. “Equal Educational Opportunity: The Durable Injustice.”  Philosophy 
of Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of  
Education Society, 27, (1971), 121-143. 
 
------. “Challenge to Meritocracy.”  Liberal Education.  The Liberal Arts: 
Death or Transfiguration.  Papers from the 58th Annual Meeting of the  
Association of American Colleges, May (1972). 
 
------. “Time as an Educational Variable.”  Notes on the Future of  
 Education, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter (1972), 2-6. 
 
------. “The Undergraduate College and the World of Work.”  New 
Directions for Higher Education, No. 9, Spring (1975). 
 
------. “Funding for Curriculum Development: An Analysis of Some Policy 
Problems.”  Washington, DC: National Institute of Education (1976).  A report. 
 
------. “Images of Education in Kyklios Paideia.”  Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Education, Vol. 3 (1976), 109-149. 
 
------. “The Logic of Youth.”  Review of Education, May/June (1976). 
 
------. “Teacher Competence as Practical Rationality.”  Educational Theory, 
Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer (1976). 
 
------. “Ironies and Paradoxes.”  Current Issues in Higher Education, Vol.  
 32 (1977), 36-45. 
 
------. “Lifelong Learning and the Educational System: Expansion or 
Reform?”  Washington DC: The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,  
December (1977).  A report. 
 
------. “Minimal Educational Standards: A Systematic Perspective.”   
 Denver: Education Commission of the States (1977).  A report.  
 
------. “Learning and Liberalism.”  The Center Magazine, Vol. XI, No. 2,  
March/April (1978). 
 
------. “The Systemic Dynamics of Two Principles: ‘Best’ and ‘Equal’.” 
Proceedings, The Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, Philosophy of Education  
Society (1978). 
 
------. “Competency-Based Education Viewed from ‘The System’.”  




------. “Response to Burbules and Sherman.”  Philosophy of Education:  
 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 35  
 (1979), 115-120. 
 
------. “The Logic of Political Arguments for Equal Educational  
 Opportunity,” in Laurence Martel (Ed.), Itinerary of the Concept “Equal  
 Educational Opportunity.”  Washington D.C.: N.I.E. (1980). 
 
------. “Philosophy and Policy Studies: Personal Reflections.”  Teachers  
 College Record, Winter (1980), 211-224. 
 
------. “Policy and Politics.”  Change, Vol. 12, No. 3, April (1980), 5. 
 
------. “Reply to James E. McClellan’s Predicting the Behavior of the  
 Educational System.”  Educational Theory, 30 (1980), 367-372. 
 
Green, Thomas F. and D. Bob Gowin, “Two Philosophers View Evaluation.”   
 Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 2, March/April (1980),  
 67-70. 
 
Green, Thomas F. “Weighing the Justice of Inequality.”  Change, Vol. 12, No. 5,  
 July/August (1980), 26-32. 
 
------. “On Transcendental Arguments.” Philosophy of Education: 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 37  
(1981), 334-339. 
 
------. “Policy and Evaluation: A Conceptual Study.”  #52 Paper and  
 Report Series, Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, Research on  
 Evaluation Program (1981), 162-187. 
 
Thomas F. Green and Maxine Greene, “1982 Annual Meeting Program.”  Educational  
 Researcher, Vol. 11, No. 2, February (1982), 19-20. 
 
Green, Thomas F. “Evaluating Liberal Learning: Doubts and Explorations.”  Liberal  
 Education, Vol. 68, Summer (1982), 127-138. 
 
------. “Social Studies and the American Dream: Responsive Notes.”   
 Curriculum Inquiry, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn (1984), 327-336. 
 
------. “The Formation of Conscience in an Age of Technology.”  American 
Journal of Education, Vol. 94, No. 1, November (1985), 1-32. 
 
------. “On Seeing the Point and Knowing the Risks: Ethics in the Academic 
Community.”  Journal of Thought, 22 (1987), 12-15. 
 
 114 
------. “The Economy of Virtue and the Primacy of Prudence.”  American  
 Journal of Education, Vol. 96, No. 2, February (1988), 127-42. 
 
------. “On Moral Learning.” Philosophy of Education: Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 44 (1988), 109-123. 
 
------. “A Tale of Two Controversies: Comment.”  Zygon: Journal of  
 Religion and Science, 23 (1988), 341-346. 
 
------. “Excellence, Equity, and Equality Clarified.”  Philosophy of  
 Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education  
 Society (1990), 220-224. 
 
------. “Theme and Commentary.”  Philosophy of Education: Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (1990), 111-117. 
 
------. “The Value of Values.”  Career Development Quarterly, Vol. 38,  
 No. 3, March (1990), 208-12. 
 
------. “Values: Linguistic Conjecture, Constructive Venture.”  Philosophy 
of Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of  
Education Society, 49 (1994), 68-75. 
 
------. “Public Speech.”  Teachers College Record, Vol. 95, No. 3, Spring  
 (1994), 369-88. 
 
------. “The Learning of Liberty: The Educational Ideas of the American 
Founders by L. Smith-Pangle.”  The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) /  
Revue de la Pensée Éducative, Vol. 29, No. 1, April (1995), 101-103. 
 
------. “Spiritual Values and Public Languages.”  Philosophy of Education: 






Archer, Margaret. “On Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System.”  British 
Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1981), 211-219. 
 
Bernstein, Adam. “Samuel Halperin, Educational Leader, Dies at 83,” The Washington  
 Post, May 9, 2014.  Website:  
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/samuel-halperin-dies-at-83- 
 education-policy-leader/2014/05/09/1369ac30-d794-11e3-95d3- 
 3bcd77cd4e11_story.html.  Last retrieved on 3/21/2015. 
 
 115 
Bouwsma, O.K. “Jack and Jill on a Log.”  Prairie Schooner, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 
1944), pp. 112-120. 
 
Cox, Harvey. The Secular City: New Revised Edition.  New York: The Macmillan  
 Company (1965). 
 
Cunningham, Craig A. “Tom Green, In Memoriam.” Education Policy Blog:  
 http://educationpolicyblog.blogspot.com/2006/12/tom-green-in-memoriam.html.  
 Last retrieved 2/28/2015. 
 
Cyphert, Frederick R. and Walter L. Gant. “The Delphi Technique: A Tool for  
 Collecting Opinions in Teacher Education.”  U.S. Department of Health,  
 Education, and Welfare (1969). 
 
Dewey, John. Democracy and Education.  New York: Free Press, Reprint Edition 
(1997). 
 
Dunne, Joseph. “Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience.”  The  
 Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 204, July (2001), 414-417. 
 
Durkheim, Emile. Moral Education.  Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc. (1961). 
 
------. Pragmatism and Sociology.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 (1983). 
 
Ericksen, Neil. “A Tale of Two Cities: Flood History and the Prophetic Past of Rapid 
City, South Dakota.”  Economic Geography, Vol. 51, No. 4, October (1975). 
 
Giarelli, James. “Education, Excellence, and the Formation of a Public: A Response to  
 Green.”  American Journal of Education, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Nov., 1985), pp. 33- 
38. 
 
Hustwit, Ronald E. and J.L. Craft (eds.) O.K. Bouwsma’s Commonplace Book: Remarks 
on Philosophy and Education.  Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press (2001). 
 
MacIntyre, Alastair. After Virtue.  Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press  
 (1981). 
 
------. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry.  Notre Dame: The  
 University of Notre Dame Press (1991). 
 
Mauhs-Pugh, Tom. “Memories of Tom Green.”  Education Policy Blog website:   
 http://educationpolicyblog.blogspot.com/2006/12/tom-green-in-memoriam.html   




McClellan, James E. “Review of Thomas F. Green, prepared with the assistance of  
 David P. Ericson and Robert H. Seidman, Predicting the Behavior of the  
 Educational System (Syracuse: the University Press, 1980) 320 pp.”   
 Educational Theory, Vol. 30, Issue 4 (Feb. 1980), 353-366. 
 
McGuinn, Patrick and Frederick Hess. “Freedom from Ignorance? The Great Society 
and the Evolution of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.”   




Morley, Christopher. Parnassus on Wheels.  New York: Doubleday, Page & Company  
 (1917). 
 
Oliker, Michael A. “Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System by Thomas 
F. Green, D.P. Ericson, R.H. Seidman.”  Journal of Thought, Vol. 18, No. 1,  
Spring (1983), 118-124. 
 
Pierce, Charles S. “The Fixation of Belief.”  Popular Science Monthly, 12, November  
 (1877), 1-15. 
 
Pietig, Jeanne. “Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System by Thomas 
F. Green, David P. Ericson, and Robert H. Seidman.”  Educational Evaluation  
and Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 6, November/December (1981), 83-84. 
 
Pinch, Trevor and Richard Swedberg. “Wittgenstein’s Trip to Ithaca in 1949: on the 
importance of details,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory  
(2012). 
 
Pincoffs, Edmund L. (chairman), Edwin B. Allaire and Aloysius Martinich. “In 




Smith, C.M. “Work, Leisure, and the American Schools by Thomas F. Green.”  Journal  
of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 4, No. 1, Special Issue: The Future and Aesthetic 
Education, January (1970), 144-148. 
 
Stuart, Chipman G. “Work, Leisure, and the American Schools by Thomas F. Green.”   
 Journal of Thought, Vol. 4, No. 4, November (1969), 328-329. 
 
Taylor, Charles. The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1992). 
 




Weber, William H., III. “Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System by Thomas 
F. Green.”  The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 52, No. 4, July/August  
(1981), 437-439. 
 
Worsford, Victor L. “Green’s Objectivity: A Stance for Today?”  Philosophy of  
 Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education 

















Appendix: Notes on Methods and Materials 
Structurally, this work falls into the category of intellectual biography, a 
subgenre of intellectual history.  Just as intellectual history treats of the ways an idea 
changes over time, intellectual biography takes a particular subject as, in some sense, a 
privileged locus of those changes.  Thomas Green championed the centrality of 
prudence in our thinking on moral education, and both his academic life and his work 
reveal in a unique way the social forces that ultimately occluded the role of prudence in 
moral formation.  Indeed, he was in many ways the perfect person to play the part of 
prophet of prudence for the last half of the twentieth century.  It is the purpose of the 
present work to show why this is so.  First, it would be prudent to explain how I intend 
to compose this biography, explaining my own theoretical assumptions and 
methodology. 
 In his Aspects of Biography, Andre Maurois compares the work of a biographer 
to that of a portrait or landscape painter, who “must pick out the essential qualities in 
the whole subject which he is contemplating.”1  Undoubtedly, the first and most 
fundamental art of the biographer is this selectivity, without which biography devolves 
into an artless accumulation, a great drift of details.  The basis for selecting “essential 
qualities” varies to some extent from one biographer to another according to concern for 
historical truth, depth of historical analysis, and level of identification between 
biographer and subject.  The key is to “make the choice without weakening the whole.”2  
                                                
1 Andre Maurois, Aspects of Biography  (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1929), 50. 
2 Maurois, Aspects, 50. 
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This amounts to saying that biography is as much a science as an art.  Its twin objects 
are knowledge and pleasure, or, to put it another way, instruction and entertainment.3 
 Maurois proposes a two-pronged approach for “maintaining a scrupulous respect 
for scientific truth” while embracing the art of the novelist.4  First, the biographer 
should present the selected details in chronological order.  This makes intuitive sense in 
an age of three-act sitcoms and reality TV shows, but it represents a departure from the 
longstanding “facts first, character afterwards” approach to biography that held from 
Plutarch through much of the Victorian period.5  This concern for chronological order is 
not rooted in a simple desire to break from the pattern of past biographies but is 
grounded rather in an important aesthetic consideration.  A life unfolds in anticipation 
of a future and in reaction to the unforeseen.  It follows patterns, is disrupted, and 
comes together in new arrangements, all in an attitude of expectation or surprise or 
disappointment.  In biography, this chronological dialectic of mystery and anticipation 
constitutes the “romantic interest” of the reader—an interest that should be respected by 
the biographer. 
 Nevertheless, chronological order presents, if not exactly a problem, then 
perhaps a slight embarrassment for the biographer.  She knows how her subject’s life 
will turn out, knows the defining failures and successes, knows the changes of character 
that mark her subject’s spiritual evolution, and yet she must, if she is to respect the 
interest of her reader, pretend to ignorance at the outset.  To anticipate every discovery 
would deprive the subject of the tentativeness, the ambiguity, and the indecisiveness 
                                                
3 Arnold Rampersad, “Design and Truth in Biography” in South Central Review  Vol. 9, No. 2. (Summer, 
1992): 2. 
4 Maurois, Aspects, 56. 
5 Maurois, Aspects, 57. 
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that characterize a human life, and the resulting biographical portrait would be 
manifestly false. 
 In order to present not only a truthful but also an aesthetically pleasing work, a 
work that is both scientific and artful, the biographer must “relieve his reader of the 
burden of useless material.”6  This is Maurois’s second prong.  In intellectual 
biography, where the endgame is a greater understanding of ideas, the biographer 
assumes the burden of narrating a life and exploring an intellectual landscape in equal 
measure.  Therefore, unlike biography more generally construed, intellectual biography 
demands a series of regressions.  Certain points in the subject’s life present narrative 
pivots into the history of an idea, and those pivots must be made as the opportunity 
presents itself or be lost as the narrative proceeds along the axis of the subject’s life.  In 
this regard, the present work diverges from Maurois but only in a qualified way.  It 
presents Maurois’ vision of biography in three dimensions, concerned as ever with 
aesthetics and accuracy while taking modest albeit necessary liberties with the primary 
narrative’s chronology. 
 It is important to emphasize that the method of following narrative pivots is not 
to be mistaken for a somewhat different, popular approach to intellectual biography that 
“traces aspects of the performance of the intellect of an individual over an extended 
period of time.”7  Though that is indeed the common view of intellectual biography, I 
propose something a bit more radical with respect to the subject of an intellectual 
biography.  On the one hand, that his or her identity is so forcefully shaped by specific 
currents of thought that the life-force of the subject will be uncovered where it intersects 
                                                
6 Maurois, Aspects, 62. 
7 Rampersad, “Design and Truth,” 2. 
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with the history of an idea more so than in the particularities of the emotional life; and 
on the other hand, that the historic contingencies of the individual’s life are uniquely 
suited to reveal the history of the idea(s) that shaped him or her.  On this view, 
intellectual biography is intellectual from two directions: (a) because of the primacy of 
an idea or a set of related ideas to the production of the subject qua biographical 
subject; and (b) because of the centrality of the subject’s intellectual work to the history 
of the idea.  The biographical subject in intellectual biography is therefore a privileged 
point of contact between an historic individual and the history of an idea. 
 This way of conceiving the biographical subject as distinct from the historic 
individual has repercussions for the notion of biographical truth.  The purpose of 
intellectual biography is to truthfully depict the life of an idea, especially as it is 
instantiated in the biographical subject.  Therefore, only those facts of the subject’s life 
that reveal the idea are brought within the compass of the present study.  In the case of 
Thomas Green, it is difficult to imagine more pressing biographical facts than his close, 
lifelong identification with Protestantism and his experience, first as a student and then 
as an educator, of an educational landscape quickly changing to facilitate the demands 
of America’s Cold War period.   
 The primary sources for my biographical dissertation include all five books 
written by Thomas F. Green, as well as his most important scholarly articles.  These are 
Work, Leisure, and the American Schools (1968), The Activities of Teaching (1971), 
Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (1980), Voices: the Educational 
Formation of Conscience (1999) and its companion volume, the unfinished and 
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unpublished Walls.  I will also draw on his archived papers, including personal and 
professional correspondences and papers in the works. 
 Green began writing Work, Leisure, and the American Schools nearly fifteen 
years after graduating with his Ph.D. in philosophy from Cornell University.  It is in 
some ways a surprising first book for Green, and perhaps it is appropriate here to say 
something about his dissertation before proceeding.  His philosophical education was 
conducted under the auspices of three of America’s most important analytic 
philosophers, O.K. Bouwsma at Nebraska and Norman Malcolm and Max Black at 
Cornell.  Bouwsma made his mark on American analytic philosophy by being the first 
major name in the field, by writing in an often eccentric style, and by being the first 
American philosopher to understand the importance of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book, 
communicating its meaning in a famous article conveniently titled, “The Blue Book.”  
Norman Malcolm who, like Green, had been a student of Bouwsma, made his name in 
philosophy by bringing Wittgenstein to the United States and writing his definitive 
biography.  This group of Wittgensteinian philosophers was actively engaged in 
common language analysis, believing that philosophy could be made relevant to real 
life through the logical analysis of the concepts that underwrote our ways of thinking, 
believing, and acting in the world.  It was a “practical philosophy” that was nevertheless 
an alternative to pragmatism, which often lacked analytic rigor.  One drawback of 
analytic philosophy, despite Wittgenstein’s desire to bring philosophy down to earth, 
was a penchant among analytic philosophers to get lost in endless debates over the 
meanings of terms.  Green’s own dissertation had been a critique of some ambiguous 
phrasing in the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid.  Norman Malcolm had been 
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long at work criticizing the defense of common sense philosophy made by G.E. Moore, 
and so it is safe to assume that Green’s dissertation had been an apprentice piece.  The 
dissertation is entirely unremarkable and stands in stark contrast to the liveliness of 
mind characteristic of Green’s professional scholarship.  The tone of the work is flat 
and seems to indicate a lack of interest in the subject.  In any event, he never again 
returned to the problem explored by his dissertation.    
 From another perspective, a book about the philosophical problems of education 
makes perfect sense.  Green’s mother, Norma Kidd Green, had been an historian of 
education and it is to her that he dedicated Work, Leisure, and the American Schools 
(1968) with the inscription, “To my mother/Norma Kidd Green/who knows better than 
most/what this book means.”  The book is, as he puts it in the preface, a personal work.  
It is also the product of more than a decade of thought about “what it means to think 
philosophically about education.”8  In it, he argues that the most fundamental problems 
of education are ideological, rather than psychometric or managerial, and therefore the 
philosophy of education is the philosophical study of ideology.  One such fundamental 
problem is what we mean when we talk about work and leisure within the context of 
education.  This question was of particular interest in the 1960s when the futurists were 
predicting a coming social change in which the majority of labor would be automated 
and America would be a leisure society.  Green treats such speculation as grounds for a 
thought experiment: in a society which, through automation of labor, has abolished jobs 
for the vast majority of its population, what would “leisure” and “work” mean and how 
would we prepare the young for such a society? 
                                                
8 Thomas Green, Work, Leisure, vii. 
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 Green’s next book, The Activities of Teaching (1971), is not a survey on the 
philosophy of education as a scholarly field so much as it is a handbook on how to think 
philosophically about key problems in education.  Green’s method is simple: to 
illustrate in a step-by-step manner how he goes about the business of analyzing 
concepts.  From a biographical standpoint, his book is interesting because it contains 
some of the most explicit statements by Green of his Wittgensteinian approach to 
philosophy.  In the preface, Green says that “[p]hilosophy is an activity and not a 
subject, something to do rather than something to study.”9  When explaining why he did 
not write a textbook on the philosophy of education, he says, “A textbook is a peculiar 
form of discourse…it need not have unity and coherence, though it should have 
organization…should be coldly objective and never personal, supremely confident and 
never admittedly inadequate or puzzling…in short, a textbook, by its very conception, is 
everything philosophy is not.”10 
 Green’s epistemological humility about what can and cannot be accomplished 
through the philosophical analysis of concepts does much to explain the fact that his 
book is aimed merely at teaching students how to formulate their questions with more 
precision and how to answer them with a more complete grasp of their tentativeness.  
This way of conceiving the work of philosophy of education is not about knowledge 
acquisition, true beliefs, or justification of beliefs.  It is rather about clarifying questions 
and selecting the most heuristically and pedagogically worthy questions.  The outcome 
of such aims is neither to produce a doctrine nor a complete system of thought, nor is it 
to produce ideas in some final form.   
                                                
9 Thomas Green, The Activities of Teaching  (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), ix. 
10 Green, Activities, ix. 
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The method Green employs is fairly straightforward.  First, connect a 
supposition about some concept to education, and then illustrate that connection through 
examples.  For instance, one might suppose, as Green does, that practical activities 
involve “an exercise of judgment based upon whatever knowledge is appropriate for 
that particular activity.”11  He then connects that supposition to education with the claim 
that teaching is a kind of practical activity.  Next, he illustrates the connection between 
the concepts of teaching and practical activities by categorizing all of the things a 
teacher does that might be called “practical activities,” including explaining, 
concluding, motivating, counseling, collecting money, and keeping reports, to name a 
few.  As a final move, he divides these activities according to their structure into logical 
acts, strategic acts, and institutional acts. From a biographical perspective, what is 
interesting about Green’s method is that he reveals affinities with various philosophical 
movements.  His notion of a concept as “a locus of inferences permitted by the various 
uses of a term” is drawn from analytic philosophy, whereas his claim that “the analysis 
of a concept is the description of its use” is a notion taken from Peirce’s pragmatism.  
This reveals a consistency between his ideas here and his desire to remain outside of 
ideological disputes between philosophical movements as expressed in the opening 
pages of Work, Leisure, and the American Schools as well as later in his career, in the 
opening pages of Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience. 
In the same year Green published The Activities of Teaching, he also published a 
monograph, Educational Planning in Perspective: Forecasting and Policy-Making 
(1971).  In both the Introduction and in his chapter contribution titled, “The Dismal 
Future of Equal Educational Opportunity,” Green writes about an emergent context for 
                                                
11 Green, Activities, 1. 
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understanding and undertaking educational planning.  This new context is one which 
calls into question “the very idea of schools and schooling” in both the undeveloped, 
developing, developed, and over-developed world.  Whereas the previously held belief 
in a causal connection between the growth of schools and economic growth had gone 
unchallenged in most of the OECD countries, educators and policymakers in Latin 
America and parts of the undeveloped world had raised valid objections to the social 
value of schools, claiming that they acted far too often as tools of oppression for the 
enfranchised groups.   
In his chapter contribution, Green takes up one goal that education policymakers 
could put forward in response to the increasing sensitivity to issues of injustice, the 
problem of equal educational opportunity.  He examines what it might mean in multiple 
contexts and assesses the prospects of achieving it in the schools.  He defines equal 
educational opportunity as a problem primarily concerned with injustice, “a problem in 
the distribution of educational goods and benefits.”12  One of the keys to addressing the 
problem is to determine what does and does not count as educationally relevant criteria 
for the distribution of benefits.  Race, class, and wealth are ruled out.  Ability and 
choice seem to be the most promising candidates for educationally relevant criteria, but 
upon reviewing an exhaustive number of cases in which both are rendered problematic, 
Green concludes that “[e]ducation is endemically unequal in the way it distributes its 
benefits.  Some distributions will be acceptably unequal and some will not.”13  It is this 
kind of honest analysis that caused problems for Green throughout his career, especially 
                                                
12 Thomas Green (Ed.), Educational Planning in Perspective: Forecasting and Policy-Making  (Surrey, 
England: Futures, 1971), 25. 
13 Green, Educational Planning, 39. 
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with philosophers and education theorists who felt he should take a principled (meaning 
ideological) stand on educational problems.   
His next book, Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (1980), grew 
out of his puzzlement with what fundamental elements comprise our education system.  
This inquiry began when Green ran up against a wall while thinking about policy-
making in his previous monograph.  If education is not clearly a system of distribution 
based upon a principle of justice, then what exactly was it and how did it produce such 
uniformity across the country in the “absence of any basic [national] policy requiring 
it?”14  Green’s answer is elegant and relatively simple and has the advantage of 
rendering a “formal” (as opposed to content-oriented) account of the educational system 
rationally intelligible.  It is composed of schools related through a system of exchanges, 
arranged by a principle of sequence.15  There are certain secondary characteristics 
occasioned by these primary features, such as a definite size, a means of social control, 
and a means of distributing its benefits.   
The primary criticisms of this book are (a) that it is too ethnocentric to actually 
reveal a logic of the educational system, (b) that it presents too rational a picture of 
educational change, and (c) that it is sociologically naïve.16  Yet, all three criticisms 
follow, I think, from a failure to understand the pragmatic tenor of Green’s analytic 
approach to philosophy.  He does not set out in search of ultimate definitions or even 
ultimate “Platonic” logical structures, but rather his method is to take some presently 
                                                
14 Thomas Green, Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System  (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1980), 3. 
15 Green, Predicting the Behavior, xvi. 
16 See Margaret Archer’s review in the British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1981) 
pp. 211-219.  Also see William H. Weber, III in the Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul-
Aug, 1981), pp. 437-439. 
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existing problem and unravel whatever is of philosophical significance about it.  
Therefore, the logic of the educational system refers to a structure as it is found in 
America; and the practical rationality of the system points to the real practice of 
education policymakers to offer reasons for putting forward, accepting, or rejecting 
policies.  To point out, as Archer does, that people are also motivated by irrational 
drives and desires, does not negate the fact that policy decisions are made based on 
reasons that are either accepted or rejected.  In other words, policy plays out in the arena 
of reasons.  He is not talking about ultimate, abstract realities, but rather of present 
realities and the way those realities operate. 
Green’s last published book, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience 
(1999), and its companion piece, the unpublished and unfinished Walls, are in a very 
real sense the intended follow-up to Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System.  
Whereas the latter book dealt with the logical structure of the educational system, the 
former books deal with the content of education.  Green’s opening shot in Voices is the 
claim that education in a democratic society simply is the matter of achieving self-
governance.  This, as with every claim he made in his long career, is deceptively 
complex.  It means that education in a democratic society for democratic citizenship is 
nothing other than moral education, and moral education means the formation of 
conscience.  Green defines conscience as the exercise of reflexive judgment on matters 
of importance, and Voices is about how the complex structure of conscience is formed.  
Conscience, Green tells us, speaks in the voices of craft, membership, sacrifice, 
memory, and imagination.  Voice is used throughout as a metaphor for the self-
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governance, or reflexive self-judgment, that occurs when one has internalized or 
“acquired” a norm.    
Not only do we learn to exercise self-governance, i.e. to heed the voices of 
conscience, in our sectarian normative communities, but moral education should 
actually aim for extending the practice of self-governance to the polity in the office of 
citizen.  One obvious conclusion of this construal of moral education is that morality is 
not held by Green to be a private affair.  It includes not only deeply sectarian self-
judgments about things like sin but also public prudential considerations such as feeling 
guilty when one has shown up to work late or even feeling that one has not performed a 
task excellently.  The claims Green makes in this book, though acknowledging the role 
of sect or normative community, could apply to anyone regardless of the content of his 
or her particular belief system.  He asks simply, however one construes the good, how 
does one get to be that?  His concern is the acquisition of norms, whatever they may be. 
Walls takes up the sectarian side of the problem.  The dominant fact of our 
society is pluralism, and the relationship between commons and sect has grown 
increasingly complex.  The problem he focuses on is not, however, the moral problem 
of pluralism but the educational problem.  He asks, “What must education be like in a 
world of rampant pluralisms?”17  He argues that education must be conducted in the “in 
the embrace of some unity,”18 and this fact renders both the sect and commons 
necessary to education.  Some unity is required within the commons to hold together the 
national community, but because of our commitment to a secular commons that unity 
will possess a certain shallowness.  The unity of the sect is necessary for the formation 
                                                
17 Thomas Green, Walls (unpublished manuscript), “Prolegomenon,” 2. 
18 Green, Walls, “Prolegomenon,” 2. 
 130 
of identity in the young.  They need something “to push against,” a set of guiding 
certainties, as Green says quoting Bruno Bettelheim.  That is the educational function of 
the sect. 
The very notion of commons creates the problem of public speech.  If we are to 
have a truly common space in a pluralistic culture, then we must learn to offer our 
reasons in acceptable terms.  For example, if a Christian supports universal health care 
because he or she has interpreted the sermon on the mount as commanding it, then that 
is fine, but he or she will have to be able to offer reasons for universal health care that 
an atheist or a Buddhist or a Muslim would find acceptable.  Otherwise, there will be no 
hope of rational persuasion and the commons will be an impotent space for action.  
Because Walls is unfinished, it is difficult or perhaps impossible to tell where Green 
would have taken the argument.  He was not one to define his terms at the outset and 
interpret his findings in light of them.  His work was intensely exploratory, pragmatic in 
the best sense of the word. 
 
